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Abstract
Government intervention in agricultural prices--particularly in
producer and consumer prices of rice, the staple food--persisted
throughout the period 1960-84 in the Republic of Korea. During that
period, the country largely completed its transformation from an
agrarian economy to an industrialized one. In 1960, agriculture's share
of gross national product (CNP) was 36.5 percent, and agriculture
accounted for 60 percent of the country's employment. By 1984,
agriculture's share of GNP was only 13.9 percent, and its share of
employment had fallen to 25.9 percent.
In the mid-1950s, Korea's centralized government concentrated
on rebuilding the country, heavily damaged by the 1950-52 conflict.
Later in the decade, and on into the 1960s, Korea turned its attention
to expansion of industry and trade, and was highly successful. On
average, national GNP increased more than 8 percent a year between 1960
and 1984, while the value of exports increased an average 30 percent a
year.
Initially, the great amount of attention paid to the industrial
and trade sectors had negative effects on the incentives for
agricultural production. In 1962, for instance, trade and exchange rate
policies (i.e., indirect intervention in agricultural prices) led to
negative effective rates of protection (ERPs) for rice (-29.2 percent),
barley (-27.7 percent), soybeans (-28.6 percent), and beef (-35.4
percent).
Early in the 1970s, however, various factors--including a high
rate of migration from the countryside to the cities, rising prices for
grain imports, and an increasing differential between urban and rural
iv
wages--caused the government to adopt a more favorable attitude toward
the farm sector. The ERPs for agriculture turned positive in the 1970s,
and continued to climb in the first half of the 1980s. During the
period 1980-84, total (direct plus indirect) effective intervention in
agricultural producer prices was a positive annual average oiE 74 percent
for rice, 91 percent for barley, 178 percent for soybeans, and 111
percent for beef. Only pork (at -5 percent) continued to show a
negative rate of total effective protection. The high positive rates
for the first four products were the outcome of two different trends: a
steady rise in direct positive protection for agriculture, and a gradual
decline in the negative effects of indirect intervention (particularly
when compared to the rates of such intervention in most other developing
countries).
Notwithstanding its increasingly favorable policies for
agricultural producers in the 1970s and 1980s, the government also
sought to keep consumer food prices stable, and there were many years
when consumer food prices were less than border (i.e., world) food
prices. During those years, the government subsidized both the prices
received by farmers and the prices paid by consumers.
Government intervention in agricultural prices had effects on
agricultural production, agricultural consumption, foreign exchange
earnings, the government's budget, and wages and income in both the
rural and urban sectors. Those effects are also presented in this
report.
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Chapter 1
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONO01Y AND AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The Republic of Korea (hereinafter Korea or South Korea) is
situated in the southern half of the Korean peninsula and has a total
land area of 99,118 square kilometers. It is surrounded by the Yellow
Sea on the west, the Strait of Korea on the southwest, and the Sea of
Japan on the east. The country is separated from the People's
Democratic Republic of Korea (hereinafter North Korea) by a military
demarcation line about 30 miles north of Seoul.
Korea is a hilly and mountainous country with only about 22
percent of the total area under cultivation and about 12 percent in
urban and industrial uses, highways, and other nonclassified uses.
About 66 percent of its land area is classified as suitable only for
forestry, grazing, or other extensive land uses.
Korea had a population density of 416 persons per square
kilometer in 1984. Its population growth rate declined from 2.9 percent
in 1960-61 to 1.9 percent in 1970-71 and to 1.5 percent in 1983-84.
This was one of the most rapid declines in birth rate ever recorded in
developing countries. A government program of family planning, combined
with changes in economic opportunities and attitudes toward family size,
helped to bring this about. Korea, however, still faces a serious
problem of population pressure on limited space.
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Its estimated 1986 population of more than 43 million lives in a country
of only 38,000 square miles.
Rapid urbanization has been one of the most conspicous
characteristics of the third quarter of the twentieth century in less
developed countries, and Korea is no exception. Although an accurate
figure of population transfer out of rural areas is hard to ascertain,
one estimate indicates that almost half a million rural people moved to
urban areas every year, or a total of more than 15 million, during the
1955-84 period. In Korea, urbanization (defined as the rate of growth
of the percentage of population in cities of over 50,000) has proceeded
at an annual rate of 4.1 percent. This high rate of urbanization has
been closely linked to the rate of economic growth, particularly of the
urban-oriented manufacturing and service sectors.
The rapid increase in non-farm employment has resulted in a
significant change in the structure of employment in Korea. Non-farm
employment, which accounted for less than half of total national
employment until the late 1960s, surpassed farm employment in the early
1970s. Moreover, the absolute level of farm employment began to show a
decline after 1976. The rapid increase in non-farm employment was
almost entirely absorbed by the manufacturing, government and service
sectors. The expansion of employment in non-farm sectors would not have
been possible without South Korea's increased investment in education.
Table 1 shows the average number of years of schooling in selected years
between 1960 and 1984. According to the table, the average education
level of the labor force increased gradually from about 4 to 12 years of
Table 1. Population, Labor force, Educational Level aiid Arable Land
Population
Year Total urDan> Rural U b  as Arable Land per Person
Total ConcentratiowbY % of Total Employed in Agriculture
(1000) (1000), (X) (1000) (%) (ha)
1955 21,502 5,281 81.3 16,245 24.6 0.30
1960 24,994 6,999 82.8 17,995 28.0 ".29
1965 28,705 12,893 58.3 15,812 44.9 0.49
1970 32,241 17,819 61.0 14,422 55.3 0.47
1975 35,181 22,037 62.5 13,244 62.5 0.41
1980 38,124 27,297 62.8 10,827 71.6 0.47
1984 40,578 31,563 60.8 9,015 77.8 0.55
Table 1. (Cont.)
Labor Force Educational Level-s
Year
Y Total Non-farm Farm Non-farm Farm AverageTotal Non-fam Fam as % of TotalNo-amarAvae
(1000) (1000) (1000) (X) (No. of Yrs) (No. of Yrs)
1960 8,521 1,746 6,775 20.5 6.3 3.0 4.2
1965 8,859 3,889 4,970 43.9' 7.6 3.8 5.4
1970 10,199 5,150 5,049 50.5 8.6 4.2 6.4
1975 12,340 6,997 5,343 56.7 9.0 4.9 6.9
1980 14,455 9,786 4,669 67.7 9.8 5.0 8.0
1984 14,984 11,103 3,881 74.1 12.7 8.2 11.5
Source: Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Qgri cLtl_tati s _ti__stjea k
h lod. EconomySurvy, various issues.
a/ Population in cities of over 50,000 persons.
b/1 Ratio of population of 10 largest cities to total urban population.
c/ In terms of the number of years of schooling.
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schooling during the period. The table also shows that the average
education level of the labor force in the non-farm sectors is
significantly higher than that in the farm sector. The gradual rise in
the average education level enabled Korea to meet the rapid increase in
non-farm employment without experiencing any shortage of skiLled workers
until the early 1980s.
Economic Performance
Since the early 1960s, the Korean economy has recorded
sustained high growth, only interrupted by a few years when production
temporarily declined. Real GNP in Korea grew at an average annual rate
of 8.4 percent during the 1962-84 period. Even during the 1974-75
period of worldwide recession, Korea managed to attain a relatively high
rate of growth of 7 to 8 percent.
Per capita GNP in 1975 constant prices increased from US$155 in
1962 to US$1,124 in 1984, more than a sevenfold increase. The rapid
growth of per capita GNP was, of course, largely attributable to the
rapid growth of output, but it was also facilitated by the gradual
decline in the population growth rate.
The sustained growth in GNP between 1962 and 1984 was largely
the result of an export-oriented industrialization strategy. Until the
early 1960s, exports were still only 2 percent of GNP. Thereafter, the
rate of export growth surpassed that of GNP growth. Merchandise exports
amounted to only US$55 million in 1962 but increased to US$1,624 million
in 1972, for an average annual growth rate of about 40 percent. Between
1972 and 1984 they increased at an average annual rate of about 30
- 5 -
percent. In contrast, imports of goods and non-factor services grew
much more slowly, showing an average annual growth rate of about 17
percent during the 1962-84 period (see Appendix 1). The nominal value
of merchandise exports in 1984 reached US $29.2 billion, or roughly 36
percent of GNP.
Economic growth and export expansion required a sustained
increase in domestic capital formation. Gross domestic investment was
less than 15 percent of GNP until the mid-1960s, but thereafter it
increased fairly steadily, rising to nearly 30 percent in the 1970s and
reaching a high of 31.5 percent in 1980.
To finance this increase in gross domestic investment, the
country had to import a significant amount of foreign capital. The
inflow of foreign savings has fluctuated from year to year, depending
upon the balance of payments situation and the domestic
saving/investment gap. The ratio of foreign saving to GNP increased
from an average 7.7 percent in 1954-56 to nearly 10 percent in 1961-63,
declined to 6.6 percent in 1971-73 but increased again to almost 7.6
percent in 1981-82, due mainly to the sharp increase in world oil prices
(see Appendix 2).
On the other hand, domestic savings increased fairly slowly,
from about 5 percent of GNP in the mid-1950s to over 7 percent in the
mid-1960s. Savings then increased rapidly to 17 percent in the early
1970s and over 20 percent in the early 1980s.
The rapid expansion of gross domestic investment from the mid-
1960s was largely made possible by the increase in domestic saving.
Table 2. GNP, Investment and Savings, and Imports and Exports,
for Selected Years
Year Real GNP Per Capita GNP Share in GNP of
'75 Const. Price In US$ Nominal Real.2/ Investment Savings Imports Exports
Billion Won Million US$ US$ '75 Const.$ Z % % %
1955 2,423 1,395 65 134 12.3 5.2 24.1 1.3
1960 2,846 1,948 79 144 10.9 0.8 17.2 1.6
1965 3,885 3,006 105 177 15.0 7.4 15.4 5.8
1970 6,363 7,986 248 341 26.8 17.3 24.8 10.5
1975 10,092 20,852 591 591 30.0 19.1 34.9 24.4
1980 14,359 61,203 1,605 1,130 31.5 21.9 36.4 28.6
1984 18,979 81,073 1,999 1,124 30.0 27.4 37.8 36.1
Source: The Bank of Korea, National Income Statistics, various issues.
a/ Nominal US dollars deflated by the US WPI (1975=100.0).
Prior to the first five-year economic plan (1962-66), only about 30
percent of gross domestic investment was financed by domestic savings.
That share rose to 34 percent in the early 1960s and to 75 percent by
the early 1970s. During 1975-78 the share rose as high as 92 percent
before declining to about 70 percent by the early 1980s.
Relative Importance of Agriculture
Until the early 1960s, Korea was a typical agrarian country,
with almost half of its GNP generated by agriculture and an overwhelming
portion of its population engaged in farming. But a vigorous
industrialization and export drive undertaken in the early 1960s rapidly
transformed the character of the economy. Between 1960 and 1984,
agriculture's share of GNP declined from 36.5 percent to 13.9 percent,
while its share of total employment declined from 60.2 percent to 25.9
percent. While total GNP expanded at an average annual rate of about 8
percent, the agricultural sector grew at an average of about 3.5 percent
during 1960-84 (see Appendix 3).
Of the total increase in GNP of 15,908 billion won between 1962
and 1984 (in constant 1975 prices), agriculture contributed 1,312
billion won, or roughly 8.3 percent. The manufacturing sector accounted
for 34.5 percent of the total increase in GNP, while the remaining 57.2
percent came mainly from the SOC and service sector, particularly trade
(see Appendix 4).
Although agriculture's growth rate of 3.5 percent annually
appears not unfavorable compared with the population growth rate of 1.6
to 2.8 percent during 1962-84, production of agricultural products did
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not rise rapidly enough to keep pace with the expanding demand resulting
from population and income growth. Although self-sufficiency in rice
had been nearly attained by the early 1980s, overall self-sufficiency in
all grains declined from 94.5 percent in 1960 to 48.9 percent in 1984.
In the cases of wheat and feed corn, Korea is completely dependent on
imports. Imports of wheat have remained relatively stable in recent
years at a level of 2 million metric tons a year, but import:s of feed
corn have been increasing. Between 1965 and 1984, such imports
increased from 60,000 to 3.2 million metric tons. Korea was self-
sufficient in soybeans until the mid-1970s, but the rate of self-
sufficiency had declined to 24.0 percent by 1984 (see Appendix 5).
In 1965 the total value of grain imports amounted to US$51
million; by 1984 the total value was US$1,250 million. If non-grain
food imports are added, the country was spending US$1.6 to US$2.0
billion in the early 1980s for imports of food, which were roughly 5 to
B percent of total imports.
Table 3. Relative Share of Agriculture in GNP, Employment,
Imports and Exports for Selected Years
Share of -Agricultural Agricultural
Year Agriculture in Imports Exports
GNP Total Lel Share in Level Share in Share in
Employnient eve Total Imports Total Exports Total Agri. Output
% % Billion US$ % Billion US$ x x
1955 43.9 na 68 19.9 1 5.5 0.1
1960 36.5 60.2 32 9.3 4 15.2 0.3
1965 37.6 56.1 64 13.8 15 8.6 1.3
1970 26.4 49.5 319 16.0 30 3.6 1.3
1975 24.7 43.3 947 13.0 176 3.5 3.4
1980 14.4 32.3 1,797 8.1 459 2.6 5.2
1984 13.9 25.9 1,622 5.3 489 1.7 4.3
Source: The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Ministry of Agricilture and Fisheries, Agr iliura] Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
The Bank of Korea, National Income Statistics, various issues
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able 4. AHricultural Food Production
(1974-76=100.0)
Production
Year-
Total Per Capita
1960 54.09 78.86
61 60.19 86.30
62 53.65 74.40
63 59.27 80.26
64 69.87 91.96
65 69.87 89.45
66 74.49 93.63
67 71.12 86.11
68 71.12 84.44
69 81.72 94.47
70 80.48 90.29
71 81.10 88.62
72 82.15 87.78
73 83.92 87.36
74 88.88 90.70
75 100.84 100.86
76 100.28 108.45
77 118.58 11e.75
78 127.05 121.08
79 131.44 123.43
80 106.65 98.72
81 118.84 108.46
82 121.10 108.99
83 125.10 111.04
84 129.18 113.09
Source: FAQ, Production Yearbook, various issues.
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An Overview of Government Intervention
Since the early 1960s, Korea has been governed by a highly
authoritarian and centralized government which has identified economic
growth as its principal objective. The course of development has been
shaped in large part by top-down planning mechanisms and policy
formulation by a relatively few decisionmakers. The government has full
authority to use any type of instruments and policies whenever
considered useful, with the result that the public sector has accounted
for a larger share of value added than is true of a number of developing
countries. The mode and the instruments of government intervention are
discussed here under six categories: government expenditures, trade
regime, capital market, labor market, public enterprise, and price and
foreign exchange controls.
Government Expenditures. Government expenditures as share of
GNP have fluctuated widely. Government expenditures and revenues, and
their effects on the fiscal deficit, are presented in Appendix 7.
Government expenditures expanded during the Korean War and leveled off
in the immediate postwar period. They were again expansionary from
1956-58 but contracted as part of the stabilization effort from 1958 to
1960. A rise in government spending and the fiscal deficit in 1961-67
contributed to inflation. From 1968-72, expenditures were fairly
constant in the range of 18-20 percent of GNP, but the deficit grew as
revenues stagnated and then declined.
An export boom and the oil crisis in late 1973 combined to
inject demand-pull and cost-push pressures into the economy that
- 12 -
overwhelmed any contractionary effect of restraint on government
spending. These external factors became the predominant causes of
instability throughout the 1970s as variation in the rate of government
spending became less significant. The amplitude of swings in the
expenditure ratio diminished, and a rise in both the export ratio and
fluctuations around the trend of that ratio became the dominant factors
in aggregate demand (Mason, et al. 1980).
Trade Regime Intervention. Because of South Korea's lack of
natural resources and the relatively small size of its domestic market,
the country had to heavily rely on foreign trade in the process of
industrialization. A high rate of inflation in the 1960s brought about
a situation in which the official exchange rate, despite periodic
devaluations, consistently overvalued domestic currency. The government
undertook various ad hoc measures to alleviate excessive demand for
imports and to offset disincentives to exporting industries. A
complicated structure of multiple exchange rates was also developed to
alleviate balance of payments difficulties. An import licensing system
was adopted on the basis of a semi-annual trade program that designated
items eligible for import, and basic tariff rates w re imposed. These
tariff rates ranged from zero to over 100 percent and encouraged import
substitution, mainly in the consumer goods industries.
In an attempt to reduce the export disincentive effects of
currency overvaluation, a preferential export system was instituted
which granted successful exporters of specified comodities the right to
import popular items. An export credit system was also put into
l1
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effect. On the other hand, interest rates in the financial markets were
also controlled in order to accelerate private long-term investment by
keeping the cost of capital to investors low, since it was generally
felt that aggregate domestic savings were not very responsive to changes
in interest rates.
In May 1964, the government devalued the official exchange rate
from 130 to 256 won per US dollar and announced that the existing fixed
exchange rate system would be changed to a unitary floating system. The
government then gradually alleviated nontariff barriers on imports by
increasing the number of importable items in semi-annual trade
programs. But even after the 1964 exchange rate reform, the government
had to grant direct subsidies to certain commodity exports, since the
official exchange rate was considered unfavorable to export promotion.
Among these export incentives were (1) tariff exemptions on
imports of raw materials for export manufacturing; (2) exemptions from
domestic indirect taxes for both intermediate imports used in export
production and for export sales; (3) direct tax reductions on income
earned from exports and other foreign exchange-earning activities; (4)
tariff and tax exemptions for domestic supplies of intermediate goods
used in export production; (5) wastage allowance subsidies; (6) low-
interest rate preferential loans for exports; (7) local letters of
credit and standby credit (Westphal and Kim, 1982).
Export incentives were reduced, however, beginning in 1973,
when reductions in direct taxes on profits from exports were
abolished. Wastage allowances were decreased over time, and exporters
- 14 -
are no longer entitled to discounted utility rates. The credit subsidy
to exporters decreased as there were continued reductions in general
interest rates, and the subsidy was finally eliminated in 1982 (Yang,
1986).
Also, the government took steps toward import liberalization by
reducing both tariff and non-tariff protection of domestic industries.
Nominal tariff rates prior to the early 1980s were in the range of 5-30
percent for most raw materials, 20-50 percent for most intermediate
goods, and 40-80 percent for most final goods. A new tariff law passed
in 1983 set norms of 5-10 percent for raw materials, 20 percent for
intermediate goods and 20-30 percent for most final goods. Akt the same
time, the government announced its plan to raise the import
liberalization ratio to 95.2 percent by 1988, when most manul-actured
goods were to be off the restricted import list. The government has
given domestic industries notice that they must prepare themselves for
continued liberalization of the domestic market (Koo, 1986).
Capital Market Intervention. Monetary policy in Korea has
served as almost the sole tool for controlling aggregate demasnd. The
annual financial stabilization program, which focus s on monetary
management, specifies year-end money supply targets along with
coordination among short-run stabilization policies. Monetary
authorities have had to rely on direct control measures -- ceilings and
quotas on loan programs, changes in required reserve ratios,
manipulation of the deposit money banks' stabilization accounts with the
central bank, and forced sales of stabilization bonds to the banks and
institutional investors. Traditional instruments, such as open market
.4
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operations, could not be utilized because of the absence of well-
developed capital markets. But control of the official interest rates
has resulted in fragmented markets for many financial assets and uneven
flows of funds among the markets.
Deposit money banks, which dominate Korea's capital markets,
have been no more than banking branches of the government, whose main
role is to mobilize deposits and allocate resources and new credit
supplied by the central bank to the sectors, industries, and even
individual borrowers designated by the government. The portion of
lendable resources that banks could allocate on their own discretion has
been very limited. In recent years, more than 50 percent of the deposit
money banks' total loans were classified as "directed policy loans"
whose volume and allocation were determined by the government itself,
often independently of monetary stabilization (Park, 1984).
Labor Market Intervention. The labor unions in Korea have not
been effective in raising the level of real wage rates or in improving
working conditions. The relatively free system of collective bargaining
which began to unfold in the 1960s was suspended by the 1971 Special Law
on National Security, a law which remains in force today. Under the
law, labor unions are required to secure government approval prior to
engaging in contract negotiations with management, and all strikes are
prohibited.
Numerous labor disputes occur each year, mostly involving
issues of worker rights rather than wages or working conditions.
Moreover, unions are restricted to only a few industries, such as long-
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established textile companies. Employees of public enterprises, such as
the railway, telephone, and electricity corporations, are regarded as
civil servants and are not permitted to strike. Among the newly
emerging giant corporations, only a few have been unionized. Labor
unions seem to be effective in providing job protection for their
members, and the government's attempts to introduce labor-saving
machines have often met strong resistance from labor organizations
fearing employment reduction.
It was market forces, not labor unions, that were responsible
for wage increases up to the late 1970s. Because of the existence of an
abundant labor supply during the initial stages of economic development,
real wages did not rise as much as labor productivity. During the 1960s
the real wage rose only 5.8 percent per year, compared to a 12.0 percent
increase in the labor productivity index. From the mid-1970s, however,
the increase in real wages surpassed the rise of the productivity
index. A pattern of sharp wage hikes prevailed for three consecutive
years before a sharp drop caused by the second oil shock.
In the late 1970s the government became concerned about the
possible impact of wage increases upon South Korea's competitiveness in
international markets. This concern led to the establishment of wage
guidelines. The rationale was that stable wages were essential for
export competitiveness because many of Korea's exports were still labor-
intensive. Although the guidelines were effective in controLling the
wage rates for civil servants and the employees of government-controlled
banking institutions, they were not effective for private firmns. The
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guidelines, however, did have an indirect psychological impact upon
labor and management (Kim, 1976).
Public Enterprise. Although South Korea is generally thought
of as one of the most capitalistically oriented countries in the Third
World, it still has a large public enterprise sector. Public
enterprises (railway, electricity, telephone, tobacco, coal, etc.)
constitute a "leading sector" in the national economy. From 1970 to
1980, value added in this sector grew at the rate of 14.5 percent a
year, while the total economy was growing at 9.5 percent and the non-
agricultural sector at 12.2 percent. During these years the public
sector absorbed about 25 percent of annual gross investment.
Since public-enterprise goods and services are usually priced
to cover costs and yield a profit, the private enterprises purchasing
these goods and services are not indirectly subsidized, and the earnings
of public sector enterprises make a sizable contribution to government
revenues. Revenue from the government's tobacco monopoly alone accounts
for about 7 to 8 percent of total government revenue each year.
Approximately 10 percent of the value added by public
enterprises has been sold in competitive markets. Public-sector
enterprises are generally characterized by high capital intensity, large
size, market concentration, and the production of import substitutes
rather than exports (Mason et al., 1980).
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Inflation.l/ South Korea's average annual growth rate of over
8 percent during the period 1962-84 has been remarkable by international
standards, but the same can hardly be said about inflation. Measured by
the wholesale price index (WPI), inflation was more than 16 percent per
year on average, and ranged from a low of 0.2 percent to a high of 42.1
percent. On the basis of the GNP deflator the rate of inflation was
even higher, at 18.6 percent per year.
During the 1961-64 period, the average annual rate of inflation
was almost 20 percent in terms of WPI, or 23 percent using the GNP
deflator. The main sources of inflation during this period were
numerous government measures to stimulate economic growth and two years
of crop failure. In 1964, the government undertook an almost 100
percent devaluation of the won against the US dollar. Although this
reform helped to improve Korea's export competitiveness, it had a
devastating effect on general prices, which surged more than 35 percent
that year.
The years between 1965 and 1973, on the other hand, were a
period of outstanding performance characterized by relative price
stability and rapid growth. Output grew at an average annual. rate of 10
percent, while price increases measured by the WPI averaged about 8
percent (15 percent on the GNP deflator).
The world resource crisis of 1973 returned the rate of domestic
inflation to a level almost comparable to that of the early 1.960s.
11 This section is drawn from Park (1984).
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Since Korea is heavily dependent on imported oil, oil price increases
during the 1976-79 period caused more than a 20 percent deterioration in
Korea's terms of trade. Bank credit was expanded by nearly 50 percent
to help finance imports. As a result, wholesale prices rose by 42
percent in 1974, the largest increase since the 1960s. In 1976 the
government attempted to tighten the supply of credit and money and at
the same time put strong price control measures into effect. These
measures slowed inflation to an average annual rate of 11 percent during
1976-78.
As in the case of the first oil crisis in 1974, the cost
increases resulting from the second oil shock in 1979 were handled
through an expansion of credit. The annual rate of inflation during
1979-81 was close to 27 percent on average, and inflationary impact of
the crisis was aggravated by South Korea's promotion of heavy and
chemical industries. On the supply side, real wages and labor costs
soared.
The grain price support program added to the inflationary
pressures. The prices of major grains in the years after 1969 were
always lower than the amounts paid for grain by the government. The
shortfall arising from this difference was financed mostly through long-
term borrowing from the central bank, and by the end of 1984 the
accumulated grain deficit by printing amounted to 2.0 trillion won (or
US$3 billion), equivalent to roughly 25 percent of the money supply.
Expansion of the grain deficit was one of the major reasons for credit
expansion. In the meantime, price-control measures initiated in 1975
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distorted the relative price structure, resulting in black marketing of
a number of commodities.
While still beset by such problems, Korea was jolted by the
death of President Park in October 1979. The ensuing political turmoil
complicated the problems of economic management. Since inflation
appeared to be the most pressing problem, a package of stabiLization
measures was put into effect with a view to slowing down inflation and
improving the balance of payments. The package included a 21) percent
devaluation, a managed float system of foreign exchange, and an upward
adjustment of bank deposit and lending rates. The governmeni: also
reaffirmed its determination to continue a tight credit policy. Despite
these efforts, prices rose by 39 percent in 1981, and the economy had a
negative rate of growth for the first time since the end of the Korean
War.
The new government that took office in 1981 continued the
;'stabilization first" policy. This policy, combined with a drop in
import prices, succeeded in decelerating inflation while maintaining 6
percent growth of the economy in both 1981 and 1982. The prices of
imported commodities declined by 5.3 percent in 1982, 1.7 percent in
1983, and 2.7 percent in 1984. Prices measured by WPI rose by less than
5 percent in 1982 and by only 0.7 percent in 1984. Notwithstanding the
worldwide recession, South Korea had annual growth rates of 5.6 percent
in 1982, 9.5 percent in 1983, and 7.6 percent in 1984.
Foreign Exchange Control. Korea maintained a complicated
system of multiple exchange rates during the 1950s and the first half of
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the 1960s. As a result, the won was almost always overvalued despite
periodic devaluations.
In 1961 there were two devaluations, which were intended to
unify the exchange rate and to reduce currency overvaluation. This
effort failed, mainly due to the government's expansionary policy, and
the authorities were obliged to intensify the use of quotas and various
quantitative controls over purchases of foreign exchange. A system of
multiple exchange rates reappeared in early 1963 and with that, adoption
of a system which permitted exporters to use their foreign exchange
earnings to import commodities not otherwise legally importable
(Krueger, 1979).
In May 1964, the government announced a 100 percent devaluation
of the official exchange rate, from 130 to 256 won per U.S. dollar, and
at the same time announced a unitary floating exchange rate system. The
government was then able to maintain a relatively stable level of
domestic prices, as well as a stable rate of foreign exchange, until
1967-68. As the gap between Korea's inflation rate and those of its
major trading partners widened after 1968, a gradual depreciation of the
won took place.
This continued until June 1971, when there was a 13 percent
devaluation, from 326 to 370 won per U.S. dollar. The rate remained
pegged at that level until the end of 1971, then was allowed to
depreciate until June 1972, when it was again fixed at 400 won per
dollar.
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In December 1974, the government undertook a 21-percent
devaluation from 400 won to 484 won per dollar, which lastecd until the
end of 1979 despite gradual overvaluation of the won and a resulting
deterioration in the country's balance of payments. Delay in devaluing
the currency in the latter half of the 1970s was attributable to
political instability and to strong opposition from business groups with
large foreign debts.
A package of stabilization measures was undertaken in 1980
aiming at slowing down inflation and improving the balance of
payments. The package included a 20 percent devaluation of the won,
from 484 to 580 won per dollar, and a managed floating system.
Equilibrium Exchange Rates
The equilibrium nominal exchange rates that would have
prevailed under free trade -- that is, in the absence of government
intervention in trade -- were estimated for each year in the! 1960-84
period (see Appendix 12). To check on the results obtained, the actual
real exchange rates (or the purchasing power parity real exchange rates)
and the equilibrium real exchange rates were estimated, as shown in
Table 5. The actual real exchange rates were calculated by adjusting
the corresponding nominal rates for each year for differences in the won
value of Korea's seven major trading partners' currencies as well as for
differences in purchasing power; the equilibrium real rates were
obtained from equilibrium nominal rates by adjusting for differences in
purchasing power. In estimating the latter, Korea's CPI was adjusted to
the effects of exchange rate overvaluation on the tradable part of
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CPI. In estimating the two series in real terms, the year in which the
external imbalance was the lowest was chosen as a base year (1977).
As can be seen, the equilibrium real rates were persistently
higher than the PPP-adjusted official rates, indicating that the Korean
currency was consistently overvalued. The divergence can be explained
by the sizable inflow of non-trade receipts of foreign exchange to meet
import requirements, along with import restrictions.
From the mid-1950s to the late 1960s the bulk of Korea's
imports were financed by foreign grant aid, especially U.S.
assistance. Other sources of foreign capital were relatively
unimportant during this period. By the early 1970s, however, foreign
grant aid had become negligible. Since then, other forms of external
financing, such as long-term loans and remittances by Korean emigrants
abroad have played the major role in meeting the trade gap (see Appendix
15).
An attempt was made to correlate the relative magnitude of
divergence between the PPP-adjusted official exchange rates and the
equilibrium real rates with net capital inflow plus transfer receipts
and tariff equivalent, as shown in Figure 1. In the figure, net capital
inflow and transfer receipts are presented in terms of ratio to total
imports of goods and services. It can be observed from this figure that
the degree of divergence is in general positively correlated with the
relative size of net capital inflow and the tariff equivalent. This
indicates that as the relative size of net capital inflow declines and
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import restrictions are gradually lessened, PPP-adjusted real rates
approach free trade equilibrium real rates.
Using regression analysis, the above-stated relationship can be
quantitatively investigated. The estimated regression equation is:
D = -.0252 + .326 (T CI) + .274 tm + 0.0033 t
(.781) (4.800) Qd (2.319) (.085) (t-value)
R2 = .938
where: D = Divergence ratio
Qd = Total imports of goods and services
NT = Net transfer
CI = Net capital inflow
tm = Tariff equivalent
ts = Export subsidy
The results indicate that 94 percent of the variation in
relative divergence between the two series is explained by the three
factors, and 6 percent by unspecified factors.
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Table S. Current Account and Exchange Rates, 1960-84
Unit: Million US dollars
won per US dollar
Current Nominal Exchange Rates Real Exchange Rates
Year Account Official Equilibrium Official-/Equilibrium /Oegree of Oivergence
(E0) (E*) (e0) (e*) between e0 .nd e*
1960 10 63 176 250 371 -.329
61 50 125 258 463 654 -.292
62 -56 130 296 457 647 -.294
63 -143 130 338 378 542 -.302
64 -26 213 414 483 650 -.257
65 9 266 434 541 715 -.243
66 -103 271 452 509 700 -.273
67 -192 271 448 462 622 -.257
68 -440 277 484 429 591 -.274
69 -549 288 489 409 559 -.269
70 -623 311 507 399 537 -.256
71 -848 348 578 410 543 -.244
72 -371 393 540 459 541 -.152
73 -309 398 503 543 586 -.073
74 -1,839 400 579 526 601 -.125
75 -1,887 484 678 544 627 -.132
76 -314 484 571 488 543 -.102
77 12 484 546 484 507 -.046&=
78 -1,085 484 556 485 500 -.030
79 -4.151 484 619 454 482 -.058
80 -5,321 607 784 504 538 -.063
81 -4,646 681 813 480 508 -.055
82 -2,650 731 835 465 488 -.048
83 -1,620 776 850 474 498 -.049
84 -1,372 806 867. 476 515 -.076
Source: See Appendix 11-15.
EaRE r w.E.
4/ Real Official Exchange Rate (e0 ) CPI/vwWPI
where Ek a Korean exchange rate per US dollar
E. = Index of ith trading partner's exchange rate per US dollar(1977=100)
w; = Weight of ith trading partner
2: w.WPI.i
b/ Real Equilibrium Exchange Rate (e*) = E*(WPIf/CPI*) - E*- 
oc(E*/E )Pr+(Il0)PNT
where E* a Free trade nominal equilibrium exchange rate
WPIf = Weighted average of Korea's major trading partners'WPI
CPI* a Domestic CPI adjusted to exchange rate overvaluation
c/ Difference bet,ween e and e* in the base year (1977) can be attributable to the
effect of the non-tra8e inflow of 222 million dollars. The foreign loans and
fi.,estment of 1.5 billion dollars in 1977 combined with import restricttons(ex-
pressed in terms of tariff equivalent of 33 percent) may have contributed to
maintaining eO at a level lower than e* in 1977.
4
Figure 1. Relationship between Divergence Ratio and
Ratio Net Transfer,'Capital Inflow and Tariff Equivalent
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The Agricultural Sector
Korea is a peninsula which lies in the path of typhoons
originating in the Southern Pacific in summer. The summer monsoon
carries warm, moist air to the peninsula from the southeast. Total
rainfall is ample for agricultural purposes, ranging from less than 800
millimeters annually in the east central part of the country to over
1,400 millimeters in the southern and western coastal areas. Rain is
rather poorly distributed throughout the year, however, with almost 70
percent falling between June and September. Rainfall is especially
light from November to February, the "dry winter" period. Heavy
rainfall during the summer months often causes damage to farm crops,
while low rainfall during other months limits crop production.
Temperatures vary widely, with severe winters in the north and
mild winters in the south. The frost-free period ranges from mid-April
to mid-October on the northwest coast and early April to mid-November in
the southwest, a difference of about 40 days. Long periods of sunshine
-- about 2,400 hours a year -- are a favorable factor for growth of rice
and other crops.
Land in the valleys and river plains has been shaped into
paddies that are irrigated or flooded by rainwater during the warm
months. The coarse alluvial soils are relatively easy to work. They
tend to be suitably drained and are satisfactory for dryland crops, such
as barley, soybeans, and various kinds of vegetables. Nearly all areas
of podzolic soils which occur intermittently along the coast are used
intensively for crop farming, especially for rice.
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Rice is the major crop grown in Korea, comprising about 35.8
percent of the total value of agricultural production and 45.5 percent
of the total planted acreage in 1984 (including double-cropped
acreage). Other food crops, such as soybeans and other pulses,
potatoes, and miscellaneous cereals grown mainly in upland areas,
account for about 25.4 percent of crop area but for only 7.4 percent of
total output value. While the share of cereal crops, both in total
output value and planted acreage, has been rapidly declining, that of
fruits, vegetables, and livestock has been steadily increasing.
Rapid economic growth and a subsequent increase in income
levels have brought about considerable change in food consumption
patterns. Demand for higher-quality vegetables and livestock products
has increased, and consumers' tastes have shifted from carbohydrates to
protein foods, such as meat and processed foods. This shift in
consumption patterns, especially in urban areas, has induced Korean
farmers to cultivate more high value crops as well as raise more
livestock.
As already mentioned, the supply of paddyland is almost
completely inelastic due to the limited availability of land as well as
to the low substitutability in land use between paddy and upland.
Increased production stems mainly from increases in land productivity
brought about by improvement of irrigation facilities, expanded use of
fertilizers and chemicals, introduction of high-yielding crop varieties,
and improved cultivation practices.
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Among other things, the irrigation of paddy land is of crucial
importance for increasing rice yield per unit area. Although fully
irrigated paddy land has been steadily increasing, poor irrigation and
drainage facilities are still major constraints to larger yields and
expansion of the double-cropped area.
Farm Size and Land Tenure. Korean agriculture has long been
characterized by the rigidity of a smallholder structure formed under
the pressure of surplus farm production. In terms of cultivable land
per farm household, Korea's land endowment is probably the smallest in
the world if one excludes city-states like Singapore. The government
has been striving to improve the agricultural structure, but little has
been achieved in terms of enlarging the scale of farming operations.
The rate of decrease in the number of farm households has been much
lower than that of farm population. As a result, the acreage of
cropland per farm household has remained static at about one hectare for
the past two decades. Nearly two-thirds of farm households have one
hectare or less of cropland, but they account for only 40 percent of all
cropland (see Appendix 21). It is hardly an exaggeration to say that
virtually all of the problems confronting Korean ag iculture originate
from its fragmented structure.
It should also be noted that the proportion of medium-sized
farms with 1.0-1.5 hectares (medium-size in Korea) has been increasing,
while that of submarginal farms with less than 0.5 hectares and that of
large farms with more than 3.0 hectares has been declining. These
phenomena are attributable to the following:
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First, there has been an increasing trend toward the nuclear
family system in rural areas. The average size of Korean farm
households decreased from 6.3 persons in 1965 to 4.6 in 1984. This is
because younger family members who are better educated almost invariably
migrate to cities or industrial areas.
Second, more and more farmers now hold part-time off-farm jobs
to augment their incomes. Diversification of rural industrial
activities and expansion of the rural infrastructure have combined to
enable farmers to secure sources of off-farm income without leaving
their farms. Off-farm pursuits are much more widespread among medium-
sized farmers than among large farmers.
Third, the desire of farmers to hold on to their land has been
strengthened by high rates of inflation and a continuous rise in land
prices. Since the market price of farmland is much higher than its
value as determined by land productivity, there is a stronger tendency
to hold on to it. It is likely that medium-sized farmers exhibit the
strongest tendency to hold on to land, since they can achieve relative
financial stability by supplementing farm income with off-farm
earnings. In view of the fact that both the absolute number and
relative proportion of large farmers have been declining while those of
medium-sized farmers have been increasing, it is almost certain that the
smallholder structure will persist in Korea for a long time to come.
The Korean government established a land tenure system in 1950,
whereby the land owned by landlords was distributed to all of those
farming as tenants. Tenancy was virtually abolished. The farmland
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reform also provided that individual holdings cannot exceed 3 hectares
of cultivated land. Because of changing economic conditions, however,
illegal tenancy has become widespread, especially since the early 1970s.
The farmland acreage cultivated under tenancy increased from
370,000 hectares (16.4 percent of total acreage) in 1965 to 581,000
hectares (26.8 percent) in 1983. In 1975, almost two-thirds of South
Korea's farmers were classified as owners, 30.3 percent as part-owners
who operated some rented land in addition to their own land, and 4.1
percent as full tenants. By 1983, however, the proportion of owners had
declined to 40.2 percent, while that of part-owners had increased to
56.9 percent.
Government Policies towards Agriculture
Agricultural policy in Korea before 1945 was in line with
Japan's overall colonial policy. The major objectives were to increase
production of food and raw materials to satisfy Japan's own growing
demand. Upon completion of cadastral land surveys in 1918-26, a series
of rice production plans was formulated and implemented. Measures were
taken to improve and expand irrigation facilities and to convert upland
into paddy land. Improved crop varieties and chemical fertilizers were
distributed. As a result, many advanced farming practices were adopted
by farmers, and the level of agricultural production increased, although
the compulsory measures used by Japanese authorities created much
resentment on the part of Korean farmers.
The U.S. military replaced the Japanese in August 1945 and took
over Japan's colonial administrative system without much modification.
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Amidst the social confusion after liberation of Korea from Japanese
rule, the U.S. military was obliged to concentrate its efforts on
maintaining social order. The major emphasis in economic policy was
reducing the postwar inflationary spiral. Government investments in and
loans to agriculture were severely limited by the small size of the
overall budget.
After the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, some
efforts were made to shift to a new agricultural policy. The most
notable effort was the Land Reform Act of June 1949. The compulsory
rice collection system was replaced by a government purchase system at
government-determined prices in 1950. Public investment in and loans to
agriculture started in 1949, when the government formulated an economic
stabilization program based on counterpart funds generated by U.S.
aid. This program was suspended when the Korean War broke out in June
1950. Government finance was shifted to a wartime system, with defense
outlays amounting to 56 percent of total budget expenditures. The
agricultural sector received only 2.5 percent. After the Armistice was
signed in July 1953, policy emphasis shifted to recovering from war
damage and alleviating rapid inflation.
The largest commitment of government resources to agriculture
in the 1950s was for the importation of chemical fertilizer and the
maintenance of existing irrigation facilities. The government's
investment in agriculture was low, amounting to less than 10 percent of
total government investment.
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In the early 1960s the South Korean government exhibited some
enthusiasm toward agriculture. Under the first five-year economic plan
(1962-66), the government launched various programs to boost
agricultural production, reclaim slopeland, increase the supply of
fertilizers and pesticides, and strengthen agricultural research and
extension. Government investment in agriculture rose to over 20 percent
of total government investment outlays.
Various institutional reforms were also carried out. The major
ones included a new Agricultural Cooperatives Law, enacted in 1961 to
merge the Agriculture Bank into the National Agricultural Cooperatives
Federation and thus to integrate cooperative marketing with the
agricultural credit system. In 1962 the agricultural research and
extension system was reorganized, and an Office of Rural Development
(ORD) was established with the backing and financial support of the
USAID.
Despite these efforts to increase food production, basic
agricultural pricing policies remained the same as in the 1950s.
Support for farm prices received little attention, since higher consumer
prices for major food grains were believed to cause a rise in general
prices.
In the 1960s the government sacrificed agricultural price
supports in order to curb inflation. In the 1970s, on the other hand,
grain prices were supported to improve agriculture's terms of trade and
thus raise farm incomes and stimulate production, even at the cost of an
increase in inflationary pressure. In the third and fourth five-year
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plans, self-sufficiency in staple foods and urban-rural income parity
were listed as priority targets. A massive increase in investments for
land and water resources development was also envisaged, and the prices
of fertilizer and pesticides were heavily subsidized. Investments in
rural infrastructure were increased under the Saemaul (New Community)
Movement, which was initiated in 1972.
Land and Water Resource Development
The development of water resources has been one of South
Korea's goals since the first five-year plan. During the first and the
second (1967-71) plan the government emphasized small-scale irrigation
projects, such as the construction of small-scale dams, pumping
stations, tubewell irrigation, and weirs. But in the third five-year
plan (1972-76) the emphasis shifted to larger scale, integrated regional
development projects.
An integrated plan for developing the four major river basins,
including the construction of thirteen dams and electric power plants,
was set out in 1971. In addition, afforestation and erosion control
projects on watershed areas of the Han, Kum, Nakdong, and Yonsan Rivers
were undertaken. Multipurpose projects for developing large farming
areas were completed in the Kum River and Pyongtaek basins, where
reservoirs, tidal dikes, water-pumping and draining plants, and canals
were constructed. Two tidal dikes completed at Asan and Namyang bays in
1974 were the largest water resource development projects in Korean
history.
Completion of these projects brought 11,000 ha of land
- 35 -
reclaimed from the seabed under cultivation and also irrigated 16,000 ha
of existing farmland. Paddy field consolidation projects, initiated in
the mid-1960s, were promoted with a view to facilitating farm
mechanization and increasing farming efficiency. Paddy fields
rearranged under this program amounted to 500,000 ha by 1984, or
approximately 33 percent of Korea's total paddy lands. Investment in
land and water resource development projects accounted for 40-45 percent
of all agricultural investment during the 1970s but increased to over 50
percent since 1980.
Increased Supply of Fertilizer
Given limited land resources, an increase in land productivity
is the best and probably only means of increasing aggregate agricultural
production. A high rate of fertilizer application is part of the
answer. Since the early 1960s the government has made all-out efforts
to increase fertilizer use by providing price subsidies and purchase
credits. As a result, fertilizer consumption more than doubled during
the 1965-84 period, from 393,000 metric tons in 1965 to 792,000 metric
tons in 1984.
This rapid increase in fertilizer consumption led to the
construction of a series of large-scale fertilizer plants. By the mid-
1970s the country had not only achieved self-sufficiency in fertilizer
supply but was producing export surpluses. In the early 1980s, average
annual production reached 1.4 million metric tons, exceeding the annual
domestic requirement by over 600,000 metric tons. Between 1976 and
1984, 37 percent of South Korea's fertilizer production was exported.
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Since the enactment of the Fertilizer Control Law in 1962, all
fertilizer marketing has come under government control, including
determination of overall requirements, procurement, and pricing. At the
end of each year the government informs each fertilizer manufacturer of
its procurement plan, including price and quantity, and concludes a
contract. At the same time the government announces selling prices to
farmers. Fertilizer is then acquired by the National Agricultural
Cooperatives Federation (NACF) and sold to farmers through NACF local
branches. The government purchases fertilizer at prices higher than
those at which it sells to farmers and exports at a still lower price.
The implementation of a two-price system designed to protect
consumers, farmers, and fertilizer manufacturers simultaneously has
inevitably resulted in increasing the government deficit. The total
accumulated deficit in the fertilizer account reached approximately 712
billion won in 1984, or about one-third of the deficit incurred for
grain subsidies.
If the fertilizer deficit were to be eliminated by raising the
selling price to farmers while the prices paid to manufacturers remained
unchanged, fertilizer prices would have to be raised on average by 72
percent. If the deficit were to be eliminated by reducing the
procurement prices the necessary reduction would be 32 percent of what
is currently being paid. This suggests that farmers have paid more than
half the direct cost of protecting fertilizer manufacturers in recent
years. During the five years prior to 1976, by contrast, domestic
fertilizer prices were close to or below export prices.
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Until the mid-1970s, Korean farmers purchased fertilizers at
prices lower than world market prices. Since then, however, the
government purchase price has averaged 60 percent above the export
price, while the sales price (net of marketing costs) has averaged 22
percent above the export price. The sales price of nitrogen fertilizer,
for example, is almost double that of the export price, while the prices
of phosphate and potash fertilizers are about 20 percent higher. Such
high pricing for domestically produced fertilizer, despite surplus
production, is mainly attributable to the unfavorable terms agreed to at
the time that Korean companies entered joint ventures with foreign
enterprises to construct fertilizer plants. The Korean government, for
example, is obliged under one joint agreement to buy the entire output
at prices that guarantee a profit of 15 to 20 percent.
If the price currently paid to Hankuk Fertilizer Company, one
of the leading fertilizer manufacturers, were to be used as the
criterion, 47 percent of the total deficit attributable to fertilizer
could be traced to the subsidy for manufacturers and the remaining 53
percent to the subsidy for farmers. But if export prices were to be
used as the benchmark, most of the deficit would be the result of the
subsidy paid to the fertilizer industry.
According to a recent estimate (Lee, 1986), the protection rate
for the Korean fertilizer industry was 68 percent for the 1976-84
period, while that for Korean farmers who purchased fertilizer was (-)18
percent. For urea alone, the protection rate for fertilizer
manufacturers was estimated as 61 percent while that for Korean
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purchasers was (-)51 percent. These results indicate that the
fertilizer industry has benefited to a considerable degree from the
government price subsidy program. Korean farmers, on the contrary, have
paid high fertilizer consumption taxes.
Agricultural Credit Expansion
The National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation (NACF) is
given sole responsibility for the administration of agricultural loans
financed by government funds. No other organization is authorized to
borrow from the government or the central bank for agricultural loan
purposes. Since the government supplies a major portion of the capital
loaned by NACF, nearly all of the organization's programs must adhere to
guidelines issued by the government. For instance, NACF's annual
business program requires prior approval from the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF).
Within overall guidelines for domestic credit, MAF and MOF determine the
level of resources available for NACF. They then allocate credit to
specific sectors and activities in accordance with government priorities
at government-set interest rates.
The sources of financing consist of government funds,
borrowings from the Bank of Korea, agricultural bond issues, deposits
received, and foreign loan funds. Although financial support from the
government for agricultural development steadily expanded in absolute
terms during the postwar period, it was insufficient to meet the rapidly
rising demands for medium- and long-term farm loans. Since the
government funding alone could not meet the increasing demand for
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investment loans, NACF had to draw on the deposit source to finance
medium- and long-term loans. Since the early 1970s, agricultural
cooperatives have made all-out efforts to raise funds on their own. A
campaign to attract a trillion won in rural savings was set in motion in
1974.
As of 1970, the cooperatives' own funds constituted only 30
percent of their total loan funds, but this share increased to about 70
percent by 1980. Since the interest rates on NACF loans are only 8-15
percent, compared to 30 percent on loans from private sources, demand
for credit from NACF has continued to exceed supply. Among the various
problems created by this excess demand has been a tendency for loans to
be made to richer farmers, who are better risks and have more local
political clout. A law designed to channel more funds to poorer farmers
was passed in 1971, but it has not yet altered this bias.
Agricultural Research and Extension
Since the Office of Rural Development (ORD) was established in
1962, it has evolved into a remarkably effective agricultural research
and extension organization. Agriculture research and extension services
have been continuously expanded to improve farming technology through
such methods as the introduction and diffusion of improved varieties of
rice, barley, and soybeans. Efforts have also been directed toward
promoting more efficient application of fertilizer and pesticides. The
high level of fertilizer use in Korea today is largely attributable to
extension activities as well as the government policy of making
sufficient supplies available to farmers at subsidized prices.
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One of the most noteworthy achievements in the field of
agricultural research was the development, in cooperation with the
International Rice Research Institute, of the high-yielding fertilizer-
responsive rice variety, IR 667 (or Tongil), which yielded on the
average 25-30 percent more than traditional varieties when grown on
well-irrigated paddy and accompanied by improved cultural practices.
Despite poor cold resistance and unsatisfactory milling qualities, the
acreage planted to this variety increased from 200,000 hectares in 1972
to almost 1,000,000 hectares (or 85 percent of the total paddy area) in
1978. This rapid diffusion was convincing evidence of the effectiveness
of rural extension services. The market price of the new rice soon
began to fall, however, because of consumers' preference for
conventional rice, and by 1984, the acreage devoted to Tongil had
declined to less than 300,000 hectares. In retrospect, it seems that
the government's desire to achieve self-sufficiency in rice production,
combined with authoritarian rural extension agents, led to excessively
rapid diffusion of the new variety regardless of producers' and
consumers' preference.
Despite problems like this, however, it is clear that the
Office of Rural Development has acquired the capacity to improve crop
and animal production and to make knowledge about the use of technology
available to Korean farmers (Ruttan and Krueger, 1986).
Promotion of Farm Mechanization
Stimulated by rapid changes in rural conditions -- especially
the steady outflow of the rural work force and rising rural wages -- the
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government over the years has initiated various measures designed to
facilitate the introduction of labor-saving farm implements. As a
result, farm machinery has increased sharply in both number and variety
in recent years.
About 600,000 power tillers were on hand in rural areas at the
end of 1985, representing 1 tiller for every 3 households. The number
of power sprayers and dusters in use increased to 514,000, or 1 unit for
every 4 households. The government began to provide loans for the
purchase of high-performance implements, such as tractors,
transplanters, harvesters, and combines in 1979. By 1985, approximately
42,000 transplanters and 26,000 harvesters were in use, or 1 unit for
every 50 and 75 households, respectively.
The number of machines in use is expected to increase rapidly
in the years to come.
The degree of farm mechanization attained thus far, however,
has not yet resolved the rural labor shortage. This is because
utilization and diffusion of farm machinery have been impeded by the
prevailing small-scale, fragmented farming operations and by inadequate
physical and economic conditions for mechanization.
In conjunction with the introduction of rice transplanters,
harvesters, tractors, and combines, the government established 1,600
farm mechanization demonstration districts in 1977. These are designed
to demonstrate integrated systems of mechanization and joint utilization
with a view to enhancing farmers' knowledge and improving the rates of
utilization of available machinery.
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These demonstration centers are operated by agricultural
cooperatives or farmland improvement associations. They mostly do rent-
work for farmers in their areas in return for fees. Although they have
been somewhat successful in disseminating the skills needed for
integrated mechanized farming, they have encountered various problems in
operation and management, including financial losses.
Improvement of Rural Living Environment
Under the Saemaul (New Community) Movement, massive investment
projects were undertaken to improve the rural living environment. They
included sanitary water supply systems, improved sewage systems, housing
improvements, village reconstruction, the expansion of electrical and
communication networks, etc.
Sanitary water supply and improved sewage systems have made a
substantial contribution to reducing the frequency of waterborne
diseases. Prior to the Saemaul movement, most farm households depended
for both drinking water and water for other purposes on unsanitary
village wells, located at a distance from most residences. The
installation of running-water systems has not only provided disease-free
water but also been a great convenience to households. By 1984, a total
of 31,330 South Korean villages had benefited from this effort.
Housing improvement projects have also contributed
substantially to modernization of the rural environment. In the past
the grey straw-thatched roofs of farm houses were considered a symbol of
rural poverty and economic stagnation. A straw roof had to be replaced
every year and required considerable labor. Replacement of the straw
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with clay tiles or other permanent materials has made it possible for
farm families to use the straw for other purposes, such as straw bags
and compost. By 1984, a total of 15,000 farmhouses had received
improved roofs.
Village restructuring projects, consisting of the relocation,
redevelopment, and partial improvement of villages, have raised
villagers' confidence in further improvements in their living
conditions. By 1984, 3,500 villages had completed restructuring
projects with government financial assistance.
Another important achievement has been the expansion of
electrical and communication networks. Only about 20 percent of the
more than 2 million farm households in 1971 had electric lighting, while
the remaining farmers relied on kerosene lamps. By 1982, however, rural
electrification and the installation of a telephone system were
completed except in remote mountainous areas and on isolated, small
islands. The socioeconomic impact of these projects is quite
impressive. The projects have helped to reduce the cultutal gap between
the rural and urban sectors. Electrification has created new consumer
demand for home appliances, such as television sets, refrigerators,
electric cookers, and electric irons. It has also led to the use of
electric power for productive purposes, such as repair of farm
machinery. The expansion of communication networks, especially the
widespread installation of public telephones, has not only reduced the
social distance between villages and cities but also increased the
efficiency of transmitting public information, including news about farm
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products and market conditions. The construction of village roads, farm
feeder roads, and small bridges has facilitated farm mechanization, the
marketing of farm products, and the mobility of farm inputs.
During 1975-84, government investment designed to improve the
rural living environment increased from 18 billion won to 247 billion
won, or approximately 22 percent of total agricultural investment.
Improvement of Agricultural Marketing
Although Korea has experienced remarkable growth in its
agricultural sector, agricultural marketing has been relatively
neglected by the government. It was not until 1980 that the government
initiated a comprehensive plan for improving agricultural marketing.
The rapid rural-urban shift, accompanied by rapid growth in consumer
income, has brought about substantial changes in the food supply and
demand pattern and made it almost imperative to improve the marketing
network to enable it to handle the increasing volume and variety of
marketed agricultural products.
The government promulgated a law in 1980 to improve the
marketing structure while protecting producers and consumers and
contributing to price stabilization. The law specifies that the
government shall formulate a master plan for marketing modernization.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries formulated a comprehensive
five-year plan (1982-86) for developing agricultural marketing. The
plan included the conversion of wholesale markets into public
institutions, the construction of new municipal markets, and the
establishment of procedures for orderly trade. The Ministry of
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Agriculture and Fisheries decided on public ownership of wholesale
markets to reduce market disorder and to strengthen the role of local
governments. The plan also encourages vertical integration of
collection and delivery centers (Sung, 1985).
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Chapter 2
HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICING POLICIES
Policy decisions pertaining to food grain prices, particularly
rice prices, have long been the central issue in agricultural price
policy, and the term "food grain price policy" has been virtually
synonymous with "agricultural price policy" in Korea. It was not until
the mid-1970s that a few non-cereal products were included in government
support programs.
Prior to 1939, Korea was a rice-exporting country, and Japan
was its principal export market. There was no government intervention
in grain marketing. It was only after the Sino-Japanese war broke out
in 1939 that interventions in grain marketing began, primarily to meet
military demand. An administrative order was issued requiring farmers
to sell a portion of their rice to the government at government-
determined prices.
Japan's subsequent involvement in World War II led to a further
increase in military demand. Compulsory grain delivery quotas were
assigned to farmers, and supplies to consumers were rationed. The
government-determined prices were so low, however, that the main concern
of farmers was to minimize actual delivery of grain. This system
continued until the end of World War II.
After the liberation of Korea in August 1945, rationing was
discontinued and free-market transactions were resumed. The U.S.
military authorities apparently believed that Korea had a substantial
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surplus of food grains, given the records of rice exports. The result
of liberalization, however, was an aggravation of the imbalance between
supply and demand. The repatriation of approximately 1.2 million
Koreans from abroad and an influx of about 2 million refugees from North
Korea caused a sharp rise in both consumption and grain prices. The
wholesale price of polished rice rose from 1.0 won per 80 kilo bag in
October 1945 to 6.0 won per bag in June 1946. The wholesale price index
rose almost twofold during the same period.
Fearing the confusion attendant on a switch from a wartime to a
peacetime system, the U.S. military government reconsidered the free-
market system. With a view to stabilizing prices and protecting urban
consumers, the U.S. authorities put into effect a ceiling-price system
at the retail level for 11 major consumer items, including rice, barley,
and cotton cloth. But the ceiling prices were never honored in the
market. Hoarding and black marketing operations prevailed. Consumers
who had been dependent upon government rations suddenly found rationing
eliminated and no alternative source of supplies. Grain prices almost
doubled within a few months.
In January 1946 the authorities issued a rice collection decree
which permitted direct government intervention in the grain market. The
military authorities believed that direct government control of the rice
stock would be more effective in alleviating inflationary pressure than
price control schemes. The free grain market was closed, and compulsory
rice collections from farmers and a rationing system for urban consumers
were enforced. This system continued until 1948. Although it helped to
- 48 -
balance the overall supply and demand for rice and contributed to some
extent to alleviating inflation, the system also reminded the public of
Japanese rule. Furthermore, due to a lack of administrative ability and
a dearth of adequate statistics on grain production, it was difficult to
allocate government procurement quotas fairly among different localities
and individual farmers.
The Republic of Korea came into existence in August, 1948. In
November 1948 the government instituted a grain purchase law. The major
provisions of the new law were virtually the same as those of the old
decree. Grain producers and landowners were required to sell to the
government all grain other than that required for home consumption and
seed use. Free market transactions of grain were prohibited. The
stated objectives were to improve farm income through government
purchase at an adequate price level while securing a stable supply of
food grain for urban consumers. However, the government could not
obtain enough grain to implement rationing. The main reason was low
purchase prices, much lower than the market price. The low purchase
prices in turn were attributable to the limited government funds
available for grain procurement and underestimation of grain production
costs.
A fundamental change in policy was inevitable. Overall control
was lifted, free market transactions were allowed, and the rationing
system was changed to a priority system. First claim to the limited
grain supply was given to the military, the police, government
employees, and workers in critical industries, such as coal mining and
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railroads. Urban consumers not receiving rations were able to purchase
from the open market.
While enforcing this partial rationing system, the government
enacted a grain management law in February 1950. The primary objective
was to enable the government to secure sufficient grain from farmers so
as to stabilize the economy. The main provisions of the law were
reaffirmed in 1963, 1967, and 1970.
Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the
securing of grain for the military and the distribution of grain to war
refugees emerged as priority issues. Because of crop failures in 1951
and 1952, however, the government was unable to secure the required
amount of grain through direct purchases. Moreover, due to budgetary
requirements, inflation, and spiraling grain prices, the government was
compelled to discontinue direct purchases. Instead, an attempt was made
to secure grain by reimbursing owners for land distributed to tenant
farmers at the time of land reform in 1950. At the same time, a measure
to collect a land tax in kind and a scheme to barter fertilizer for rice
were initiated. Land tax collection was rather successful, but the
government had much less success in collecting rice through the barter
program. The implicit price of grain being bartered was lower than that
prevailing in the market.
The availability of American grain under U.S. Public Law 480,
beginning in 1945, enabled the Korean government to keep grain prices
low. Imported under this program were wheat, barley, raw cotton, corn,
milo, and tallow, with wheat and barley accounting for about 50 to 60
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percent of the total value of imports. The quantity of grain imported
under this program was, on average, equivalent to 8 to 12 percent of
annual domestic grain production during the 1956-65 period.
As the economy entered the 1960s, and gradually recovered from
the war, there was a strong tendency among policymakers to identify
economic growth with industrialization. In both the first and second
five-year economic development plans, the major objective was rapid
industrial growth. This industry-oriented strategy necessarily required
massive investment in the nonagricultural sector. The goverment's
efforts were directed toward maintaining low prices for staple food
grain and preventing wide seasonal price fluctuations, rather than
toward maintaining adequate prices to support farm incomes. Government
purchase prices were below market prices almost every year. Low food
prices for urban workers were not only rationalized in terms of
equitable income distribution but also served to increase industrial
profits and capital formation at the expense of farm producers.
Adverse terms of trade for farm producers due to this policy
further impoverished the already poor rural economy. It hindered
efforts to increase food production while at the same time it stimulated
rice consumption, resulting in a widening food gap. As long as a large
portion of the shortage could be covered by local currency purchases
under the PL 480 program, the food gap did not impose a serious burden
on the country's foreign exchange position. But when the U.S. policy
shifted in the late 1960s to cash or credit sales in U.S. dollars, the
food grain situation became directly related to the balance of payments
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position. In 1962, for instance, the total value of imported food grain
amounted to $70 million, of which $34 million (or approximately 50
percent) was used for PL 480 purchases. By 1975, grain worth $700
million was imported on cash or credit terms. In the early 1980s the
country had to spend more than $1 billion annually for grain imports.
Faced with a rising food shortage, the resultant foreign
exchange constraints, and a growing disparity in income between urban
and rural households in the 1960s, Korean policymakers were obliged to
give serious consideration to expanding food grain production. In
particular, the world food crisis and soaring grain prices in the early
1970s made it almost inevitable for the government to shift the emphasis
of its development strategy toward agriculture.
The government undertook to improve the terms of trade in favor
of farm producers by raising the real purchase prices for rice and
barley, and after 1969 the prices of agricultural products rose more
rapidly than the prices paid by farmers for nonfarm products.
Higher purchase prices for grains clearly reflected a dramatic
change in farm price policy. Under conventional grain practices,
because of the intermediate handling costs incurred by the government, a
higher purchase price would have automatically led to a higher selling
price to consumers. A higher selling price, however, may exert upward
pressure upon the general price level as well as upon urban living
costs. The only way to protect the interests of farm producers and
urban consumers simultaneously was to establish a two-price system for
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major food grains -- higher prices for commodities sold by farmers and
lower prices for goods sold to urban consumers.
The implementation of the two-price system, however, conflicted
with other objectives, such as financial and monetary stability. As the
difference between the purchase and selling prices of rice and barley
widened, the financial losses of the grain management fund increased.
Since a large portion of this deficit was financed by inflationary or by
long-term overdrafts from the Bank of Korea, this policy became a major
factor in an increase in the money supply. Expansion of the government
deficit due to the two-price policy finally emerged as a serious
constraint to the policy.
In the mid-1970s the government began to take measures to
reduce the deficit. The burden of reducing this deficit fell on farm
producers. Annual increases in the purchase prices of rice began to
fall behind the rate of inflation. There were two reasons for this
shift. First, policymakers became increasingly concerned about upward
pressure on the general price level caused by increases in the money
supply resulting from inflationary financing of the grain deficit.
Second, the financial requirements for developing heavy industry and
expanding social overhead capital were enormous, and the costs of the
two-price policy almost exceeded the tolerable limit.
Relative Importance of Objectives
Of the many conceivable objectives sought by the government,
the following six are directly relevant to the formulation of
agricultural pricing policy:
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1. Enhancing farm income;
2. Food self-sufficiency;
3. Reducing foreign exchange expenditures on food imports;
4. General price stability;
5. Urban consumer welfare;
6. Reducing government costs.
The relationships among the objectives are clear. The first
three objectives complement one another, but they compete with the last
three objectives. That is, a higher grain price will provide farm
producers with incentives to expand production, while at the same time
improving farm income. Expanded production and reduced consumption due
to higher prices may reduce imports of foreign grain. On the other
hand, a higher grain price may have a negative effect upon the general
price level, government costs, and urban living expenditures.
However, depending on how the government operates the food
grain program, competitive objectives as defined above may not always be
in conflict. For instance, a two-price system for grain may achieve the
conflicting objectives of higher farm income and lower consumer
prices. But such a system conflicts with the objective of reducing
government costs.
The South Korean government has historically placed higher
priority on general price stability which favors the urban, industrial
sector, with a support-period exception during the 1969-75 period.
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Table 6 presents the authors' judgement of the relative importance of
policy objectives, with numerical weights assigned to each category of
objectives.
Table 6. Relative Importance of Objectives
1950-68 1969-75 1976-84
Farm Income 0.3 0.5 0.2
Food Self-Sufficiency
Foreign Exchange - 0.2 0.2
Price Stability
Urban Consumer Welfare 0.5 0.3 0.3
Government Costs 0.2 - 0.3
Government Institutions and Parastatals
The Korean government's efforts to achieve such objectives as
food security and equitable income for the rural population is reflected
in pervasive intervention in the agricultural sector by public and semi-
public institutions.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) has primary
responsibility for formulating agricultural policies and development
programs in rural areas. Other ministries, such as the Ministry of Home
Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Economic Planning Board,
and the Ministry of Construction are also concerned with improving the
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rural infrastructure, rural employment, rural industrialization, and
living conditions. Various bureaus within the MAF have authority for
foodgrain and other price support programs, land and water resource
development, fertilizer distribution, credit programs, marketing
programs, and imports and exports of agricultural products.
Three other organizations directly concerned with agricultural
price policy and product marketing include the National Agricultural
Cooperatives Federation (NACF), the National Livestock Cooperatives
Federation (NLCF), and the Agricultural and Fisheries Development
Corporation (AFDC).
NACF is a nationwide organization consisting of 1,476 local
primary cooperatives for producers of major grains and 42 special-
purpose cooperatives for marketing mostly horticultural products. NACF
handles grain price support and distribution programs, and has a
monopoly on fertilizer distribution. It provides farm credit, markets
farm products, and sells various agricultural inputs.
In principle, NACF is supposed to be a voluntary'
organization. But in reality, it acts more as a monopolistic arm of the
government. As a consequence, Korean farmers do not regard NACF or its
local cooperatives as their own organization. Farmers exercise little
control over NACF and have only a small investment in its capital
structure. Economic and political conditions at the time NACF was
formed in 1961 made it necessary for the newly-formed organization to
depend heavily on the government for financial support.
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NLCF was established in 1980, being consolidated with the
Livestock Industry Development Corporation created in 1978. This
organization provides livestock development loans to its members and
imports and exports livestock products under an MAF-determined supply
and demand program. NLCF also controls the Livestock Development fund
which finances technological and infrastructural support for livestock
development and offers credit to farmers for purchases of dairy and beef
cattle.
In 1983, NLCF and its member cooperatives entered the banking
business in rural areas. Since membership in livestock cooperatives is
open only to farmers with five beef cattle or more, ineligible cattle
farmers lost access to credit from formal sources. The separation of
rural credit functions between the NACF and NLCF evidently discriminates
against farmers who raise only one or two cattle or a few swine.
AFDC was created in 1968. Its main function is to make loans
for the development of facilities for processing, storage, and marketing
of agricultural, forestry, and fisheries products. It obtains its funds
from government and foreign sources, including the World Bank. Because
of financial limitations, AFDC tends to favor relatively well-
established agro-firms in urban areas.
AFDC also controls the Agricultural Products Price
Stabilization Fund and carries out buffer stock operations for such
agricultural items as peanuts, red peppers, sesame seeds, soybeans,
garlic, and onions. Yearly determined amounts are procured at off-
season, when prices are high. AFDC was given sole authority to import
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and export the quantities necessary to perform its buffer operations.
In most cases, it loses in handling domestic products but profits from
imports.
Major Instruments of Price Intervention
The major policy instruments used by the government for price
intervention are: (1) government purchase of staple food grains and
price determination; (2) government monopoly of fertilizer distribution,
and price determination; (3) control of agricultural credit; (4) buffer
stock operations for non-cereal farm products; (5) a system of price
ceilings for beef and pork; and (6) quantitative restrictions and
tariffs on agricultural imports. Some of these topics are discussed
below, while some are discussed elsewhere in this report.
Purchase of Grain and Price Determination. Foodgrain
administration is the responsibility of the Food Bureau in the Ministry
of Agriculture and Fisheries. The Food Bureau is responsible for
formulating and implementing food policies and programs at the national
level. Food divisions in provincial and city administrations receive
instructions from and report to the Food Bureau.
Financial transactions involving the Food Bureau are handled by
the NACF as the Food Bureau's agent. Through its city and county
branches and primary unit coops, the NACF disburses funds to pay for
grain purchased from farmers.
The government acquires grain from farmers at prices set by the
government during or after the harvest season. The major acquisition
programs include: (1) direct purchase, (2) rice-fertilizer barter, and
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(3) collection of harvest taxes in kind. In recent times, almost all
grains have been acquired through direct purchases. The principal
supply programs are: (1) military use, (2) government institutions, (3)
prisoners and detainees, (4) relief, (5) seed grain distribution, (6)
grain loans, (7) price stabilization, and (8) contingency or emergency
programs.
In the earlier period a major function of the government grain
operation was to supply the armed forces and government institutions.
The emphasis now has been shifted to supporting producer prices at
levels sufficient to give farmers strong production incentives and to
assure consumers of low prices. Implementation of the price support
policy has been through the operation of the government's Grain
Management Fund (GMF).
Buffer Stocks. The buffer stock program is intended primarily
to prevent excessive price fluctuations. The government set in motion
in 1970 a program to purchase selected agricultural commodities at
government-set prices during their harvest seasons and to sell during
the off-season, when prices begin to rise. Selling prices are
determined on the basis of the purchase price plus handling and storing
costs, with the prevailing market prices also taken into considera-
tion. The list of products stockpiled under the program encompassed red
pepper, garlic and sesame in 1971. Peanuts, eggs, soybeans, onions, and
laver (processed sea weed) were added to the list later.
In light of the fact that the stockpiling program requires a
lump-sum release of government funds (through the Agricultural and
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Fisheries Development Corporation) to purchase crops in a short period
of time, the government initiated a marketing-regulation program in 1972
to complement the stockpiling program. Under this program, the AFDC
makes advance payments to producers--instead of buying crops directly
from them--to enable them to hold their products off the market during
the harvest season, when prices tend to be depressed. A study (Moon,
1982) indicates that this program made a substantial contribution to
alleviating fluctuations in prices, resulting in benefits for both
producers and consumers.
QRs and Tariffs. Prior to 1956, all imports had to be approved
by the government. But a semi-annual trade program was instituted in
1957, when some automatically-approved items began to be included in the
trade list. Although substantial liberalization of imports of
manufactured items has been undertaken by the government in recent
years, most of the important agricultural products are still on the
restricted list, reflecting a highly protective agricultural policy.
Out of 492 CCCN eight-digit agricultural commodities, 149 items were
still subject to quantitative restrictions as of 1985. They included
rice, feed corn, corn for industrial use, soybeans, milo, compound
feeds, beef, pork, etc. Imports of these items are allowed only when
importers obtain licensing from the relevant ministries, mainly the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Licenses are issued only when
domestic producers cannot meet demand.
A uniform tariff of 10 percent was levied on all imports until
1950. In 1950, however, the government introduced a multi-tariff
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system, with rates differing with commodities. For agricultural
commodities, the tariff rates range from 5 to 30 percent of imported
value--5 percent for rice and wheat, 7 percent for feed corn, 10 percent
for soybeans, 22 percent for meatstuffs, and 30 percent for corn for
industrial use. In actuality, however, a significant proportion of
imports of major grains are exempted from tariffs to achieve price
stabilization in the domestic market.
Historically, tariffs on agricultural imports have not been
used by the Republic of Korea to raise government revenue nor to
maintain domestic producer prices by insulating domestic from world
prices. Therefore, inasmuch as agricultural commodities are concerned,
tariffs have not been an effective deterrent to imports. It is
quantitative restrictions that are used to ensure that domestic prices
are not reduced by competition from cheaper imports.
Phases of Intervention
The evolution of price intervention by government can be
divided into five different phases, depending on the extent to which
price interventions were used, their complexity, and the direction in
which they were changing.
Phase I is characterized by government intervention in the
prices of a limited number of important products or inputs. The rates
of subsidization or taxation are relatively low. Phase II is
characterized by increasingly complex intervention both in the number of
subsidized or taxed products and in the instruments used. Phase III is
defined as a period of transition in which the government attempts to
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reform the system of agricultural price intervention. This reform may
be part of a more general effort to rectify distortions in other
policies, such as international trade, the exchange rate, monetary
policies, etc. This reform effort may result in the elimination of
price controls for some products to bring their relative prices into
line with their equivalent border prices.
If Phase III is successful, it is normally followed by Phase
IV. The main feature of Phase IV is a reduction in intervention. Phase
V is characterized by a virtual absence of direct price intervention.
In Phase V, the relative internal prices of agricultural products at the
producer and consumer levels are approximately equal to their equivalent
relative border prices.
Korea's agricultural pricing policies during 1950-69 can be
characterized as belonging to Phase I. Government price intervention
was limited to staple foods, notably rice and barley, and fertilizer.
The degree of market control varied from year to year. The Grain
Management Law, enacted in 1950, gave the government the authority to
regulate the prices of staple foods. The market share of government-
controlled rice was less than 10 percent during the 1950s but expanded
to 20-25 percent during the 1960s. Throughout this period, the
government placed emphasis on maintaining low domestic prices for staple
foods.
In the early 1970s there was a move toward Phase II, with
government price intervention becoming more intense. The buffer-stock
operation for non-cereal products was set in motion, and pesticides and
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farm machinery were added to the list of subsidized inputs. The
government's purchase prices for rice and barley had been steadily
raised with a view to increasing food production as well as reducing the
urban-rural income gap. As a consequence, the average effective rate of
protection for rice rose from (-)26 percent in 1962-69 to 39 percent in
1970-79. Although the government raised the producer prices for staple
food grains, it did so without a comparable rise in the market prices of
rice and barley. The result was a substantial deficit in the grain
account that had to be made up by the central bank.
Entering the 1980s, the Korean government took a great leap
forward by reducing both tariff and non-tariff protection for
manufacturing industries. It announced a plan to raise the import
liberalization ratio to 95.2 percent by 1988. In other words, Korea
began to move from Phase IV to Phase V with respect to industry. In
contrast, the level of protection for agriculture has steadily
increased. The producer prices of farm products continue to be
maintained far above border prices, and most agricultural commodities
are still on the list of import restrictions. The effective rate of
protection for rice has risen to 74 percent, and that for beef to as
high as 112 percent.
At present, one observes no signs of an effort to reduce
government intervention in agricultural pricing policies and to move to
Phase III. Hence, so far as agricultural pricing policy is concerned,
Korea still remains in Phase II. Table 7 indicates the related policy
decisions which characterize each of the two phases.
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Table 7. Phases of Intervention
Years Phase Main Feature of Phase
1950-69 I Enactment of the Land Reform Law, 1949
Tenant-farmed land distributed
to tenants and landlords paid in
government bonds with the face
value stated in terms of rice.
Enactment of the Grain Management Law,1950
Government given full authority
to control food market, including
purchase and selling prices,
imports and exports of grain, etc.
Signing of the U.S. Farm Surplus Importa-
tation Agreement (PL 480), 1955
Importation of above 10% of total
grain requirement made it easier
to control grain market and to
pursue low-price policies for
staple food grains through supply
management.
Market share of government controlled
rice rose from 10% in 1950-59 to 20-25%
in 1960-69.
Newly established NACF given sole authority
to distribute chemical fertilizer, 1962.
Domestic currency(won) substantially
overvalued under the fixed exchange rate
system
Annual average inflation rates 17.5% for
1955-59, 13.0% for 1960-69
Exchange rate devalued by 100%, from 130
to 256 won per US$, 1964
Effective rate of protection for rice
rose from (-)28.87. in 1962 to (-)22.4%
in 1969, and that for beef from (-)23.9Z
to (-)2.67.
Two-price policy initiated for rice and
barley, 1969
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Table 7 cont.
1970-85 II Buffer-stock operation initiated for
non-cereal farm products including red
pepper, sesame, peanuts, garlic, etc.,
1972.- The number of products steadily
increased.
World food crisis spurred government to
use price incentives for increased food
production, and government purchase
prices for rice and barley steadily
raised, resulting in large amount of
government deficit. Government deficit
compensated for by inflationary financing.
Rice saving measures enforced, e.g. no
rice serving for two days a week, etc.
1973.
Saemaul Movement initiated, 1972
Market share of government controlled
rice rose to 35.-407 by the early 1980s.
Rice self-sufficiency nearly attained
by the early 1980s.
Ceiling price system for beef and pork
implemented, 1979.
Annual average inflation rates 15.67 for
1970-79 and 13.0% for 1980-84.
Exchange rates devalued by 13% in 1971,
21% in 1974 and 207 in 1980, and exchange
control reduced by adopting floating
system, 1980.
Import liberalization ratio of manufac-
tured goods increased to 907 by 1985.
Agricultural protection rates steadily
rose; effective rate of protection for
rice rose from (-)16.9% in 1970 to 52.0%
in 1984, and that for beef from 0.07 to
151.5%.
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Chapter 3
MEASURES OF INTERVENTION
We begin by analyzing the effects of direct government
intervention, such as direct price control or price support, in the
prices of major agricultural products. In analyzing these effects, our
basic premise is that government intervention in the pricing mechanism
causes a distortion in the relative prices which would otherwise prevail
in the competitive market, regardless of its legitimacy in terms of
greater economic efficiency or more equitable income distribution.
Effect of Direct Intervention on Relative Prices
The approach used here is to start with existing relative
prices (which reflect the effects of all price interventions) and then
to subtract the various price interventions to determine relative prices
without intervention (The World Bank, 1985). In order to do this, it is
necessary to have a reference price. A commonly accepted reference
price is the international price of a commodity at the country's border,
i.e., the border price. This notion is based on the assumption that the
prices of traded or tradable goods tend to equal the price of the same
commodity on international markets. Despite the fact that there are a
number of problems and limitations in using the borderprice as a
reference price, it appears to capture the real opportunities open to
countries through trade and hence provide a useful reference point.
Usual practice is that the c.i.f. import price is used in the case of
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importable goods as the border price and the f.o.b. export price is used
in the case of exportable goods as the border price, where it is
converted into domestic currency at the official exchange rate.2/
In measuring the net effect of direct intervention on relative
prices, the prevailing relative prices at the producer level are
calculated first. Next, the relative prices that would have prevailed
in the absence of direct intervention (relative border prices) are
calculated. Finally, the percentage differences between the prevailing
2/ In measuring the nominal protection rate (NPRD) for Korea for
1955-63, Anderson and Hayami (1986, p. 22, p. 124) used the
purchasing-power-parity effective exchange rate on imports
obtained from "Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development:
South Korea, pp. 70-73" (Frank, Kim and Westphal, 1975) to convert
the domestic prices of nine agricultural products to border price
equivalents. Frank, Kim and Westphal estimated the purchasing-
power-parity exchange rate after adding the actual tariff and
foreign exchange tax per dollar of imports to the official
exchange rate. Since the actual tariff belongs to direct measure
and foreign exchange tax to indirect measure in our concept, it is
doubtful that Anderson;and Hayami's calculation could be
appropriately defined as the "nominal protection rate." Moreover,
they used the purchasing-power-parity effective rate expressed in
real terms (deflated by Korea's WPI: 1965=100.0) for 1955-63
while using the nominal official exchange rate for 1964-82,
resulting in conceptual inconsistency. Also, a question has been
raised whether the measure of direct intervention (NPRD) should be
based on the effective exchange rate on exports or the official
exchange rate. There are two reasons why the effective exchange
rate on exports cannot be applied to measure NPRD. First, we are
dealing with agricultural products obtained by Korea almost
entirely through imports. Second, even if there were years in
which Korea exported rice (mostly in small amounts), farm
producers had nothing to do with the effective exchange rate
because the government had a monopoly on rice exports. The effect
of this government monopoly is to be captured in indirect
measure. As reference, however, the nominal protection rates
(NPRD) were measured for five products using the nominal effective
exchange rate for both producer prices and consumer prices (see
Appendix 34a and 34b).
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relative prices and those that would have prevailed in the absence of
price intervention are obtained, and are referred to as "nominal
protection rates" (NPR).
Selection of Products
Three crops and two livestock products were selected for
analysis: rice, barley, soybeans, beef, and pork. Rice was chosen
because it is both the major food crop and the major tradable crop.
Although its relative importance in Korea's total agricultural
production is gradually declining, rice still constituted about 86
percent of the total value of agricultural output as of 1984. Korea
exported rice until the mid-1960s, and has been an importing country
since 1967, except for a few years of bumper crops. Barley is the
second largest crop, comprising 3 to 4 percent of the total value of
agricultural output. Although self-sufficiency was attained in the
early 1970s (not by increased production but by a decline in
consumption), barley is classified as importable because of the past
record of imports. Korea was self-sufficient in soybeans until the mid-
1960s, but the rate of import-dependency rose to 76 percent in 1984 and
was expected to increase further in the future. Domestic production of
wheat and corn is trivial, making the country dependent upon imports.
There was therefore no point in including those two commodities in the
analysis. Beef and pork were included because of their increasing
importance in Korean agriculture.
Prices. To obtain border prices for each commodity, f.o.b.
export prices were used for those years in which Korea exported the
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commodity (after subtracting transport costs to major ports to get
producer-price equivalents), and c.i.f. import prices were used for
those years in which Korea imported the commodity. For those years in
which Korea did not export or import significant quantities of a
commodity, the import prices of Japan or Hong Kong were used as the
proxy for border prices. Since prices differ by shipment, weighted
annual average prices were obtained by dividing the total value of
imports or exports by the quantity for each year. All producer prices
are a weighted average of the government procurement price and the free
market price, with the weights equal to the shares procured by the
government and sold in the free market, respectively.
Since Korea imported mostly U.S. Californian Pearl or Carlose
rice, the quality of which is similar to that of Korean rice, a price
adjustment for quality difference was not made. As for beef and pork,
since producers are selling live cattle and live swine, producer
equivalent beef and pork prices were obtained by applying appropriate
conversion ratios. In measuring the effect of price intervention on
consumer prices, consumer equivalent border prices were obtained by
adding handling and transportation costs to border prices in order to
make the two prices comparable.
The estimated net effect of direct intervention in producer
prices is presented in Table 8.1 and 8.2, that for consumer prices in
Table 8'-1 and 8'-2. Measurement procedures are given in the footnote
of each table.
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The figures in columns (1)-(4) in Table 8-1 give the annual
relative border prices of barley, soybeans, beef, and pork vis-a-vis
that of rice evaluated at the official rate, while those in columns (5)-
(9) give the relative border prices of the five products vis-a-vis that
of non-agricultural goods (PNA). The figures in columns (1)-(4) in
Table 8-2 give the estimated direct relative nominal producer protection
rates of barley, soybeans, beef, and pork vis-a-vis rice, and those in
columns (5)-(9) represent the estimated direct nominal producer
protection rates (NPRD) of the five products vis-a-vis the prices of
non-agricultural goods.
The estimated NPRD in columns (5)-(9) in Table 8-2 indicates
that production of rice, barley, soybeans, and beef relative to
production of non-agricultural goods was, in general, increasingly
protected during the 1960-84 period. Only in the case of pork did the
policy result in a decline in the nominal rate of protection. The
average nominal rate of protection (NPRD) for rice rose from 14 percent
during 1960-69 to almost 100 percent during 1980-84, while that for beef
rose from 11 percent to as high as 138 percent. In contrast, the NPRD
for pork declined from 40 percent during 1960-69 to 11 percent during
1980-84. This implies that Korea's swine-raising industry continuously
improved its efficiency.
The figures in columns (5)-(9) of Table 8'-2 give the estimated
nominal protection rates for consumers. Contrary to the figures in the
corresponding columns of Table 8-2, the positive sign represents the
consumer tax and the negative sign consumer protection. For soybeans,
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beef, and pork, the nominal rates of protection carry a positive sign
throughout 1960-84, implying that consumers have been persistently taxed
by consumption of these three products. For rice and barley there were
several years during 1960-84 in which consumers were subsidized due to
prices lower than border prices. Overall, the price distortions due to
direct intervention in prices resulted in subsidizing farm producers and
taxing consumers.
Effect of Indirect Intervention on Relative Prices
Apart from direct intervention in prices, other government
actions affect the relative prices of agricultural products. Exchange
rate overvaluation, along with import tariffs and quantitative
restrictions, are thought to be the most important. To obtain a new
series of prices that would have prevailed in the absence of policy
intervention, the tradable part of the non-agricultural price index was
first adjusted by eliminating protection measures (tariffs and import
quotas). Then, product prices were adjusted for exchange rate
overvaluation. A new series of adjusted domestic prices for the five
products and the relative effects of indirect intervention are presented
in Table 9 for producer prices and Table 9' for consumer prices.
Since the five products dealt with in this study are all
tradable goods, and producers and consumers are equally affected by
trade and exchange rate policy, the magnitude of indirect effects in
relative terms is the same for both producer and consumer prices. The
estimated results in Tables 9 and 9' clearly indicate that indirect
price intervention had a negative effect on both producer and consumer
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Table 8-1. Effect of Direct Price Intervention on Relative Producer Prices, 1960-84
(Relative Border Prices at E0)
Relative to Rice Relative to PNA
Barley/ Soybean/ Beef/ Pork/ Rice/ Barley/ Soybean/ 8eef/ Pork/
Rice Rice Rice Rice pKA PNA PNA pNA pNA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1,000 won/MT
1960 .599 .657 4.970 3.834 115.2 68.9 75.7 572.4 441.6
61 .411 .860 5.911 4.098 191.7 78.7 164.9 1,133.3 785.7
62 .735 .749 4.824 3.377 218.0 160.1 163.3 1,051.5 736.1
63 .684 .746 4.893 3.032 198.3 135.7 147.9 970.3 601.3
64 .649 .753 4.201 3.151 308.9 200.6 232.7 1,297.7 973.2
65 .491 .739 4.474 2.842 309.6 150.0 228.3 1.385.3 879.8
66 .823 .754 5.173 2.887 265.9 218.9 200.5 1,375.3 767.6
67 .749 .651 4.673 2.591 274.8 205.9 178.8 1,284.1 713.4
68 .604 .677 4.931 2.651 247.4 149.5 167.4 1,219.9 655.9
69 .511 .529 5.019 2.778 255.5 - 130.6 135.1 1,282.6 709.8
70 .640 .575 5.416 2.610 246.3 157.7 141.7 1,334.2 642.8
71 .637 .903 7.299 3.306 200.7 127.8 181.3 1.464.9 663.6
72 .677 .932 8.542 3.797 190.1 128.7 177.2 1,623.6 721.6
73 .612 .846 6.308 2.560 338.5 207.1 286.3 2,135.3 866.7
74 .560 .624 3.952 2.511 476.2 266.5 296.9 1,881.9 1,195.7
75 .684 .601 3.618 2.535 465.4 318.2 279.8 1,683.5 1,179.5
76 .787 .924 6.412 4.853 267.4 210.5 247.1 1,714.4 1,297.7
77 .775 1.372 8.662 6.539 205.0 158.8 281.2 1,775.5 1,340.4
78 .528 .771 5.957 7.801 272.9 144.1 210.5 1,625.7 2,128.9
79 .645 1.024 9.029 8.673 195.1 125.9 200.0 1,761.7 1,692.3
80 .666 .786 8.660 6.316 238.3 158.8 187.4 2,063.8 1,505.4
81 .651 .750 7.973 9.169 262.8 171.2 197.0 2,095.7 2,410.1
82 .495 .587 7.202 9.952 285.2 127.9 151.6 1,859.9 2,570.0
83 .426 .565 7.282 6.210 282.1 120.2 159.2 2,054.0 1,751.6
84 .551 .556 5.860 4.915 305.1 168.0 169.6 1,787.8 1,499.4
Source: Computed from Appendix 13,. 16a and 33a.
Table 8-2. Effect of Direct Price Intervention on Relative Producer Prices, 1960-84
(Direct Nominal Protection Rates:NPRO)
Relative to Rice a/ Relative to PNA P..
Year NPR tIPR NPR NPR NPR NPR NPR NPR NPR
(Barley/ (Soybean/ (beef/ Pork/ (Rice/ (barley/ (soybean/ (Beef/ (Pork/
Rice) R1ce) Rice) Rice) NA) NA) NA) NA) NA)
(1) (2J) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1960 .080 .391 -.006 -. 109 .848 .996 1.571 .837 .646
61 .739 -.129 -.258 -.231 .280 1.226 .115 -.051 -.015
62 .021 .007 -. 088 .248 .145 .169 .153 .044 .429
63 .202 -. 060 -. 394 -. 166 .824 1.192 .934 .105 .521
64 .321 .294 -.338 -.073 .172 .561 .516 -.224 .087
65 .417 .468 .076 .369 -.088 .292 .3;8 -.020 .247
66 -.239 .533 .037 .155 -.061 -.286 .439 -.026 .084
67 -.124 1.144 .336 .579 -.107 -.217 .914 .193 .410
68 .010 .225 .389 .896 .051 .061 .287 .460 .993
69 .121 .382 .179 .209 .149 .288 .587 .355 .389
70 -.132 .750 .140 .462 .208 .049 1.114 .377 .765
71 -.037 -.085 -.184 .126 .719 .655 .574 .402 .936
72 -.088 -.127 -.277 -.304 1.101 .915 .834 .519 .463
73 -.014 .078 .009 .399 .198 .173 .282 .200 .664
74 -.057 .245 .253 .143 .007 -.051 .254 .261 .150
75 -.144 .253 .187 .316 .110 -. 050 .391 .317 .461
76 -.361 -.065 -.083 -.225 1.028 .292 .888 .852 .565
77 -.138 -.189 -. 119 -.428 1.480 1.137 1.011 1.186 .419
78 .221 .305 .530 -.365 .951 1.383 1.547 1.986 .240
79 -.104 -.420 -.229 -.647 1.864 1.566 .661 1.210 .011
80 -.153 .194 -.258 -.500 1.361 1.001 1.819 .752 .181
81 -.138 .558 .024 -.487 1.136 .848 2.327 1.186 .096
82 .236 .817 .327 -.547 1.036 1.517 2.670 1.702 .078
83 .470 1.081 .437 -.355 .790 1.631 2.725 1.572 .154
84 .143 1.038 .637 -.3.66 .652 .889 2.367 1.706 .048
Source: Computed from Table 8-1 and Appendix 32a.
a/ Domestic producer prices of tradables/Oomestic producer price of rice 1
Border prices of tradables at EO/Border prices of rice at Eo
t/ (Domestic producer price / PtA) / (Border price PNA - 1
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Table 8'--1. Effect of Direct Price Interventions on Relative Consumer Pri:es, 135G-1984
(Relative Consurer Equivalent Border Prices at Ew )
fielalive to Rice ' Relative to PN,, b)
Year Barlthy. Soybean- Beef.- Pork. Rice 11arliey Saybetia.' - eef. Porl.
Rice Rice Rice Rice PFM'P r rN PN
C1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) W1,88.44T (8) (9)(7)
365 .738 .7G4 5.146 3.673 161.9 115.6 123.7 833.2 594.:
61 .58i .876 6.944 4.931 235.2 138.9 286.9 1.421.7 948.2
62 .798 .75S 5.8.9 3.499 2G4.2 211.1 290.3 1,347.3 921.4
63 .791 .738 4.741 2.574 264.6 2R1.3 195.2 1.254.2 785.8
64 .794 .764 4.266 3.211 3C6.5 2!1.1 288.1 1,563.4 1,176.5
GS .532 .787 4.847 3.2tl 346.2 218.9 272.4 1,678.1 1,188.8
66 .993 .818 5.383 3.367 396.t 27G.8 259.7 1,658.5 979.9
67 .843 .739 4.548 2.928 338.9 28S.9 254.1 1,573.4 928.3
68 .643 .757 5.554 3.138 295.7 356.3 223.7 1,642.2 928.3
69 .595 .668 5.88 3.277 295.7 176.8 155.2 1,738.7 963.1
7t .656 .675 6.189 3.937 292.0 263.3 197.3 1,886.9 886.6
71 .63t .515 7.539 3.C87 264.7 16C.7 243.2 1.995.8 97G.I
72 .716 1.936 8.641 3.991 253.6 181.2 2C2.1 2.186.3 1,899.7
73 .62 .859 6.628 2.915 488.2 245.9 367.1 2.792.6 1,119.1
74 .613 .766 4.595 2.858 52S.7 322.4 465.1 2,429.6 1,587.1
7S .683 .683 4.065 2.835 559.1 383.7 381.9 2.239.0 13585.2
76 .163 1.072 6.569 4.885 365.8 293.8 352.1 2.,43.3 1.758.9
77 1.616 1.443 8.684 5.957 297.8 382.6 429.7 2.585.8 1.773.9
7t .798 1.115 6.383 6.851 382.8 382.6 388.3 2,412.4 2,637.5
t9 .786 1.242 7.578 6.394 327.7 25I.5 467.8 2,483.1 2,955.1
is .838 .878 6.738 4.530 435.I 348.0 354.3 2,797.1 IM,8 S.5
81 .866 .S45 6.259 6.224 47:.9 489.6 359.7 2.978.5 2,943.3
82 .626 .7S3 6.859 6.678 456.1 285.7 357.3 2,759.5 3,142.1
83 .532 .745 6.821 4.894 441.9 235.2 325.5 3.814.? 2,162.7
84 .562 .788 5.28S 3.568 596.7 284.8 359.3 2.675.5 1,808.8
Source: Computed from Appendix 13, 16b and 33b.
a/ Border prices of tradables at E + Handling and transportation costs
_ ode pie f ie t anligan tasprttoncot
Border price of rice at Eo + Handling and transportation costs
(Border prices of tradables at Eo0 + Handling and transportation costs) /PNA
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TabIe 8 -2. Efftct of Dirict Price I atervention on RkelaLivt. rIsuor prirces, 1I69-1384(Girect Numinal Prntectiur Rat .c: Hl'll
Rllative to Rice C RelaLive to PNA b)
Year NPR D NPRC NJPR C NPR - NPR S NPR NPRC NPR c NPRC
(Barley/ (SuybedLr . (Beef. (Puriv (Rice- (Barley. (SoybeaW. (Cee? (Porkl
Rice) Rice) Ricu) Rice) NA) NA) NA) NA) NA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1968 -.192 -.177 39 .984 .523 .368 *.793 .314 .529
61 .266 -.15? .698 -.133 .177 .439 -.992 .252? .026
62 -. 949 -.911 .354 .175 .632 -.989 .621 .398 .212
63 -.928 .635 -. 835 -.866 .404 .451 .546 .442 .403
64 .171 .2t6 .619 -. 032 .9C2 .13G .2S1 .682 .98l
65 .161 .3a8 .254 .383 -. 114 .629 .168 .111 .226
66 -. 229 .411 .225 .442 -. 13G -. 326 .219 .6G2 .240
67 -.131 .79i .435 .688 -.184 -. 1:s .461 .171 .378
68 -. 078 .11? .88! .919 -.698 -. 151 .612 .638 .745
69 -.659 .383 .716 .636 -. 026 -. 684 .263 .671 .592
7I -. 137 .691 .616 .587 .831 -.119 .651 .666 .636
71 .117 .848 .333 .588 .271 .293 .33? .694 .396
72 -.236 -. 146 -.936 -. 91I .788 .2S9 .451 .639 .G98
73 -.I58 .863 .389 .58. .62! -.838 .t86 .337 .618
74 -.254 .18C .673 .433 -.14: -. 369 .817 .436 .238
75 -.313 .255 .743 .636 -.993 -. 3CS .138 .581 .523
7G -. 416 -. 152 .246 .I63 .46C -. 144 .389 .826 .559
77 -.435 -.172 .118 -.185 .785 .I8I .478 .995 .455
78 -. 271 .199 .546 -. 146 .344 -.628 .599 1.877 .148
79 -.456 .124 .t53 -.217 .685 -.127 .415 .859 .145
so -. 6GZ .162 .113 -. :8a .588 -.418 .653 .6t7 .187
81 -.519 .343 .324 -.244 .426 -.311 .916 .888 .678
S2 -.418 .354 .487 -. 33a .396 -.188 .899 1.676 -.976
83 -.896 .653 .527 -. 149 .3I9 .281 1.196 1.029 .131
84 -. 173 .53s .855 -.IR8 .139 .f57 .822 1.113 .816
Seurce: Computed from Table '-1 and Appendix 32b.
Domestic onsumer prices of tradabjes / DomesLic consumer price of rice
a) - I
Consumer quiv. border prices of tradables / Consumer quiv. border price of rice
Domestic onsumer p ices / PNA
b)
Consumer quiv. border pricas /N
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prices throughout 1960-84. To put it differently, both the producer and
consumer-equivalent border prices used in measuring the effect of direct
intervention were underestimated by the ratios calculated in column (6)
due to overvaluation of the Korean won. For instance, the maintenance
of an overvalued exchange rate resulted in the border prices of these
five products being on average 20 percent lower than they would
otherwise have been during the 1960s, about 15 percent lower during the
1970s, and 7-8 percent lower during 1980-84.
Using a new series of product prices and a non-agricultural
price index which was adjusted to indirect price intervention, a new
series of relative prices and "real protection rates" (NPRT) for each
product was calculated, as shown in Table 10-2 for producer prices and
Table 10'-2 for consumer prices.
Columns (5)-(9) of Table 10-2 give estimated relative real
protection rates (NPRT). One can observe from the estimated results
that rice, barley, and beef were subject to negative protection in most
years during the 1960s, average NPRT being (-)27 percent for rice, (-)19
percent for barley, and (-)9 percent for beef. But with an increasing
subsidy since the early 1970s, the real protection -ites have been
consistently increasing for all the products except pork. The real
protection rate rose to 74 percent for rice, 91 percent for barley, 198
percent for soybeans, and 111 percent for beef, whereas that for pork
increased from (-)9 percent during 1960-69 to (-)5 percent during 1980-
84.
- 77 -
Additional Effects of Intervention on Relative Value Added
The present section attempts to measure the combined effects of
product and input price intervention, including exchange rate policy, on
value added. This measure allows for the fact that the domestic price
of inputs, like that of output, may differ from their border prices and
thus affect the value added of the production process. This is referred
to as the "effective rate of protection" (ERP). It is the percentage
difference between the value added (VA) expressed in domestic market
prices and the value added (VA*) expressed in border prices converted at
the equilibrium exchange rate.
The inputs considered for the three crops are tradable ones:
fertilizer, pesticides, and farm machinery. These three items account
for approximately 85-90 percent of the purchased inputs in the
production process of the three crops (excluding hired labor and
irrigation water). Other cost items, such as seeds, miscellaneous
materials, and depreciation of farm facilities are excluded because of
their non-tradability and their negligible share of costs. For beef and
pork, feed corn is the only input considered.
As the price of fertilizer, the average un- value (per metric
ton) was used for both domestic and border prices obtained from the
total value of consumption divided by total quantity used. The c.i.f.
import price was used when imported (prior to 1972), and f.o.b. export
price when exported (after 1972). For pesticides the domestic and
border price were simply assumed to be the same, since it is almost
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Table 9. Indirect Effects on Relative Producer Prices, 1968-1984
Prices Adjusted to Indirect Effects a/b
Year Rice/PNA Barley/P NA Soybean/PNA Beef/PMA Pork/PNA NPR
(1) (2) s1888,MT (3). (4) (5) (6)
1963 394.4 254.9 368.8 1,948.2 1,346.9 -.46
61 383.7 . 274.8 287.3 1,682.8 1,289.5 -.36
62 483.7 382.8 384.6 1,775.4 1,708.7 -.38
63 652.8 537.1 516.2 1,935.8 1,651.1 -.45
64 549.9 475.4 535.7 1,528.9 1,686.8 -. 34
65 386.8 269.1 419.6 1.861.5 1,584.6 -.27
66 366.8 229.3 423.1 1,964.2 1,228.1 -.32
67 362.7 238.2 5s5.9 2,264.9 1,486.6 -.32
68 398.7 243.3 338.4 2,738.3 2,884.1 * -. 35
69 442.3 253.4 323.1 2,611.9 1,485.1 -.34
78 436.4 242.5 439.2 2,693.8 1,664.3 -.32
71 515.2 315.9 426.0 3,86T.5 1,917.9 -.33
72 538.3 332.3 438.8 3,323.4 1,423.0 -.26
73 518.6 313.3 472.7 3,380.4 1,857.5 -.22
74 661.8 349.2 514.0 3,276.9 1,898.6 -.28
75 688.8 482.9 518.9 2,956.5 2,297.9 -.25
76 654.8 327.1 561.5 3,314.5 2,444.8 -.17
77 595.8 397.8 663.8 4,549.5 2,213.5 -.15
78 784.5 394.9 616.8 5,584.4 3,836.8 -.13
7s 688.8 397.7 408.4 4,792.4 2,187.1 -.19
88 695.8 392.9 653.3 4,472.3 2,199.1 -.19
81 658.4 369.2 768.6 5,373.5 3,897.8 -. 15
82 598.9 361.8 629.9 5,645.4 2,662.8 -. 11
83 554.3 347.2 651.8 5,797.8 2,219.4 -.89
84 547.8 344.4 619.5 5,248.6 1,785.8 -. 88
Source: Computed froa Appendix 12, 13, 14, 16a and 33a -
AI Pi * _0 , E0 (_ 0 PLT / (I + t ) +( pN
where Pi = Donestic producer price of tradable agricultural output
E = Free trade quiiibrium exclange rate
Eo = Norinal exchange rate
= Slhare of tradable part of P (CPI)
T= Index of prices of tradable part of P (CPI)
PN= Index of prices of nor,tradables of P (CPI)
tn= - Effect of trade taxes on P
* E*
b/ (Pi/P,) [Pi * p E T / (I t ) + (I p1 I
= E /3 pT , (I + t E0) (I -I I ) -]
o 0
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Table .9' Indirect Effect on Relative Consumer Prices, 1960-1984
Prices Adjusted to Indirect Effects a) b)
Year -PRI
Rice/PNA Barley/PNA Soybean/sA Beef/?NA Pork/PNA
(1) (2) VI,80/MT (4) (5) (6)
(3)
196i 457.8 383.1 411.3 3,878.6 1,683.6 -.46
61 492.8 321.3 321.3 2,872.7 1,511.9 -.36
62 441.0 338.3 338.8 3,846.2 1,812.8 -.38
63 713.6 548.5 544.7 3,264.2 1,992.7 -.45
64 591.8 502.3 544.7 2,569.5 1,837.2 -.34
65 428.5 388.6 433.1 2,555.9 1,861.5 -.27
66 388.5 273.4 448.2 2,569.9 1,773.8 -.32
67 383.7 281.0 548.7 2,724.1 1,891.3 -.32
68 412.4 247.6 347.1 4,124.5 2,483.4 -.35
69 433.8 243.8 373.2 4,377.8 2,325.3 -.34
70 441.5 265.4 477.8 4,415.3 2,127.6 -.32
71 582.3 321.8 483.5 5,049.8 2,777.4 -.33
72 579.8 317.3 512.6 4,830.4 2,311.3 -.26
73 536.9 304.8 513.3 4,653.9 2,479.4 -.22
74 626.7 285.8 569.2 4,816.6 2,599.0 -.28
75 675.8 321.6 579.2 4,716.9 3,219.4 -.25
76 645.3 382.7 655.5 5,288.6 3,297.4 -.17
77 623.0 357.6 744.4 6,058.6 3,825.3 -.15
78 591.7 341.1 714.5 5,764.7 3,483.1 -.13
79 647.4 281.1 734.1 5,656.4 2,951.9 -.19
88 770.8 250.6 757.1 5,776.9 2,761.8 -.19
81 791.8 336.0 862.1 6,594.6 3,722.4 '-.iS
82 715.4 268.7 758.8 6,438.1 3,157.5 -.11
83 . 644.6 310.0 794.2 6,713.0 2,685.8 -.89
84 626.4 326.5 789.5 6,135.3 1,993.1 -.08
Source: Computed from Table 7b and Appendix 12, 13, 14, 16b, and 33b.
a),b) See Foot Notes for Table 9.
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Table 10' -1 Effect of Direct and Indirect Price Interventions on Relative Cr ansuaer Prices, 1961-1384
(Relative Consurer Equivalent Border Prices at E
Relative to Ricea) Relative t ?NA
Year Barley/ Soybean/ Beef. Pork.' Ricea. Barley/. Soybean/ Beef/. Pork,
Rice Rice Rice Rice INA PNA 81A RI;A l;A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) t6) WI,1a844T (8) (9)(7)
1965 .658 .784 5.i46 3.761 378.7 243.3 266.7 1.911.7 1,424.1
61 .554 .868 5.989 4.a66 333.1 167.3 289.a 1,994.5 1,354.1
62 .766 .753 4.953 3.432 385.2 295.1 235.2 1,918.2 1.1322.1
63 .734 .743 4.828 3.ll9 463.6 236.4 355.5 1,348.3 1,214.6
64 .731 .75S 4.235 3.183 515.2 376.1 393.7 2.182.l 1.633.7
65 .581 .769 4.712 3.171 455.6 264.5 351.3 2.146.7 1.398.8
66 .874 .795 5.3a8 3.866 424.3 371.5 337.8 2.255.4 1,382.6
67 .858 .745 4.843 2.812 445.8 368.4 332.1 2,161.3 3,249.1
68 62: .726 5.313 2.951 421.2 264.7 355.1 2,237.8 1,242.7
69 563 .611 5.SSJ 3.8 421.3 236.8 256.7 2,334.1 1,297.7
71 .677 .645 5.313 2.8S8 452.5 272.6 257.5 2,382.1 1,162.3
71 .63t .913 7.456 3.558 357.6 225.9 326.5 2,666.3 1,272.5
72 .717 1.813 8.615 3.946 319.1 225.5 323.2 2,748.4 1,253.1
73 .684 .889 6.562 2.851 558.7 317.1 452.3 3,338.4 1,455.3
74 .536 .726 4.412 2.754 7M1.2 425.5 512.4 3,115.6 1,944.8
75 .S3S .663 3.937 2.761 711.1 485.6 476.5 2,774.7 1,359.7
76 .8'1 1.155 6.551 4.311 422.2 33S.3 445.3 2,765.5 2,538.3
77 .AS7 1.437 8.681 6.1U3 336.2 335.1 483.2 2.918.7 2.518.5
73 .765 .391 6.263 6.978 423.5 324.2 419.8 2.655.2 2.955.2
79 .776 1.211 7.784 6.718 367.5 285.2 445.1 2,866.7 2.468.9
Sl .S14 .864 7.114 4.786 464.6 378.3 451.6 3.,58.7 2.223.8
i1 .845 .836 6.461 6.518 - 516.3 436.4 431.5 3.335.7 3.36i.1
82 .617 .763 6.136 6.915 485.7 299.5 373.4 2,986.5 3,358.7
83 .526 .735 6.847 4.978 467.8 246.1 343.3 3,213.2 2.314.7
84 .S61 .778 5.386 3.627 532.3 238.9 414.1 2,824.1 1.933.6
Source: Computed from Append$A .12, 13. 14, 16b, and 33b.
Border prices of tradables at E* + Handling and transportation costs
a)
Border prices of rice at E * Handnini and transportatfon otsts
6orler prices at. E- * Handling and transportation costs
PNA
wihere PN (1 - ) CT
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Table 10-2 Effect of Direct and Indirect Price Interventions on Relative Producer Prices, 1968-1984( Total Nominal Protection Rates: NPRT )
Relative to Rice a) Relative to ;A b)
Year NPRT NPR? NPR T NPRT NPRT NPRT NPRT NPRT NPRT(Barley, (Soybeaiv (Beef, (Pork- (Rice' (Barley/ (Soybeanr- (Beef/ (Pork/
Rice) Rice) Rice) Rice) NA) NA) NA) NA) NA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) .46) (7) (8) (9)
1961 .8IS .331 -.866 -. 119 -. 356 -. 313 -. 114 -. 368 -. 426
61 .733 -. 1:9 -. 258 -.131 -. 182 .426 -.287 -. 394 -. 372
62 .121 .117 -. I88 .1t4 -. 292 -. 277 -. 286 -. 354 -. 115
63 .212 .861 -. 394 -. 166 .111 .213 .171 -.38J -.157
64 .331 .294 -. 338 -.673 -. 238 .826 -. 862 -. 498 -. 286
65 .417 .468 .176 .363 -. 336 -. 153 -. 124 -. 285 -. 196
66 -.239 .533 .637 .155 -. 359 -. 512 -. 818 -. 335 -. 266
67 -.124 1.144 .336 .579 -. 397 -. 471 .293 -.194 -. 948
68 .111 .225 .389 .896 -.314 -.368 -. 166 -. 147 .312
69 .121 .382 .179 .289 -. 236 -. 144 .154 -.699 -. 177
71 -. 132 .750 .148 .462 -. 177 -. 285 .442 -.661 .214
71 --. 137 -.8I5 -.184 .126 .151 .168 .153 -.161 .296
72 -.638 -. 127 -. 277 -.304 .553 .418 .356 .123 .882
73 -.114 .878 .119 .399 -.179 -. 191 -. 117 -. 071 .2B8
74 -. 157 .245 .253 .143 -.271 -.312 -. 191 -. 685 -. 166
75 -. 144 .253 .187 .316 -. 168 -. 288 .043 -. 113 .196
76 -. 361 -.165 -.683 -. 225 .679 .173 .569 .539 .381
77 -.138 -. 189 -.113 -.428 1.I19 .826 .719 .867 .213
78 .221 .385 .538 -. 365 .69S 1.172 1.216 1.558 .179
79 -.184 -. 428 -.229 -. 647 1.329 1.I86 .358 .797 -.178
8H -. 153 .194 -.258 -. 516 .986 .616 1.276 .415 -. 146
B1 -. 138 .558 .237 -.489 .BIS .564 1.628 .858 -. 868
82 .236 .817 .327 -. 547 .8S9 1.236 2.287 1.48l -.181
83 .478 1.I81 .437 -. 355 .638 1.407 2.418 1.353 .156
84 .143 1.638 .637 -. 366 .529 .748 2.115 1.583 -. 131
Source: Computed froa Table 10-1 and Append:ix 32&.
Domestic producer prices of tradables
Ooaestic producer price of rice
a)
Border prices of tradables at E-
Border price of rice at E'
Domestic producer prices 'PtJA
Border price at E PN
NA
6" PXTpN
where fNAT NA,AE
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Figure 4
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Figure 5
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impossible to obtain reasonably comparable domestic and border prices
where a large number of pesticides are in use. Nevertheless, its input
coefficient aAj was included in the analysis for want of a better
estimate. In the case of farm machinery, the 8 HP power tiller was
chosen as representative of both domestic and border prices. But in
calculation of its input coefficient, the depreciation cost inclusive
ofall types of farm implements in use was entered, due to the extreme
difficulty of isolating the share of depreciation by each individual
type. As for feed corn, the border price (evaluated at official
exchange rate EO) plus 7 percent tariff was used as the domestic price
paid by livestock farmers. The results of the analysis are given in
Table 11.
For comparison purposes, the average of each NPRD, NPRT and ERP
were calculated in Table 12 for three different subperiods. The table
shows that the real protection rate (NPRT) was substantially lower than
the nominal protection rate (NPRD) for all products throughout the
entire period, and that NPRT was negative for all products during 1962-
69. This is because the implicit overvaluation of the won more than
offset the nominal protection given to the five agricultural products.
The average over-valuation rate of foreign exchange in nominal terms
during the 1960s was as high as 100 percent and thereafter declined to
18 percent during 1970-79 and 15 percent during 1980-84.
If the distorted agricultural input prices are taken into
account, one would expect some degree of discrepancy between NPRT and
ERP. Contrary to one's expectation, however, the estimated effective
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rates of protection (ERP) for rice, barley, and soybeans, do not differ
significantly from the real protection rates (NPRT). This is because
fertilizer price distortion was not large enough to alter the EPRs, due
to its negligible share of the total value of production. For instance,
fertilizer cost constitutes only 4-5 percent of the producer price of
rice. In the case of beef and pork, however, the estimated ERPs are
higher than the NPRT. This implies that livestock farmers largely
benefited by using feedmix containing cheaper imported corn.
Overall, trade and exchange rate policies exerted a squeeze on
agriculture in the 1960s, while the price effects of agricultural
pricing and trade policies since the early 1970s indicate growing
protection.
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Table 11. Effects of Interventions on Relative Values AddedA/
ERP ERP ERP ERP ERP
(Rice/NA) (Barley/NA) (Soybean/NA) (Beef/NA) (Pork/NA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1962 -.2 8 -.268 -.279 -.239 .323
1963 .014 .223 .077 -.274 .158
1964 -.218 .064 .028 -.431 -.130
1965 -.332 -.042 -.009 -. 229 .046
1966 -.352 -.501 .001 -.290 -.162
1967 -.383 -.441 .329 -.130 .100
1968 -.297 -.267 -.116 .041 .533
1969 -.224 -.112 .093 -.026 .C68
1970 -.169 -.266 .471 -.000 .355
1971 .163 .137 .077 -.002 .454
1972 .573 .463 .388 .159 .149
1973 -.062 -.048 .029 -.052 .348
1974 -.261 -.292 -.070 -.048 -.100
1975 -.167 -.287 .046 .014 .154
1976 .664 .051 .541 .554 .326
1977 1.106 .799 .695 .884 .233
1978 .688 1.042 1.189 1.626 .101
1979 1.338 1.108 .362 .833 -.145
1980 ..926 .660 1.330 .418 -.008
1981 .816 .567 1.833 .877 -.053
1982 .799 1.203 2.246 1.419 -.168
1983 .626 1.361 2.356 1.368 .069
1984 .520 .724 2.074 1.515 -.022
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Cost of Production
Survey, various issues.
National Aqricultural Cooperative Federation, Rural Price
and Wage Survey, various issues.
FAO, Trade Yearbook, various issues.
a/ ERP = VA - VA'
VA*
where VA = Actual unit value added
VA* Unit value added in the absence of e.rect and
indire,ct price interventions
and
VA - PA - aAj j
VA* - Pi - aAj P
PA- Actual producer price of output A
PA- Border price of output A evaluated at equilibrium
exchange rate E*
P. - Price of purchased input j paid by farmers
PI - Border price of purchased input j evaluated at
3 equilibrium exchange rate E*
aA - Input coefficient
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Table 12. Summary of Price Intervention Effects
for Selected Sub-periods
Period Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(NPR%)
1962-69 .135 .257 .521 .;l0 .395
1970-79 .765 .606 .755 .731 .467
1980-84 .995 1.175 2.381 1.383 .111
(NPR T)
1962-69 (-).269 (-).191 (-).009 (-).27i (-).091
1970-79 .383 .260 .365 .363 .121
1980-84 .739 .914 1.982 1.105 (-).053
(ERP)
1962-69 (-).260 (-).168 .016 (-).197 .117
1970-79 .387 .270 .372 .397 .186
1980-84 .737 .903 1.968 1.119 (-).036
Source: Calculated from Table a-2, Table 10-2 and Table 11.
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Chapter 4
EFFECTS OF PRICE IlTERVENI1O
The Effect on Agricultural Output
Given the elasticity of supply of each product with respect to
relative prices, one can estimate the effect of government intervention
on the output of each product in the short run and long run. To measure
supply elasticity, the Nerlovian lagged supply function was fitted to
the observed data. The Nerlovian supply function hypothesizes that the
output response of a given crop to a price change depends on the prices
of corresponding outputs and the prices of inputs used, as well as on
output in the previous year. Specifically, it takes the form:
Qx. t = a+ablnPx, t-l + c ln P., t-l) + (I - a) ln Qxt-
where: Qt = Current output
Qs, t-l = Output in the previous year
Px, t- = Product price in the previous year
Pz, t-l = Major input price in the previous year
ab (ac) = Short-run supply elasticity w/r to own price
(input price)
a = Adjustment coefficient of the current output to
product and input prices.
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The above supply function precludes substitutability among
different crops, assuming that the farm producer's response to price is
influenced neither by the price of other crops nor by the inputs used
for other crops. The factors which condition farmer decisionmaking in
Korea are many and complicated. Three of the major factors are:
1. Limits on the elasticity of substitution among crops. For
example, rice is grown in paddy land where irrigation is
required, while barley and soybeans are primarily grown
upland (on dry land). Sometimes, however, they are planted
in paddy land as a second crop after rice. Substitution
between cattle-raising and swine production is also
limited. Beef cattle are mostly raised by farmers in small
herds of 2 to 5 animals, whereas a significant portion of
hog production comes from large-scale farms.
2. A certain degree of labor competition between rice
transplanting and barley harvest for a short period. This
is not so strong as to preclude the planting of either one
or two crops, once it is planned to grow both. Moreover, a
traditional labor exchange system allevidtes labor
shortages during the period of peak demand.
3. Diversified use of fertilizer is limited because a specific
kind is generally used for a specific crop; in the case of
compound fertilizer, the government sells only those
already prepared.
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In estimating the supply function for each product, the data
were adjusted to three year moving averages. The use of moving average
price and moving average output during the preceding three years was
based on the judgment that farmers are trend-conscious.31 Output data
were based on the aggregate production statistics presented in Appendix
Table 16c. All the price data were deflated by non-agricultural CPI
(PNA). As for the input price data, only the price of fertilizer was
used for the three crops. In the cases of beef and pork the price of
corn was used. The estimated supply equations are:4/
Rice:
lnQt = 4.038 + .277 lnPt-i + .467 lnQt_l + .048 lnPFt-
(4.104) (3.707) (1.239) (3.590) 2 = .944
3/ Conventionally, the price of the immediately previous harvest season
has been used in estimating supply function under the assumption that
farmers expect to receive the same price for the current output. This
assumption is valid only if the previous season price has been a fairly
stable one. But where a fluctuation in aggregaLt._ production causes a
corresponding fluctuation in price, it is hard to believe that farmers
expect to receive the abnormally high or low price for their
products. The use of three-year average here is rather arbitrary, and
each year's price is equally weighted.
4/ An attempt was made to estimate the output supply elasticities and
cross-elasticities using multi-products variable profit function and
deriving therefrom a set of supply functions and input demand
functions. But since the estimated results were not satisfactory, they
were not used in this study. Appendix Table 36 gives the estimated
results, and Appendix Table 37 provides a list of supply elasticities
for agricultural products estimated by other researchers (and by one of
the present authors).
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Barley:
lnQt = -.321 + .488 lnPt_i + .721 lnQt-l - .118 lnPFt-1
( .278) (2.411) (4.382) (1.047)
R2 = .867
Soybeans:
lnQt = .089 + .303 lnPt-i + .727 lnQtil - .091 lnPFt-1
(.095) (1.282) (5.624) (1.863) 2 = .941
Beef:
lnQt = .691 + .251 lnPt_1 + .615 lnQt_l + .256 lnPFt-1
(4.577) (2.680) (6.090) (3.326) 2
R2 .965
Pork:
lnQt = -.394 + .688 lnPt-1 + .614 lnQ,_l - .196 lnPFt-1
(2.692) (4.497) (6.099) (1.574) 2
R .991
* Figures in parenthesis are t-values.
The following table gives the short- and long-run supply
elasticities derived from the above equations:
Short-run Long-run Elasticity w/r
Product Elasticity Elasticity to Input Price
(Q) (ab) (b) (Qc)
Rice .277 .520 .048 a/
Barley .488 1.749 -.118
Soybean .303 1.110 -.091
Beef .256 .665 .256 a/
Pork .668 1.731 -.196
a/ Not used in simulation of output effect due to wrong sign.
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The estimated elasticities for barley and soybeans are higher
than rice, indicating a faster response to price changes. The results
also show that livestock producers are more responsive to changes in
pork prices than to changes in beef prices. This is ascribable to the
fact that the investment period is in general longer for cattle than for
swine.
Applying the above estimated elasticity coefficients, both the
direct and total effects of price intervention on aggregate output were
measured for the five products. In measuring the direct output effect
in both the short and the long run, the price changes (NPRD) were
calculated as:
pp ~p/p
NPR =XP NA X NA
X NA
where NPRD = Nominal protection rate on Px due to direct effect of
intervention
Px = Border price (adjusted for transport cost, quality, etc.)
at the official exchange rate
In measuring the total short-run output effect, the price
changes in the preceding period (A P t ) caused by the elimination
x, t-1
of all intervention (direct and indirect) were applied. APS is
estimated by:
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E
SR SR X NA o X/ NA
A P NPR =xE
E X /PNA
0
Et
px - E PX
E p'
E X
0
where NPRSR = Nominal protection rate on PX due to total effect of
intervention
In estimating the total long-run effect, the cumulative effects
of past price changes were taken into account instead of applying the
estimated long-run elasticity (b). The sum of effects of past price
changes on current output (Xt) is measured by:
t X = a b PX, t-l + (1 - a) b A X, t-2
(short-run) (long-run)
effect in effect in
t t
A px is given by: *
E , *P/P -E P/P*
A PX = NPR - X NA O X NA
X T E* I*
E X NA
0
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E pNAT
where PNA E 1 + t NAH' tNA
is the effect of trade taxes on PNAT' and
NPRT = Nominal protection rate due to total effect of
intervention
Three-year moving averages of the above estimated NPRD, NPRSR,
and NPRT were used in measuring both direct and total output effects,
given the volatility of world prices (see Appendix Table 39c). Tables
13a and 13b present the direct short-run and long-run effects, and
Tables 13c and 13d the total short-run and long-run effects on
agricultural outputs, respectively.'/
According to Table 13a, pricing policy had a direct, positive,
short-run effect on all five products throughout 1962-84, except for
barley and beef for a few years in the 1960s, and the magnitudes
consistently increased over the period. During 1962-69 the average
direct short-run output effects were 6 percent for rice, 15 percent for
barley, 14 percent for soybeans, and 2 percent for beef. With nominal
protection being intensified over time, the output effects rose to 26
5/ In interpreting the empirical results, based on the past observations,
one must not overlook the fact that, even if the fitted function is
accurate and the estimated coefficients are statistically significant,
they can only serve as an indicator in the neighborhood of the
statistical population to which they refer. Specifically, the estimated
elasticity may not predict what the output response would be if the
relative price of a product should double or fall by as much as 50
percent, since price changes of such magnitude have never been
experienced by Korean farmers and are very unlikely to occur in the
future.
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percent for rice, 60 percent for barley, 61 percent for soybeans and 35
percent for beef during 1980-84. In the case of pork, the output effect
shows a somewhat different pattern over time: an average 18 percent
increase in pork output during 1962-69, 31 percent during 1970-79, and
only 5 percent for the 1980-84 period.
Table 13b shows that the cumulative effects are substantially
greater than the short-run effects for every year. To take the 1980-84
period as an illustration, direct intervention resulted in an average 63
percent increase in rice output, 168 percent increase in barley output,
155 percent increase in soybean output, 82 percent increase in beef
output, and 52 percent increase in pork output.
But when both the direct and indirect effects of intervention
are combined (i.e., taking into account the overvaluation of exchange
rate), the effects on output are estimated as negative for all products
throughout the 1960s, and for the remaining years substantially
reduced. According to Table 13c, total intervention in the period 1962-
69 resulted in an average decrease in rice production of about 11
percent, along with a 12 percent decrease in barley production, a 4
percent decrease in soybean production, an 11 percent decrease in beef
production, and a 14 percent decrease in pork production. In other
words, the effect of exchange rate overvaluation more than offset the
effect of direct intervention in price during the 1960s. Although
exchange rate overvaluation persisted throughout the remaining period,
it did not offset the effect of direct intervention and thus resulted in
a positive effect on output. During 1980-84 the total short-run effect
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on output was, on average, 23 percent for rice, 43 percent for barley,
49 percent for soybeans, and 25 percent for beef. Notable is the
negative effect of (-)5 percent on pork production.
The total cumulative effect on output is measured in Table
13d. According to the estimated results, the total cumulative effect
during 1980-84 was to increase rice production by 45 percent, barley
production by 110 percent, soybean production by 117 percent, and beef
production by 60 percent over what they would have been in the absence
of price intervention.
The Effect on Consumption
Ideally, the effects of price intervention would best be
analyzed by incorporating into one system all the decisions that govern
resource allocation in production, sales, and consumption.6/ However,
there is usually a divergence between production decisions (or plans)
and actual production, due to uncontrollable factors. This fact alone
gives a sufficient reason, from the analytical point of view, to
separate our analysis of consumption from production and to carry out an
analysis of consumer response with realized output as a starting point.
6/ The necessity of simultaneous consideration of related variables is
stressed by Girschick and Haavelmo: "... it is impossible to derive
statistically the demand functions from market data without
specification of the supply functions involved. More generally, if we
wish to estimate any particular economic relationship on the basis of
market data we are forced to consider, simultaneously, the whole system
of economic relations that together represent the mechanism that
produces the data we observe in the market" (Girschick and Haavelmo,
1947).
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Table 13a. Direct Short-Run Output Effect±'
Unit: 1,000 MT
Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
Year QR QR Q/Q QB % " q Q Q ° -5/° QBF Q3F 'aBF/QiF QPK Qk A%K/QPK
1960 3,047 - - 1,098 - - 130 - - 13 - - 58 - -
61 3,463 - - 1,110 - - 16S - - 13 - - 60 - -
62 3,015 2,691 .12 1,113 830 .34 156 136 .15 17 16 .07 58 49 .17
63 3,758 3,370 .12 746 555 .34 156 147 .06 21 21 .01 55 48 .15
64 3,954 3,578 .11 1,227 990 .24 163 148 .11 32 32 -.01 63 54 .17
65 3,501 3,230 .08 1,459 1,135 .29 174 152 .15 27 27 -.01 56 49 .14
66 3,919 3,911 .00 1,632 1,513 .08 161 144 .12 29 30 -.02 96 92 .05
67 3,603 3,617 -.00 1,550 1,630 -.0O 201 173 .16 32 32 .01 72 64 .12
68 3,195 3,167 .00 1,680 1,812 -.07 245 210 .17 36 34 .05 62 48 .28
69 4,090 3,979 .03 1,666 1.617 .03 229 193 .19 33 30 .09 77 57 .35
70 3,939 3,795 .04 1,591 1,500 .06 232 194 .20 37 34 .10 83 58 .43
71 3,997 3,637 .10 1,510 1,311 .15 222 182 .22 40 36 .10 90 64 .42
72 '3,957 3.334 .19 1,600 1,272 .26 224 179 .25 40 36 .11 94 66 .44
73 4,212 3.551 .19 1,443 1,138 .27 246 208 .18 45 41 .10 92 65 .42
74 4,445 3,969 .12 1,388 1,171 .19 319 277 .15 52 48 .08 96 76 .25
75 4,669 4,512 .03 1,700 1,683 .01 311 285 .09 70 66 .07 107 86 .25
76 5,215 4,719 .11 1,759 1,793 -.02 295 264 .12 75 67 .12 118 96 .23
77 6,006 4,840 .24 814 707 .15 319 271 .18 77 64 .20 151 117 .30
78 5797 4.395 .32 1,348 974 .38 293 227 .29 74 55 .34 172 137 .25
79 5,565 3,984 .40 1,508 927 .63 257 198 .30 87 63 .37 223 198 .13
80 3,550 2,561 .39 811 491 .65 216 153 .41 93 70 .34 235 220 .07
81 5,063 3,609 .40 859- 553 .55 257 173 .48 69 54 .27 209 202 .04
82 5,175 3,903 .33 749 491 53 233 139 .67 62 47 .31 238 226 .05
83 5,404 4,245 .27 815 510 .60 226 130 .74 66 48 .38 295 280 .05
84 5.683 4,624 .23 804 504 .60 253 146 .74 91 64 .43 341 325 .05
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Aoricultural Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation, Demand and Su0ppy of Livestock Products, various issues.
Calculation based on the estimated short-run supply elasticities and the estimated
3-year moving averages of direct nominal protection rates (for producers) presented
in Table 8-2.
Q1 a Actual output
5; a Output in the absence of short-run direct price interventions
A; Q1 j Qi
Q; QI
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Figure 6
Direct Short-Run Output Effect
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Table 13b. Direct Long-Run (Cumulative) Output Effect a/
Unit: 1I000 ,MT
Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
Year QR R R QS Q3 Qs Qs 0S1/Qs 0BF 08F AiBFl08F QPK QOk AQW;K
1960 3,047 - - 1,098 - - 130 - - 13 - - 58 - -
61 3,463 - - 1,110 - - 165 - - 13 - - 60 - -
62 3,015 2.699 .12 1,113 830 .34 156 136 .15 17 16 .07 58 49 .17
63 3,758 3,212 .17 746 470 .59 156 133 .17 21 20 .05 SS 44 .25
64 3,954 3,337 .19 1,227 737 .66 163 133 .23 32 31 .03 63 48 .33
65 3,501 2.992 .17 1,459 827 .77 174 133 .31 27 27 .00 56 42 .34
66 3,919 3,622 .08 1,632 1,001 .63 161 120 .35 29 30 -.02 96 77 .25
67 3,603 3,485 .03 1,550 1,103 .41 201 142 .41 32 32 -.00 72 56 .28
68 3,195 3,117 .03 1,680 1,378 .22 245 167 .46 36 34 .05 62 43 .45
69 4,090 3,933 .04 1,666 1,402 .19 229 15 .53 33 29 .12 77 47 .63
70 3,939 3,730 .06 1,591 1,329 .20 232 147 .58 37 31 .18 83 46 .81
71 3,997 3,550 .13 1,510 1,167 .29 222 135 .64 40 33 .20 90 47 .92
72 3,957 3.176 .25 1-.600 1,088 .47 224 130 .72 40 32 .24 94 47 1.00
73 4,212 3,240 .30 1,443 898 .61 246 144 .70 45 36 .24 92 45 1.03
74 4,445 3,528 .26 1,388 855 .62 319 192 .66 52 42 .23 95 SO .89
75 4,669 4,060 .15 1,700 1,165 .46 311 198 .57 70 58 .21 107 60 .79
76 5,215 4,438 .18 1,759 1,341 .31 295 192 .53 75 60 .25 118 69 .71
77 6,006 4,540 .32 814 591 .38 319 204 .56 77 57 .36 151 87 .73
78 5,797 3,946 .47 1,348 814 .66 293 172 .70 74 47 .56 172 101 .70
79 5,565 3,444 .62 1,508 718 1.10 257 142 .80 87 S1 .72 223 143 .56
80 3,550 2,122 .67 811 332 1.45 216 108 1.00 93 52 .78 235 166 .41
81 5,063 2,949 .72 859 331 1.59 257 116 1.21 69 39 .75 209 162 .29
82 5,175 3,116 .66 749 280 1.67 233 91 1.55 62 35 .77 238 193 .23
83 5,404 3,416 .58 815 291 1.80 226 79 1.87 66 36 .86 295 246 .20
84 5,683 3,786 .50 804 278 1.90 253 82 2.10 91 47 .95 341 292 .17
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Aoricultural Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation, Demand and Sup1Vy of Livestock Products, various issues.
a/ Calculation based on the estimated cumulative supply elasticities and the estimated
3-year moving averages of direct nominal protection rates (for producers) presented
in Table 8-2.
Qi a Actual output
Q0 a Output in the absence of direct price interventions
_Q; Q1 _- Q
Qj O'
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Direct Cumulative Output Effect
Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
3.0
P.:
o o
r~~~~~~~Ya
- 194 1946 19?! 19?X 1930 1934
Year!
- 103 -
- Table 13c. Total Short-Run Outpuit Effect
Unit: 1,000 MT
Year Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
q Q R/Q Qs QB Q43 Qs Q Q/QS qf Q8F 8f f QPK QPK &Q;K/QPK
1960 3.047 - * 1,098 - 130 - - 13 - - 58 -
61 3,463 - - 1,110 - 165 - 13 - - 60 - -
62 3,015 3,395 -.11 1,113 1,190 -.07 156 167 -.07 17 19 -.12 58 73 -.21
63 3,758 4,218 -.11 746 791 -.06 156 172 -.10 21 24 -.14 55 69 -.21
64 3954 4,443 -.11 1,227 1,365 -.10 166 175 -.07 32 38 -.15 63 78 -.19
65 3 501 3,912 -.11 1,459 1,539 -.05 174 180 -.04 27 31 -.13 56 6 -.17
66 3,919 4,443 -.12 1,632 1,8s0 -.12 161 165 -.02 29 33 -.12 96 116 -.17
67 3,603 4,113 -.12 1,550 1,879 -.18 201 205 -.02 32 35 -.09 72 81 -.11
68 3.195 3,631 -.12 1,680 2.087 -. 20 245 250 -. 02 36 39 -. 07 62 64 -.03
69 4,090 4,590 -. 11 1,666 1.926 -.14 229 231 -.01 33 35 -.06 77 76 .01
70 3,939 4,333 -.09 1,591 1,800 -.12 232 225 .03 37 39 -.05 83 78 .06
71 3,997 4,212 -.05 1,510 1,601 -.06 222 211 .05 40 42 -.04 90 85 .06
72 3.957 3,849 .03 1,600 1,533 .04 224 206 .09 40 41 -.02 94 85 .11
73 4,212 4,027 .05 1,443 1,402 .03 246 243 .01 45 45 -.01 92 77 .20
74 4,445 4,379 .02 1,388 1,335 .04 319 302 .06 52 52 -.01 95 89 .07
75 4,669 4,930 -.05 1,700 1,866 -. 09 311 308 .01 70 71 -.02 107 101 .06
76 5,215 5,113 02 1,759 1,963 -.10 295 284 .04 75 72 .04 118 III .06
77 6,006 5,187 .16 814 761 .07 319 288 .11 77 68 .13 151 131 .16
78 5,797 4,579 .27 1,348 1,047 .29 293 239 .23 74 58 .27 172 149 .16
79 5,565 4,238 .31 1,508 1,027 .47 257 211 .22 87 68 .28 223 214 .04
80 3.50 2,776 .28 811 563 .44 216 168 .28 93 76 .23 235 243 -.03
81 5,063 4,006 .26 859 630 .36 257 191 .35 69 59 .16 209 224 -. 07
82 5,175 4,235 .22 749 545 .37 233 153 .53 62 51 .22 238 255 -.07
83 5,404 4,488 .20 815 550 .48 226 139 .63 66 51 .30 295 308 -.04
84 5,683 4,816 .18 804 535 .50 253 153 .65 91 67 .36 341 352 -.03
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Aaricultural Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation, Demand and Suoply of Livestack Products, various issues.
a/ Calculation based on the estimated short-run suoply elasticities and the estimated
3-year moving averages of short-run total nominal protection rates (for producers)
presented in Appendix 39a and 39b.
Q1 - Actual output
Q1 a Output in the absence of short-run direct and indirect price interventions
AQ; Qi QJ
1T Q
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Table 13d. Total Long-Run (Cumulative) Cutput Effect
Unit: 1.000 MT
Year Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
~i qX aORtOR %8 °. ^°Q/Q8 QS Q° AQS °8f F q8*AF/Q 5 QPK QPK a0PK'0PK
1960 3,047 - - 1,098 - - 130 - - 13 - - 58 - -
61 3,463 - - 1,110 - - 165 - - 13 - - 60 - -- -
62 3,015 3,267 -. 08 1,113 1,109 .00 156 164 -. 05 17 19 -. 09 58 68 -. 15
63 3,758 4,080 -. 08 746 702 .06 156 170 -. 08 21 25 -. 16 55 68 -. 19
64 3,954 4,317 -. 08 1,227 1,176 .04 163 177 -. 08 32 40 -. 20 63 79 -. 20
65 3,501 3,847 -. 09 1,459 1,357 .08 174 182 -. 04 27 35 -. 22 56 71 -. 21
66 3,919 4,489 -. 13 1,632 1,645 -. 01 161 163 -. 02 29 38 -. 23 96 126 -. 24
67 3,603 4,289 -. 16 1,550 1,824 -. 15 201 194 .03 32 41 -. 21 72 91 -. 21
68 3,195 3,868 -. 17 1,680 2,333 -. 28 245 230 .07 36 44 -. 18 62 69 -. 10
69 4,090 4,922 -. 17 1,666 2,404 -. 31 229 208 .10 33 38 -. 14 77 76 .01
70 3,939 4,612 -. 15 1,591 2,289 -. 31 232 204 .14 37 41 -. 11 83 73 .14
71 3,997 4,402 -. 09 1,510 1,987 -. 24 222 188 .18 40 44 -. 08 90 75 .21
72 3,957 3,933 .01 1,600 1,782 -. 10 224 180 .24 40 42 -. 05 94 73 .28
73 4,212 3,974 .06 1,443 1,389 .04 246 197 .25 45 46 -. 03 92 68 .35
74 4,445 4,245 .05 1,388 1,294 .07 319 257 .24 52 53 -. 02 95 74 .28
75 4,669 4,794 -. 03 1,700 1,754 -. 03 311 261 .19 70 72 -. 03 107 86 .24
76 5,215 5,163 .01 1,759 2,001 -. 12 295 250 .18 75 74 .02 118 97 .22
77 6,006 5,200 .16 814 836 -. 03 319 258 .24 77 68 .t3 151 117 .29
78 5,797 4,449 .30 1,348 1,072 .26 293 211 .39 74 55 .34 172 130 .32
79 5,565 3,886 .43 1,508 910 .66 257 171 .50 87 59 .49 223 180 .24
80 3,550 2,410 .47 811 419 .94 216 130 .66 93 60 .54 235 209 .13
81 5,063 3,369 .50 859 417 1.06 257 139 .84 69 46 .51 209 204 .02
82 5,175 3,525 .47 749 347 1.16 233 108 1.16 62 40 .54 238 249 -. 04
83 5,404 3,787 .43 815 351 1.32 226 91 1.48 66 40 .64 295 315 -. 06
84 5,683 4,112 .38 804 327 1.46 253 93 1.73 91 52 .76 341 365 -. 07
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation, Demand and Supply of Livestock Products, various issues.
Calculation based on the estimated cumulative supply elasticities and the estimated
3-year moving averages of total nominal protection rates (for producers) presented
in Table 10-2.
Q* . Actual output
Q1 a Output in the absence of direct and indirect price interventtons
*Qj* Qj Q- 
Q* Qt
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The present subsection attempts first to estimate the degree of
consumer response to price changes in terms of price elasticities for
the five agricultural products, and then to measure the effect on
aggregate consumption, using the estimated elasticities of price
intervention. The ordinary theory of demand hypothesizes that the
demand for a commodity is a function of the price of the commodity, the
price of related goods, and the disposable income of the consumer.
Two different types of demand functions were fitted: a linear
single equation model for rice, barley, and pork, and a log-linear model
for soybeans and beef. In estimating the demand functions for rice and
barley, it was hypothesized that consumers at different levels of income
respond differently to a given change in price. In order to reflect
such an inference about consumer preference, an interaction term between
price and income was introduced into the model. It is also to be noted
that various rice-saving measures executed by the government during the
1960s through the late 1970s were to some extent responsible for
reducing rice consumption and increasing barley consumption,
irrespective of price. For instance, restaurants were required to serve
a mixture of 75 percent rice and 25 percent barley. They were also
required to serve flour-noodles and other non-rice cereals on Wednesdays
and Saturdays. Lunches carried by school children had to contain a
similar mixture. These non-quantifiable administrative effects are
taken into account by introducing a dummy variable in the model for the
respective periods. For the consumption variable, the weighted average
of rural and urban per capita consumption data were used for all
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products, so that separate estimations are not needed for rural and
urban consumers. Price and income data were deflated by CPI. The
following are the estimated demand equations for each product:7/
Rice:
QR = 375.28 - 443 pR + .106 PB - .0089 PW - .282 Y
(10.925) (11.014) (4.260) (4.589) (3.152)
+ .000821 PRY - 9.318 D
(4.984) (2.965) R .825
Barley:
QRB = 49.53 + .046 PR - .0846 PB- .0425 Y + .0730 PBY
(9.704) (2.728) (2.662) (2.569) (1.407)
+ 6.419 D
(3.169) R2 = .905
Soybeans:
lnQS = 1.36 - .253 lnPs + .458 InY + .894 (1/Y)
(2.329) (2.084) (12.500) (7.931)
R2 = .968
Beef:
lnQBF = .613 - .798 lnPBF + .552 lnPPK + .416 lnY
(.445) (4.050) (3.588) (7.928) 2 = .964
Pork:
QPK = 2.586 + .00016 PBF - .000537 PPK + .00360 Y(7.742) (.688) (1.676) (8.379) 2
R .948
7/ Consumption elasticities estimated by other researchers are presented in
Appendix Table 38.
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where:
QR = Annual per capita consumption of rice (in kilos)
QB = Annual per capita consumption of barley (in kilos)
QS - Annual per capita consumption of soybeans (in kilos)
QBF = Annual per capita consumption of beef (in kilos)
QPK = Annual per capita consumption of pork (in kilos)
PR = Consumer price of rice per kilo deflated by non-
agricultural CPI (PNA)
PB = Consumer price of barley per kilo deflated by non-
agricultural CPI (PNA)
PS = Consumer price of soybeans per kilo deflated by non-
agricultural CPI (PNA)
PWX = Consumer price of wheat per kilo deflated by
nonagricultural CPI (PNA)
PBF = Consumer price of beef per kilo deflated by non-
agricultural CPI (PNA)
PPK = Consumer price of pork per kilo deflated by non-
agricultural CPI (PNA)
Y = Per capita GNP deflated by CPI
D = 1, if 1961-77
= 0, otherwise
* Figures in parenthesis are t-values.
The own-price elasticities, cross-elasticities, and income-
elasticities derived from the above estimated demand equations are
summarized in the following table:
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Estimated Elasticities with Respect to
Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
Product Price Price Price Price Price Income
(PR) (PB) (Ps) (PBF) (PPK) (Y)
Rice (QR) -.343 .185 .203
Barley (QB) .454 -.301 -.243
Soybeans (QS) -.253 .436
Beef (QBF) -.798 .552 .416
Pork (QPK) .155 -.278 .406
Note: Elasticities for rice, barley, and pork are mean elasticities.
Combining the above-estimated elasticities with the difference
between actual prices and the non-intervention consumer prices NPRD
and NPRT, the magnitude of direct intervention on aggregate
consumption of each product (see Table 13e) and total intervention (see
Table 13f) was measured.
The effect of direct intervention in prices was to reduce
consumption of rice, soybeans, and beef in nearly all years of the 1962-
84 period, while reducing pork consumption until 1976 but increasing it
after 1977. Total intervention, however, resulted in quite a different
pattern of consumption. In earlier years, when exchange rate
overvaluation was relatively high, total intervention contributed to
increasing rice and soybean consumption, but as the overvaluation rate
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- Table 13e. Oirect Consumption Effect
Unit: 1,000 MT
Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
Year R N S/R O DiD A D0 /05 I % F 08F '8F/ '%F DPK 0PK AOPK/DIK
1960 3,126 - - 995 - - 174 - - 13 - - 58 - -
61 3,092 - - 1,230 - - 148 - - 13 - - 60 - -
62 3,407 3,487 -. 02 1,235 1,219 .01 185 194 -. 05 17 20 -. 18 38 38 -. 00
63 3,136 3,240 -. 03 1,166 1,131 .03 166 179 -. 07 21 24 -. 13 55 56 -. 01
64 3,709 3,754 -. 01 1,017 1,012 .01 165 180 -. 08 32 34 -. 05 63 65 -. 03
65 3,925 3,878 .01 1,377 1,394 -. 01 163 173 -. 06 27 26 .02 56 58 -. 03
66 3,532 3,487 .01 1,488 1,498 -. 01 174 187 -. 07 29 27 .06 96 102 -. 06
67 3,954 3,954 -.00 1,719 1,694 .02 185 196 -.06 32 31 .02 72 78 -.08
68 3,822 3,814 .00 1,702 1,690 .01 223 238 -.06 36 39 -.08 62 68 -.08
69 3,946 3,994 -.01 1,742 1,705 .02 262 284 -.08 33 38 -.16 76 83 -.08
70 4,394 4,507 -.03 1,497 1,451 .03 266 298 -. 11 37 43 -.15 83 92 -.09
71 4,777 5,221 -.09 1,644 1,490 .10 281 320 -.12 40 45 -.12 81 90 -.10
72 4,362 4,736 -.08 1,717 1,568 .10 261 282 -.07 40 42 -.04 90 102 -.12
73 4,296 4,629 -.07 1,740 1,585 .10 298 313 -.OS 45 49 .-.09 90 97 -.07
74 4,641 4,750 -.02 1,771 1,695 .05 291 297 -.02 52 58 -. 11 95 101 -.06
75 4,699 5,108 -.08 1,848 1,646 .12 372 390 -.05 70 88 -.25 99 102 -.03
76 4,646 5,551 -.16 1,796 1,465 .23 418 457 -.09 76 103 -.36 109 1ll -. 02
77 5,045 6,244 -.19 1,523 1,212 .26 437 499 -.12 82 128 -.56 141 135 .04
78 5,784 7,294 -.21 1,125 882 .28 538 615 -.13 115 189 -.64 178 165 .08
79 6,764 8,455 -.20 1,286 1,008 .28 675 785 -.14 114 182 -.60 225 206 .09
80 5,402 6,988 -. 23 1,407 1,069 .32 733 879 -. 17 110 173 -. 57 235 216 .09
81 5,366 6,767 -.21 1,182 916 .29 727 917 -.21 93 155 -.67 209 187 .12
82 5,404 6,183 -.13 872 748 .17 792 1,060 -.25 107 189 -.77 238 208 .14
83 5,303 5,860 -. 10 696 619 .12 907 1,201 -. 25 116 213 -. 84 295 254 .16
84 5,526 5,854 -.06 814 763 .07 940 1,284 -.27 107 194 -.81 341 298 .15
Source: Mlnistry of Agriculture and Fisheries, The Farm Household Economy Survey, various issues.
Annual. Consum ton urvey, various issues.
LConomic lianning Board, ine urban Housenoid Livino xpeniture Survey, various issues.
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation, Demand and Supply of Livestock Products, various issues.
a/ Calculation based on the estimated demand elasticities and the estimated
3-year moving averages of direct nominal protection rates (for consumers)
presented in Table 8'-2.
Di . Actual consumption
Di - Consumption In the absence of direct price interventions
AO! D. - Di
Di D;
a S ~ 6 
C)
OA~~~~~~~~~
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Table 13f. Total Consumption Effect
Unit: 1.COO MT
Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
Year 0 D* ,D*/°* °3 8* a-B* °5 Gg 60*5/C5 D8 03F Q*8/D*3F -CKDKh6/Year ~RR 0R R/0 38 8 B Os s s 0BF B~F ~BBF D CP 'fK 40 hK'OK
1960 3,126 - - 995 - - 174 - - 13 - - 58 - -
61 3,092 - - 1,230 - - 148 - - 13 - - 50 - -
62 3,407 3,236 .05 1,235 1,327 -. 07 185 176 .05 17 18 -. 05 38 37 .04
63 3,136 3,012 .04 1,166 1,224 -. 05 166 171 -. 03 21 21 -. 01 55 53 .03
64 3,709 3,522 .05 1,017 1,089 -. 07 165 163 .02 32 31 .04 63 62 .01
65 3,925 3,696 .06 1,377 1,476 -. 07 163 159 .02 27 25 .09 56 56 .00
66 3,532 3,335 .06 1,488 1,580 -. 06 174 173 .01 29 26 .12 96 98 -. 02
67 3.954 3,773 .05 1,719 1,787 -.04 185 181 .02 32 29 .09 72 74 -.03
68 3,822 3,633 .05 1,702 1.786 -. 05 223 220 .02 36 35 .02 62 64 -. 03
69 3,946 3,787 .04 1,742 1,807 -. 04 262 261 .00 33 35 -. q5 76 79 -. 03
70 4,394 4,274 .03 1,497 1,534 -.02 266 271 -.02 37 38 -.04 83 87 -.04
71 4,777 4,899 -.03 1,644 1,582 .04 281 291 -.04 40 41 -.03 81 86 -.06
72 4,362 4,190 .04 1,717 1,805 -.05 261 262 -.00 40 38 .04 90 97 -.07
73 4,296 4,107 .05 1,740 1,830 -.05 298 294 .01 45 46 -.02 90 93 -.03
74 4,641 4,277 .09 1,771 1,946 -.09 291 282 .03 52 54 -.03 95 97 -.02
75 4,699 4,874 -.04 1,848 1,725 .07 372 371 .00 70 81 -.16 99 99 .00
76 4,646 5,262 -.12 1,796 1,534 .17 418 435 -.04 76 97 -.28 109 108 .01
77 5,045 5,921 -.15 1,523 1,264 .21 437 478 -.09 82 121 -.48 141 134 .06
78 5,784 6,910 -.16 1,125 920 .22 538 592 -.09 115 178 -.55 178 163 .09
79 6,764 8,043 -.16 1,286 1,051 .22 675 756 -.11 114 172 -.51 225 205 .10
so 5,402 6,628 -.19 1,407 1,113 .26 733 844 -.13 110 162 -.47 235 214 .10
81 5,366 6,489 -.17 1,182 947 .25 727 882 -.18 93 140 -.SO 209 192 .09
82 5,404 6,183 -.13 872 743 .17 792 1,025 -.23 107 182 -.70 238 208 .15
83 5,303 5,758 -.08 696 629 .11 907 1,170 -.23 116 206 -.78 295 254 .16
84 5,526 5,780 -. 04 814 772 .05 940 1,230 -. 24 107 188 -. 76 341 297 .15
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, The Farm Household Economy Survey, various issues.
_____________________________Annual Consumption-Survey, various issues. 
Economic Planning Board, The Urban Household Living Expenditure Survey, various issues.
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation, Oemand and Supely of Livestock Products, various issues.
a/ Calculation based on the estimated demand elasticities and the estimated
- 3-year moving averages of total nominal protection rates (fcr producers)
presented in Table 10'-2.
Di * Actual consumption
D1 * Consumption in the absence of direct and indirect price interventions
0i -
DI1
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declined in later years the effect was to reduce the level of
consumption. For beef the effect was to reduce consumption in most
years. In the case of barley and pork, the exchange rate policy
combined with direct intervention had the effect of reducing consumption
in earlier years but increasing consumption in later years.
The Effect on Foreign Exchange Earnings
Changes in production and consumption of tradable agricultural
products, as well as changes in the use of tradable inputs, necessarily
result in changes in foreign exchange spending for a country like Korea,
which is chronically dependent on imports of food and feed grain. In
order to isolate the direct foreign exchange implications of changes in
production, consumption, and input use estimated above, we simply assume
that agricultural price policy is not affected by foreign exchange
availability. It is also assumed that non-agricultural imports and
exports are independent of agricultural price policies.
Under the above assumptions, the direct short- and long-run
effect on foreign exchange gain or loss of price intervention for each
product was measured by:
I I B 'BA E. = (A Q.- A D.) P. - A I P
- 2. . 3. i Ii
where: A Ei Gain in foreign exchange earnings
I
A Qi = Change in output in the absence of direct price
intervention
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A Di = Change in consumption in the absence of direct
price intervention
A Ii = Change in the use of tradable inputs to produce
output i in the absence of direct price
intervention
B
P. = Border price of product i in U.S. dollars
1
BP1 = Border price of input i in U.S. dollars
Total short- and long-run effect was measured by:
* -A * B * B
A E = (A Q a D.) Pi - I. . P
1 1 1 Ii
where: A Qi Change in output i in the absence of direct
and indirect price intervention
A D. = Change in consumption in the absence of direct
and indirect price intervention
*
A Ii = Change in the use of tradable input i to
produce output i in the absence of direct and
indirect price intervention
Changes in the use of tradable inputs (fertilizer for rice,
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barley, and soybean, and corn for beef and pork production) are assumed
to be proportional to change in output of each product.8/ The results
of foreign exchange effects are presented in Tables 14a, 14b, 14c, and
14d.
Table 14a and 14b indicate that direct price intervention had,
both in the short run and long run, a positive effect on foreign
exchange earnings throughout 1962-84. The amount of foreign exchange
gained due to direct long-run intervention is estimated as US$130
million, or 16 percent of total exports, in 1970, and US1.8 billion, or
6 percent of total exports, in 1984. Although intervention had the
effect of requiring greater input use (fertilizer and feed corn), a
positive effect on output could more than offset this negative effect,
hence resulting in a positive effect throughout the period concerned.
When combined with indirect intervention through trade and
exchange rate policy as measured in Tables 14c and 14d, direct
intervention resulted in a loss of foreign exchange and an increase of
imports until the early 1970s, but resulted in a gain of foreign
exchange thereafter through 1984. The net loss of foreign exchange due
to the long-run effect of total intervention is estimated as US$239
million, or 29 percent of total exports in 1970; by 1984, the effect was
to gain US$1.4 billion, representing roughly 5 percent of Korea's total
exports for that year.
8/ Inputs used per unit of outputs for each product are estimated as:
Rice .031 0.5 for 1960-69 4.15 for 1960-69
Barley .046 Beef: 1.5 for 1970-79 Pork: 4.78 for 1970-79
Soybean .030 2.0 for 1980-84 5.37 for 1980-84
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Table 14a. Direct Short-Run Effect of Price Interventions
on Foreign Exchange Earnings (Gain: +, Loss: -)
Unit: miliion US dollars
Year Value of Effect Proportion Effect Total ProportionTotal Export on Outputs Prprin on Inputs Effects Pooto
(1) (2) (3)=(2)/(1) (4) (5)=(2)+(4) (6)=(5)/(1)
1960 32.8
61 40.9
62 54.8 98.1 1.790 -3.8 94.3 1.721
63 86.8 97.1 1.119 -3.0 94.1 1.084
64 119.1 111.4 .935 -3.9 107.5 .903
65 175.1 73.3 .419 -3.5 69.8 .399
66 250.3 17.3 .069 -1.9 15.4 .062
67 320.2 -6.9 -.022 -2.4 -9.3 -.029
68 455.4 8.5 .019 -4.3 4.2 .009
69 622.5 63.8 .102 -6.2 57.6 .093
70 835.2 94.2 .113 -9.4 84.8 .102
71 1,067.6 174.0 .163 -10.9 163.1 .153
72 1,624.1 194.1 .120 -10.6 183.5 .113
73 3,225.0 341.8 .106 -16.7 325.1 .101
74 4,460.4 355.5 .080 -16.2 339.3 .076
75 5,081.0 263.1 .052 -16.4 246.7 .049
76 7,715.3 429.0 .056 -16.7 412.3 .053
77 10,046.5 718.8 .072 -25.5 693.3 .069
78 12,710.6 1,342.6 .106 -32.8 1,309.8 .103
79 15,055.5 1,070.5 .071 -37.3 1,033.2 .069
80 17,504.9 1,353.2 .077 -33.0 1,320.2 .075
81 21,253.8 1,608.6 .076 -25.3 1,583.3 .074
82 21,853.4 1,299.0 .059 -21.0 1,278.0 .058
83 24,445.1 1,339.4 .055 -26.5 1,312.9 .054
84 29,244.9 1,222.0 .042 -30.6 1,191.4 .041
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Economic Statistics, various issues.
Also see Appendix 4Ca.
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Table 14b. Direct Long-Run (Cumulative) Effect of Price Interventions
on Foreign Exchange Earnings (Gain: +, Loss: -) -
Unit: million US dollars
Year ~~Value of Ef-fect Effect Total Pooto
Year Total Export on Outputs Proportion fpt Effects Proportion
(1) (2) (3)=(2)/(1) (4) (5)=(2)+(4) (6)=(5)/(1)
1960 32.8
61 40.9
62 54.8 98.1 1.790 -3.8 94.3 1.721
63 86.8 133.1 1.533 -4.5 128.6 1.482
64 119.1 188.2 1.580 -7.0 181.2 1.521
65 175.1 144.5 .825 -7.0 137.5 .785
66 250.3 147.2 .588 -9.7 137.5 .549
67 320.2 102.5 .320 -7.3 95.2 .297
68 455.4 75.4 .166 -7.7 67.7 .149
69 622.5 107.3 .172 -9.8 97.5 .157
70 835.2 144.8 .173 -14.4 130.4 .156
71 1,067.5 221.1 .207 -17.8 203.3 .190
72 1,624.1 268.1 .165 -17.2 250.9 .154
73 3,225.0 502.1 .156 -29.2 472.9 .147
74 4,460.4 712.7 .160 -38.0 674.7 .151
75 5,081.0 676.9 .133 -39.6 637.3 .125
76 7,715.3 677.0 .088 -37.9 639.1 .083
77 10,046.5 892.6 .089 -44.8 847.8 .084
78 12,710.6 1,664.4 .131 -58.5 1,605.9 .126
79 15,055.5 1,423.7 .095 -84.6 1,339.1 .089
80 17,504.9 1,776.2 .101 -94.1 1,682.1 .096
81 21,253.8 2,210.7 .104 -73.5 2,137.2 .101
82 21,853.4 1,907.3 .087 -52.8 1,854.5 .085
83 24,445.1 1,957.3 .080 -64.6 1,892.7 .077
84 29,244.9 1,888.5 .065 -70.2 1,818.3 .062
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Economic Statistics, various issues.
Also see Appendix 40b.
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Table 14c. Total Short-Run Effect of Price Interventions
on Foreign Exchange Earnings (Gain: +, Locs: -)
Unit: million US dollars
Year Value of Effect Proportion Effect Total ProportionTotal Export on Outputs rprin on Inputs Ef-fects Pooto
(1) (2) (3)=(2)/(1) (4) (5)=(2)+(4) (6)=(5)/(1'
1960 32.8
61 40.9
62 54.8 -91.5 -1.670 5.3 -86.2 -1.573
63 86.8 -96.4 -1.111 4.8 -91.6 -1.055
64 119.1 -142.1 -1.193 5.3 -136.8 -1.149
65 175.1 -118.8 -.678 4.5 -114.3 -.653
66 250.3 -156.0 -.623 9.5 -146.5 -.585
67 320.2 -180.7 -.564 5.6 -175.1 -.547
68 455.4 -159.4 -.350 3.1 -156.3 -.343
69 622.5 -153.7 -.247 1.8 -151.9 -.244
70 835.2 -121.7 -.146 -.1 -121.8 -.146
71 1,067.6 -23.4 -.022 -.8 -a4.2 -.023
72 1,624.1 13.9 .009 -2.8 11.1 .007
73 3,225.0 34.4 .011 -7.9 26.5 .008
74 4,460.4 -63.0 -.014 -4.6 -67.6 -.015
75 5,081.0 -100.2 -.020 -2.8 -103.0 -.020
76 7,715.3 158.1 .020 -4.3 153.8 .020
77 10,046.5 502.8 .050 -15.6 487.2 .048
78 12,710.6 1,061.5 .084 -23.9 1,037.6 .082
79 15,055.5 819.3 .054 -22.3 797.0 .053
80 17,504.9 985.0 .056 -7.2 977.8 .056
81 21,253.8 1,130.0 .053 .0 1,130.0 .053
82 21,853.4 958.4 .044 2.0 960.4 .044
83 24,445.1 1,029.4 .042 -.6 1,028.8 .042
84 29,244.9 956.3 .033 -6.1 950.2 .032
,curce: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Economics Statistics, various issues.
Also see Appendix 40c.
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Table 14d. Total Long-Run (Cumulative) Effect of Price Interventions
on Foreign Exchange Earnings (Gain: + Loss: -)
Unit: million US dollars
Year Total Export onfOut Proportion Effect Total Proportion
(1) (2) (3)=(2)/(1) (4) (5)=(2)+(4) (6)=(5)/(1)
1960 32.8
61 40.9
62 54.8 -61.0 -1.113 3.4 -57.6 -1.051
-63 86.8 -67.0 -.772 4.3 -62.7 -.722
64 119.1 -101.3 -.851 4.4 -96.9 -.814
65 175.1 -97.7 -.558 4.8 -92.9 -.531
66 250.3 -144.8 -.579 12.8 -132.0 -.527
67 320.2 -215.6 -.673 9.5 -206.1 -.644
68 455.4 -236.9 -.520 6.4 -230.5 -.506
69 622.5 -272.6 -.438 4.3 -268.3 -.431
70 835.2 --239.0 -.286 .4 -238.6 -.286
71 1,067.6 -86.9 -.081 -2.8 -89.7 -.084
72 1,624.1 -14.3 -.009 -5.3 -19.6 -.012
73 3,225.0 65.8 .020 -12.3 53.5 .017
74 4,460.4 37.2 .008 -15.3 21.9 .005
75 5,081.0 19.2 .004 -14.1 5.1 .001
76 7,715.3 160.0 .021 -12.4 147.6 .019
77 10,046.5 517.3 .051 -22.9 494.4 .049
78 12,710.6 1,168.8 .092 -35.9 1,132.9 .089
79 15,055.5 1,045.0 .069 -52.0 993.0 .066
80 17,504.9 1,316.7 .075 -48.5 1,268.2 .072
81 21,253.8 1,627.5 .077 -29.5 1,598.0 .075
82 21,853.4 1,404.5 .064 -10.7 1,393.8 .064
83 24,445.1 1,449.4 .059 -3.2 1,446.2 .059
84 29,244.9 1,419.6 .049 -6.0 1,413.6 .048
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Economics Statistics, various issues.
Also see Appendix 40d.
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Chapter 5
THE EFFECT OF INTERVENTION ON THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET
The Korean government's trade policy has traditionally not been
designed to raise any significant amount of revenues by taxing export
commodities. On the contrary, various benefits are provided to
exporters in the form of export subsidies and preferential credit.
There are two sources of revenues from agricultural pricing policy:
import duties levied on imported agricultural commodities, and the
profits of two parastatal agencies from sales of imported meat stuffs
and miscellaneous agricultural products, such as sesame, red pepper, and
peanuts.9/
Tariff rates vary, ranging from 5 percent for rice and wheat, 7
percent for feed corn, 10 percent for soybeans, and 22 percent for meat
and pork, to 30 percent for corn for industrial use. Significant tariff
exemptions are granted for imports of major cereals, such as rice,
wheat, and feed corn, on grounds of price stabilization in the domestic
market. The total amount of tariffs due on imports of major cereals for
9/ One of the parastatals is the National Livestock Cooperatives Federation
(NLCF), whose main function is to provide livestock development loans to
farmers and related agri-business. The profits made from the sales of
imported meats are used as a supplementary resource for financing
livestock-related development activities. The other is the Agricultural
and Fisheries Development Corporation (AFDC) which carries out buffer-
stock operations for selected non-grain agricultural products. The
profits of this agency are incorporated into the Agricultural Products
Price Stabilization Fund.
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the 1981-84 period was 365.4 billion won, but actual collections
amounted to 192.0 billion won, with the rest being exempted. Annual
tariff revenues and profits are presented in Appendix 42.
Included in the major categories of government expenditures are
direct production and consumption subsidies for staple food grains
(mainly rice and barley) and direct subsidies to farmers for fertilizer,
farm machinery, and pesticides. Prior to 1968, when the government sold
its grain at a controlled price after adding intermediate handling and
transportation costs to the original acquisition price, there was no
financial loss due to price policy. But, as explained in Chapter 2, the
implementation of a two-price system for rice and barley in 1969 caused
the government to incur a substantial loss every year.
The total accumulated loss during the 1970-84 period was
2,073.1 billion won, with 58.3 percent (or 1,208.2 billion won) having
been spent to subsidize the price of rice. The loss due to the subsidy
for barley was 34.0 percent (or 705 billion won), the loss due to the
flour price subsidy was 6.2 percent (or 128.0 billion won), and the
remaining loss was for miscellaneous grains. This deficit in the Grain
Management Fund (GMF) is taken as an expenditure associated with grain
price policy, but a closer look at the accounting makes the reported
deficit a rather dubious measure of true subsidy.
To break down the GMF deficit by source of expenditure for
1984, for example, 207.2 billion won or 48.6 percent of the total loss
of 426.2 billion won is attributable to negative price differentials,
4.1 billion won or 9.7 percent to intermediate handling and
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transportation costs, and 177.7 billion won or 41.7 percent resulted
from the interest payments on both the long-term borrowings from the
central bank and the short-term grain bonds issued to supplement grain
acquisition funds.
Another major source of government expenditure is the
fertilizer price subsidy. A large deficit has existed in the Fertilizer
Account since 1970 because of a negative difference between procurement
and sale prices, plus export subsidy. The fertilizer prices paid by
farmers were below the prices received by manufacturers, with the
difference in price and intermediate handling costs borne by the
government throughout the 1970-84 period. The current procedure is to
include interest payments on funds borrowed from the central bank. In
1984, for example, of the total deficit of 98.5 billion won, interest
payments constituted about 60.0 percent, or 59.1 billion won, the loss
due to price differential 8.1 percent, or 8.0 billion won, and handling
and transportation costs 31.9 percent, or 31.4 billion won.
Since these interest payments cannot be regarded as true
subsidies for producers and consumers, they were excluded from
government expenditures. Only the price subsidy portion of expenditures
for the 1970-84 period was included in Table 15. As the table shows,
net expenditures as a proportion of the total budget and the budget
deficit displayed no uniform trend.
In order to investigate the degree of bias against or in favor
of agriculture in the government's investments and expenditures, the
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Table 15. Effect of the Pricing Policy on the Budget
Unit: Billion won
a/ Totalb- Net Net Expenditures a a Proportion of
Year * Total-Toa/Ne
Revenues Expenditures Expenditures Total Budget Budget Deficit
Billion won Billicn won Billion won % %
1970 0.5 8.4 7.9 1.5 32.0
71 1.9 6.0 4.1 .6 5.4
72 5.3 12.0 6.7 ..8 3.5
73 8.5 13.0 4.5 .5 5.2
74 13.1 155.1 142.0 10.0 47.2
75 19.0 154.6 135.0 6.3 29.1
76 13.4 10.0 -3.4 .1 .9
77 16.4 38.8 22.4 .6 4.7
78 67.1 125.7 58.6 1.2 9.5
79 62.9 178.5 115.6 1.9 26.3
80 84.4 210.6 126.2 1.5 10.8
81 111.1 121.8 10.7 .1 .5
82 145.2 52.7 -92.5 .8 4.2
83 149.5 177.4 27.9 .2 2.9
84 120.4 249.7. 129.3 .9 .14.0
Source: See Appendix 42.
a/ Includes tariffs and profits made from sales of non-grain agricultu.al commodities
such as meats, peanuts, sesame, etc.
b/ Includes price subsidy for major cereals, fertilizer, farm machinery and livestock
raising.
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following two measures were calculated:
CI iCI
GIB = A
GDPA / GDP
GEA/GE
GEB = N
GDPA / GDP
where:
GIB = Index of government investment bias
GEB = Index of government expenditure bias
CI = Total public investment expenditures
CIA = Public investment expenditure on agriculture
GDP = Total GDP
NIGDP A = GDP originating in agriculture in the case of no
intervention
= GDPA + Net transfer out of agriculture
GE = Total government budget expenditure
GEA = Government budget expenditure on agriculture
Table 16 gives the results of our calculations. According to
the table, GIB (in the fourth column) has been steadily rising (with a
few years' exception), reaching as high as 2 in 1984 from about 0.4-0.5
in the early 1960s. GEB shows a trend similar to that of GIB. This
implies that the agricultural sector has been receiving more investment
resources relative to what it has contributed to the growth of the
national output, hence intensifying the investment and expenditure bias
toward agriculture.
Table 16. Government Investment (GIB) and Total Expenditure (GEB) Bias
Excluding Including
Defense Budget Defense Budget
Year GDPA /GDP Ci GIB GEA/GE GEB GEA /GE GEB
(1) % (2) % (2)/(1) (3) % (3)/(1) (4) % (4)/(1)
1960 34.5 20.6 .597 5.8 .168 3.4 .99
61 45.5 14.4 .316 9.6 .211 6.1 .13462 44.2 26.8 .606 15.3 .346 11.2 .253
63 48.2 18.3 .380 11.7 .243 8.0 .166
64 55.6 18.9 .340 10.9 .196 6.9 .12465 44.5 23.4 .526 11.2 .252 6.8 .15366 45.9 22.7 .495 9.2 .200 6.5 .14267 35.4 16.8 .475 6.7 .189 4.8 .13668 29.9 22.4 .749 10.3 .344 7.7 .25869 28.8 25.1 .872 11.8 .410 9.1 .316/0 26.3 21.5 .817 9.6 .365 7.3 .278
71 23.1 21.7 .939 9.4 .407 6.8 .294
72 20.3 23.8 1.172 7.2 .355 5.3 .261
73 18.2 23.3 1.280 7.7 .423 5.5 .302
74 25.9 21.6 .834 6.2 .239 4.3 .166
-75 24.0 20.5 .854 8.0 .333 5.5 .22976 17.6 20.4 1.159 8.4 .477 5.3 .301
77 14.7 19.0 1.293 8.5 .578 5.3 .361
78 14.3 18.9 1.322 7.8 .545 5.0 .350
79 12.3 15.5 1.260 6.9 .561 4.6 .37380 10.2 14.7 1.441 8.3 .814 5.4 .52981 10.3 19.5 1.893 9.5 .922 6.1 .592
8z 9.7 16.0 1.649 8.0 .825 5.1 .52683 8.9 17.7 1.989 7.5 .843 4.9 .55184 9.0 18.2 2.022 6.9 .767 4.7 .522
Source: Calculated from Appendix 42-44.
s;
-q
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Chapter 6
INTERSECTORAL TRANSFER OF RESOURCES
Transfers to Agriculture
The transfer of resources to the agricultural sector from the
non-agricultural sector can be found in non-investment ransfers and
public investment expenditures. Non-investment ransfers include
implicit price subsidies and agricultural credit subsidies that would
have been realized in the absence of government intervention. The
investment portion includes actual public expenditures for the
agricultural sector.
Transfers due to Price Subsidies
For each commodity, and for fertilizer, both the direct
transfer to agriculture due to direct intervention and the total
transfer due to direct and indirect intervention were estimated. The
direct transfer was calculated as the excess of the domestic producer
price over the border price (evaluated at the nominal exchange rate, EO)
multiplied by current output. The total transfer was given by the
excess of the domestic producer price over the producer price that would
have prevailed in the absence of government intervention (or the border
price evaluated at the free trade equilibrium exchange rate, E*)
multiplied by actual output. Each time series of absolute levels of
transfers was deflated by CPI. That is,
Direct transfer = (PA PA) QA
Total transfer = (P P Q
A A ~A
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where:
PA = Domestic producer price of product A
PA = Border price of product A evaluated at the nominal
exchange rate, E0
PA = Border price of product A evaluated at the free trade
equilibrium exchange rate, E
QA = Output
Transfers due to Value-Added
Since the prices of purchased inputs are affected by price
intervention, we measured the combined value-added transfer of product
and input price interventions. The input considered in the calculation
is fertilizer. Direct and total transfers on value-added are measured
as:
Direct transfer = (VA A - VAA QA
Total transfer = (VAA VA* QA
where:
VAA = PA - aAj Pi
VA = P - a . P.A A Aj j
VAA = PA - a Pj
P. = Price of fertilizer paid by farmers
P. = Border price of fertilizer evaluated at official
exchange rate, Eo
P.~ = Border price of fertilizer evaluated at free trade
equilibrium exchange rate, E
aAj = Units of fertilizer per unit of output A
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Agricultural Credit Subsidy
Agricultural loans in Korea are distributed through various
funds in accordance with the financing sources and the purpose of the
loans, and each loan fund is operated with different lending criteria.
With the government supplying a major portion of the finances, the
National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation exercises extensive
control over such loans by determining eligibility criteria, interest
rate, loan period, and so forth.
To simplify the computation of the implicit credit subsidy, all
loans were regrouped into short-term, intermediate-term, and long-term
loans, and the average interest rate was estimated for each category.
The annual implicit subsidy flows in agricultural credit were measured
by:
S = C ((1 + rt) (1 + it) - (1 + it)3t t t t t
where:
St = Amount of credit subsidy in year t
5t = Credit allocated to agriculture in year t
r* = Real reference interest rate in the absence of subsidy
t
= Inflation rate
tit = Actual interest rate charged
In actual measurement, the outstanding loan balance at the
beginning of each year was used for Ct, assuming that this balance was
repaid at the end of the year. For the real reference interest
*
rate rt, a rate of 1OZ was applied throughout the period concerned,
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since it is commonly recognized as the average social rate of return on
government investments in most LDCs. Appendix Table 43 gives the
estimated reference nominal interest rate (column 6) with inflation rate
taken into account and implicit subsidy rate for each loan category. By
multiplying the amount of loan in each category by the implicit subsidy
rate we obtain the subsidy. The results are presented in Appendix Table
44.
Investment
Investment covers public expenditures on the rural
infrastructure, such as irrigation systems, rural roads, rural housing,
as well as expenditures on agricultural research and extension services.
Transfer out of Agriculture
A farmland tax and miscellaneous public charges are the only
direct transfers out of agriculture. The average rate of farmland tax
on an individual crop is about 6 percent. If total output is less than
1.4 metric tons, no tax is levied. This exemption applies to about two-
thirds of the farmers in Korea.
Tables 17a, 17b, and 17c present the estimated "real" transfer
of resources between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors with
no government intervention. Table 17a presents the transfer for each
product due to output price and input price intervention, and Table 17b
the transfer due to both output price and input price intervention
except for inputs which cannot be allocated by product. The sum of
price-related and non-price transfers is presented in Table 17c.
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The results show a modest flow of resources into the
agricultural sector due to direct price intervention throughout the
period with two exceptional years, 1966 and 1967. Although the size of
the transfer is subject to large year-to-year fluctuations, it generally
shows an increasing trend. Price-related transfers to the agricultural
sector due to value added in real terms (1980 = 100.0) accounted for
10.5 percent of the GDP originating in the agricultural sector during
1962-69 and increased to 30.5 percent during 1980-84 (see columns 25 of
Table 17a and 21b of Table 17b). If non-price transfers (or public
investment in agriculture) are included, the relative share in
agricultural GDP was 12.4 percent during 1962-69 and 38.6 percent during
1980-84 (see column 15 of Table 17c).
If one takes into account the impact of overvaluation of the
exchange rate, the pattern of resource flow is completely different.
There are negative flows throughout the 1960s and for 1973-75, implying
that resources were extracted from the agricultural sector and sent to
the non-agricultural sector. Measured in terms of relative share of
agricultural GDP, the price-related resource flow from the agricultural
sector to the non-agricultural sector constituted 25.9 percent during
1962-69, while the total sum of resource flow (price-related plus public
investment in agriculture) was 22.3 percent in the same period (see
columns 26 of Table 17a, 22 of Table 17b, and 16 of Table 17c). This
reverse flow of resources in the 1960s is mainly attributable to
persistent overvaluation of the domestic currency; in 1973-75 it was the
result of extraordinarily high world prices for food grain. For the
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rest of the period through 1984, as the degree of exchange rate
overvaluation gradually lessened and price subsidization of major food
crops intensified, the total transfer of resources to the agricultural
sector became positive and consistently increased thereafter. The
relative share of price-related transfers in agricultural CDP was 26.2
percent during 1980-84. When public investment is added, the share
increased to 34.2 percent in the same period, implying that over one-
third of agricultural GDP came from the non-agricultural sector during
1980-84 (see columns 26 of Table 17a, 22 of Table 17b, and 16 of Table
17c).
Overall, agricultural pricing policy per se resulted in a
modest financial flow from the non-agricultural to the agricultural
sector throughout the 1962-84 period, but trade and exchange rate policy
more than offset the effect of price policy and effected a resource flow
in reverse direction in the 1960s. For other years through 1984, the
resource flow into the agricultural sector far exceeded the flow out of
agriculture, mainly because of intensive price supports.
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Table 17a. Direct and Total Real Transfers due to Output Price and Input Price Interventions
out of(-) and iato(+) Agriculture (in billions units of Korean currency of 1980)
Transfers on Output Pricesy'
Year Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork All Products
73--. Totai Oirect Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total
1962 136.1 -422.1 42.6 -109.5 5.1 -16.8 1.7 -13.6 24.0 -12.4 209.5 -574.463 665.8 -142.3 220.8 110.4 22.9 27.7 1.9 -20.3 19.1 -17.4 930.5 -41.964 219.1 -564.7 147.3 -10.5 20.9 29.2 -10.2 -37.0 5.5 -34.0 382.6 -617.065 -70.6 -576.8 81.4 -21.8 16.6 23.3 0.4 -16.9 ;3.7 -7.7 41.5 -599.9
66 25.4 -872.5 -98.1 -399.1 19.5 27.6 1.6 -32.0 12.5 -49.5 -39.1 -1325.567 -49.7 -635.9 -59.5 -248.4 43.9 22.5 13.1 -11.3 30.2 0.3 -22.0 -872.868 99.1 -425.7 34.2 -131.8 17.1 -10.6 27.6 -1.5 52.2 25.0 230.2 -544.669 237.9 -415.5 86.0 -50.7 23.9 4.1 20.1 -6.3 28.7 -5.7 396.6 -474.170 255.9 -292.9 20.7 -121.6 43.0 24.1 22.7 -5.3 48.4 18.3 390.7 -377.471 619.4 141.2 135.7 20.2 24.6 12.2 24.9 -10.1 60.2 24.7 864.8 188.272 856.3 548.6 193.0 109.1 33.8 17.5 33.2 6.6 30.7 3.2 1147.0 685.073 159.7 -130.6 59.5 -32.9 22.4 4.6 21.6 -8.0 58.1 33.8 321.3 -133.174 39.7 -790.8 -15.6 -160.8 26.9 -10.5 28.6 -10.0 19.6 -25.1 99.2 -997.27S 235.4 -509.7 -27.2 -213.5 33.8 3.9 37.4 -3.1 58.2 14.5 337.6 -707.976 1320.5 1016.9 86.1 5.5 59.4 43.6 100.6 72.6 76.8 43.4 1643.4 1182.077 1678.2 1484.9 133.4 113.1 81.5 67.4 147.5 125.9 68.1 36.2 2108.7 1827.518 1357.4 1145.2 246.2 220.3 87.8 79.6 221.7 205.6 66.3 18.7 1979.4 1669.479 1934.0 1676.6 282.3 237.3 30.5 18.4 174.0 137.8 -17.4 -107.1 *2403.4 1963.080 1101.9 889.5 121.5 89.9 71.? 61.3 133.3 86.1 43.9 -43.1 1471.9 1083.781 1383.7 1120.5 111.0 81.9 110.8 100.8 157.3 128.8 -153.6 -75.3 1609.2 1356.782 1308.3 1121.2 139.8 125.4 93.1 88.2 189.5 173.3 -80.7 -166.2 1650.0 1342.983 1122.6 981.7 156.4 146.4 97.2 93.6 208.3 194.4 -50.0 0.6 1534.5 1416.784 1091.8 935.2 117.6 105.4 101.7 96.0 276.5 261.8 8.0 -38.1 1595.6 1350.3
Table 17a. Con'd
Transfers on Purchased Inputs Sum of Transfers Sum of TransfersTransfers_______ on__Purchased 
_______Inputs____ on All Product as a Share ofYear Fertilizer Feed Others Credit All In'uts and Inout Prices 
-
Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct rotal Direct Tot',
- (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19j (20) (21) (22) (li)TT219-:2)1+22) (tT (263
1962 -21.8 -8.4 -8.4 7.3 -3.0 -31.5 20.5 15.0 -12.4 -17.6 196.9 -591.9 11.0 -33.263 -16.0 -2.6 -6.1 10.6 4.1 -44.0 44.6 32.2 26.6 -3.8 957.1 -45.8 38.4 -1.364 -. 3 27.8 -6.6 7.9 .o -36.2 64.5 51.4 57.5 50.8 0.2 -579.1 15.0 -19.165 -16.8 3.3 -6.1 4.2 -4.2 -24.0 18.6 15.8 -8.6 -. 8 33.1 -600.6 1.4 -25.966 -16.9 6.4 -11.6 5.0 -8.6 -25.1 12.8 11.2 -24.3 -2.5 -63.4 -1329.8 
-2.6 -54 ;67 3.9 33.6 -10.4 4.9 -8.7 -23.0 9.1 8.0 -6.1 23.5 -29.1 -849.2 
-1.2 -36.168 1.5 30.1 -12.4 7.6 -6.5 -23.0 12.8 11.1 -4.5 25.8 225.7 -518.9 8.8 -20.369 -S.3 20.7 -10.8 6.6 -6.6 -Z6.1 14.5 12.7 -8.2 14.0 388.4 -460.1 13.3 -15.870 -11.6 10.6 -11.9 7.4 -3.4 -19.6 28.1 25.1 1.2 23.5 391.9 -353.8 13.0 -11.871 -8.9 18.8 -12.6 11.7 2.7 -16.0 29.3 26.2 10.5 40.7 875.5 228.9 26.5 6.972 8.2 27.1 -7.0 9.5 8.8 .7 49.4 47.5 59.3 84.7 1206.4 769.7 33.4 21.373 25.9 48.7 -6.5 9.7 -2.1 -5.6 30.5 30.0 47.8 82.8 365.6 -53.6 10.4 -1.574 1.0 25.1 -13.7 6.6 -2.7 -23.6 155.1 141.9 139.7 150.1 238.9 -847.2 5.0 -17.775 -26.1 -3.7 -17.3 6.5 .0 -19.2 122.3 113.8 78.9 97.1 416.5 -610.5 8.2 -12.076 -52.8 -41.6 -7.3 14.1 16.6 16.0 59.9 59.8 16.5 48.3 1659.8 1230.3 28.5 21.177 -35.6 -24.8 - 6 Z1.5 2Z.5 26.8 48.8 49.4 35.0 72.9 2143.7 1900.3 34.5 30.678 -39.5 -28.9 -7.3 21.6 16.2 11.8 70.8 69.9 40.2 74.5 2019.8 1743.8 29.9 25.879 -2.3 21.5 -17.3 25.5 19.6 5.2 143.1 137.3 143.1 189.5 2546.4 2150.3 38.0 32.180 22.4 51.1 -19.2 26.0 1Z.9 2.0 310.1 .96.1 326.0 375.2 1798.2 1458.9 37.0 30.081 -10.0 8.S -11.5 17.1 16.7 9.4 141.2 137.8 136.5 172.8 1745.6 1529.3 31.6 27.782 -29.0 -21.4 -9.4 20.3 15.8 9.7 9.2 .9.1 -13.4 17.7 1636.6 1360.5 30.3 25.283 -37.4 -31.8 -3.7 21.8 15.5 12.5 -8.4 -8.3 -34.0 -5.8 1500.6 1410.9 27.1 25.484 -31.9 -26.0 -6.1 15.1 10.1 9.1 16.1 16.1 -11.9 14.4 1583.4 1374.6 26.3 22.8
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook,. various Issues
, the Cost of Production Survey, various issues
,ar rm Household EconomY Survey, various issues
National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation. The Rural Price and Wage Survey, various issues
Fertilizer Yearbook, various issues
Nation.' Livestock Cooperatives Federation, Demand and Supply of Livestock Products, various issues
Economic Planning Board, The Summary of Government Budget, various issues
_ Consumer Price Statistics Yearbook, various issues
The Bank of Korea, The Price Survey, various issues e
FAO, Trade Yearbook, various issues
^/ The real direct and total transfers are defined as:
Direct transfer - yA - YA/CP! - YA/CPI * YA/CPl TIZOVA - (t-EOA)PNAz
Total transfer a YA - YA YA/CPl - YA/CPl * YA/CPI - YA/[ ZOAPA - (lT- &A)PNAA
where YA a Realized real income
yA* Real income in the ansence of direct price intervention
yAX* Real income in the absence of total price Intervention
yA aRealized nominal income
Yj Nominal income in the absence of direct price intervention
Y* aNominal income in the absence of total price intervention
CPI aConsumer price index (1980 * 100.0)
CPI' Consumer price index in the absence of direct price intervention(Cf. Appendix 461
CPI* Consumer price index in the absence of total price intervention(Cf. Appendix 46)
PA aConsumer price of product A in the absence of direct price intervention
P* aConsumer price of product A in the absence of total price intervention
P *A aConsumer price index of non-food sector
PNA * Consumer price index of non-food sector in the absence of total price intervention
(Cf. the footnote of Table 10-Z)
VA* Share of product A in the consumer price index busket
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Table 17b. Direct and Total Real Transfers due to Value-Added and Non-Allocatable Input Price Interventions
out of(-) and into(+) Agriculture{in billions units of Korean currency of 1980)
Transfers on Value-Addedo'-
Year Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork All Products
Oirect Total Oirect Totai Direct Total Direct Tot rct T ota irect Total
(1) (2) ' (3) (4rJ V57 -(6 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1962 127.7 -425.2 34.0 -111.6 4.3 -17.1 .6 -12.5 16.9 -6.1 183.5 -572.5
63 657.7 -143.5 .215.6 109.2 22.4 27.6 .8 -18.3 14.1 -8.9 910.6 -33.9
64 219.1 -552.4 147.3 -2.4 20.9 30.1 -11.5 -35.4 .2 -27.7 376.0 -587.8
65 -76.8 -575.9 77.8 -20.9 1S.9 23.4 -1.0 -16.0 9.1 -4.5 25.0 -593.9
66 19.1 -869.5 -102-5 -397.4 18.8 27.8 -. 7 -31.4 3.2 -46.9 -62.1 -1317.4
67 -48.3 -622.5 -58.2 -239.0 44.0 23.7 10.4 -10.0 22.5 3.9 -29.6 -843.9
68 99.6 -413.4 34.4 -122.1 17.3 -8.8 23.9 .7 43.5 30.4 218.7 -513.2
69 235.1 -404.3 84.2 -44.4 23.6 5.6 17.1 -4.4 20.9 -1.0 380.9 -448.5
70 250.4 -287.6 17.7 -117.8 45.4 24.9 19.4 -3.3 39.8 23.7 372.7 -360.1
71 615.6 151.7 133.2 25.9 24.2 13.2 21.5 -6.9 51.0 33.2 845.5 217.1
72 862.4 558.6 196.6 121.6 34.3 19.2 30.9 9.9 26.0 9.4 1150.2 718.7
73 175.6 -101.0 67.4 -17.7 24.0 7.8 18.3 -6.3 51.4 38.4 336.7 -78.8
74 40.2 -773.7 -15.3 -153.8 27.1 -8.6 24.2 -7.9 10.3 -20.6 86.5 -964.6
75 221.5 -511.7 -34.5 -214.4 32.3 3.7 32.1 -1.3 46.2 19.1 297.6 -704.6
76 1292.8 995.1 74.4 -3.7 56.5 41.3 98.1 77.3 72.0 52.7 1593.8 1162.7
77 1657.3 1470.3 128.7 109.8 78.7 65.4 147.3 133.5 67.6 50.1 2079.6 1829.1
78 1335.9 1129.4 238. 214.4 85.4 77.8 219.6 211.9 61.1 34.0 1940.2- 1667.5
79 1932.5 1690.7 281.7 242.8 30.5 19.3 168.8 145.8 -29.6 -89.7 2383.9 2008.9
80 1111.6 911.5 124.7 97.0 72.5 64.1 127.8 93.8 30.3 -24.8 1466.9 1141.6
81 1378.7 1124.6 109.8 82.8 110.1 101.3 153.8 134.0 -161.6 -63.4 1590.8 1379.3
82 1289.5 1107.3 135.6 123.2 91.1 86.7 187.4 177.8 -88.0 -150.4 1615.6 1344.6
83 1100.6 963.0 151.3 142.0 94.9 91.6 207.5 199.5 -52.8 17.3 1501.5 1413.4
84 1073.9 920.7 113.6 102.1 99.8 94.4 274.7 266.4 3.7 -27.5 1565.7 1356.1
TaDle 17b. Con'd
Transfers on Purcnased Inputs Not Allocatable Sum of Transfers Sum of Transfers
Year on All Product as a Share of
Year Other Inputs C-edit All Inputs and Input Prices GOPA
Oirect Total Direct Total Direct Total Oirect Total Direct Total
(13) (14) t15) (16)T 1) (8 1 )7(2 W)8'- 2)# Z)^
1962 -7.1 -34.4 20.5 15.0 13.4 -19.4 196.9 -591.9 11.0 -33.2
63 1.9 44.1 44.6 32.2 46.5 -11.9 957.1 -45.8 38.4 -1.8
64 -.3 -42.7 64.5 51.4 64.2 8.7 440.2 -579.1 15.0 -19.7
65 -10.5 -22.5 18.6 15.8 8.1 -8.1 33.1 -600.6 1.4 -25.9
66 14.1 -23.6 12.8 11.2 -1.3 -12.4 -63.4 -i329.8 -2.6 -54.7
67 -8.6 -13.3 9.1 8.0 .5 -5.3 -29.1 -849.2 -1.2 -36.1
68 -5.8 -16.8 12.8 11.1 7.0 -5.7 225.7 -518.9 8.8 -20.3
69 -7.0 -24.3 14.5 12.7 7.5 -11.6 388.4 -460.1 13.3 -15.8
70 -8.9 -18.8 28.1 25.1 19.2 6.3 391.9 -353.8 13.0 -11.8
71 .7 -14.4 29.3 26.2 30.0 11.8 875.5 228.9 26.5 6.9
72 6.8 3.5 49.4 47.5 56.2 51.0 1206.4 769.7 33.4 21.3
73 -1.6 -4.8 30.5 30.0 28.9 25.2 365.6 -53.6 10.4 -1.5
74 -2.7 -24.5 155.1 141.9 152.4 117.4 238.9 -847.2 5.0 -17.7
75 -3.4 -19.7 122.3 113.8 118.9 94.1 416.5 -610.5 8.2 -12.0
76 6.1 7.8 59.9 59.8 66.0 67.6 1659.8 1230.3 28.5 21.1
77 15.3 21.8 48.8 49.4 64.1 71.2 2143.7 1900.3 34.5 30.6
78 8.8 6.4 70.8 69.9 79.6 76.3 2019.8 1743.8 29.9 25.S
79 19.4 4.1 143.1 137.3 162.5 141.4 2546.4 2150.3 38.0 32.1
80 21.2 21.2 310.1 296.1 331.3 317.3 1798.2 1458.9 37.0 30.0
81 13.6 12.2 141.2 137.8 154.8 150.0 1745.6 1529.3 31.6 27.7
82 11.8 6.8 9.2 9.i 21.0 15.9 1636.6 1360.6 30.3 25.2
83 7.5 5.8 -8.4 -8.3 -. 9 -2.5 1500.6 1410.9 27.1 25.4
84 1.6 2.4 16.1 16.1 17.7 18.5 1583.4 1374.6 26.3 22.8
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries A8riculttural Spatistics Yearbook, various issues
_____________________________TheiCos oProduction Survey, various issues
Farm Household Economy Survey, various issues
National Agricultural Cooperatives Ferderation, The Rural Price and Wage Survey, various issues
, Fertilizer yearbook, various issues
National Livestock Coooeratives Federation, Oemand and SUply of Livestock Products, various issues
Economic Planning Board, The Summary of Government Budaet, various issues
, Consumer Price Statistics Yearbook, various issues
The Bank of Korea, The Price Survey, various issues
FAO, Trade Yearbook, various issues
And also see Appendix 46.
L/ The real direct and total transfers on value-added are defined as:
Direct transfer * (VAA x QA)/CPI - (VAA x QA)/CPI
Total transfer a (VAA x QA)/CPI - (VA* x QA)ICPI*
where VAA * Value-added of product A
VAA ' Value-added of product A in the absence of direct price intervention
VAA * Value-added of product A in the absence of total price intervention
QA= Output of product A
CPI - Consumer price index(1980 a 100.0)
CPI a Consumer price index in the ansence of direct price intervention
CPI * Consumer price index in the absence of total price intervention
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Table 17c. Real Transfers into(+)/out of(-) Agriculture
(in billions of units of Korean currency of 1980)
Non-Price Transfers Price-Related Total of Price- Total as a
Year ---Tix & Misc. Public Research & Related & Non- Share of
CYhaarrae Investsient Extension Others Sub-Total Transfers Price Trasfers GOPA
OirectD Toa Oirect Total Oirect Total Oirect Total Oirect Total Direct Total Oirect Total Direct Total(1) (2) (3) (4) 3VTS T7 (6F7) -8 (9) (10) (11) (12) (9) (1M)(10).(12FT( YiT'
(13) (14) (15) (16)
1962 -49.3 -36.0 94.5 69.0 S.5 4.0 - - 50.7 37.0 196.9 -591.9 247.6 -554.9 13.9 -31.1
63 -56.6 -40.9 54.2 39.1 6.0 4.3 - - 3.6 2.6 957.1 -45.8 960.7 -43.2 38.5 -1.7
64 -60.9 -48.6 34.5 27.5 6.4 5.1 - - -20.0 -15.9 440.2 -579.1 420.2 -595.0 14.3 -20.2
65 -59.7 -50.7 47.3 40.1 6.2 5.3 - - -6.2 -5.3 33.1 -600.6 26.9 -605.9 1.2 -26.2
66 -57.0 -50.0 88.6 77.6 6.7 5.9 - - 38.3 33.5 -63.4 -1329:8 -25.1 -1296.3 -1.0 -53.3
67 -41.2 -36.4 73.9 65.2 6.7 5.9 - - 39.4 34.8 -29.1 -849.2 10.3 -814.4 .4 -34.7
68 -43.3 -37.5 137.8 119.2 8.3 7.2 - - 102.8 88.9 225.7 -518.9 328.5 -430.0 12.8 -16.8
69 -55.0 -48.2 210.0 184.2 10.0 8.8 - - 165.0 144.7 388.4 -460.1 553.4 -315.4 19.0 -10.8
70 -36.0 -32.2 207.0 185.1 7.5 6.7 - - 178.5 159.6 391.9 -353.8 570.4 -194.2 18.9 -6.5
71 -41.0 -36.6 224.9 200.7 20.1 17.9 6.8 6.1 210.8 188.2 875.5 228.9 1086.3 417.1 32.8 12.6
72 -38.7 -37.2 216.6 208.2 14.4 13.8 41.0 39.4 233.2 224.1 1206.4 769.7 1439.6 993.8 39.9 27.5
73 -53.2 -52.3 194.9 191.7 . 12.2 12.0 26.1 25.7 180.0 177.0 365.6 -53.6 545.6 123.4 15.6 3.5
74 -57.0 -52.1 193.4 176.9 13.7 12.5 38.1 34.8 188.2 172.2 238.9 -847.2 427.1 -675.0 8.9 -14.1
75 -66.8 -62.1 269.0 250.2 12.6 11.7 39.6 36.8 254.4 236.6 416.5 -610.5 670.9 -373.9 13.1 -7.3
76 -92.3 -92.1 335.6 334.9 19.6 19.6 51.8 51.7 314.8 314.1 1659.8 1230.3 1974.6 1544.4 33.9 26.5
77 -115.1 -116.7 342.4 345.0 20.0 20., 64.7 65.5 312.0 316.1 2143.7 1900.3 2455.7 2216.4 39.6 35.7
78 -112.3 -110.9 376.5 371.8 20.8 20.5 60.5 59.8 345.5 341.2 2019.8 1743.8 2365.3 2085.0 35.0 30.8
79 -138.0 -132.4 421.0 403.9 23.0 22.1 93.9 90.1 399.9 383.7 2546.4 2150.3 2946.3 2534.0 44.0 37.8
80 -138.7 -132.4 368.4 351.7 19.8 18.9 72.6 69.3 322.1 307.5 1798.2 1458.9 2120.3 1766.4 43.7 36.4
81 -124.1 -121.2 484.5 472.9 18.2 17.8 79.8 77.9 458.3 447.4 1745.6 1529.3 2203.9 1976.7 39.9 35.8
82 -116.9 -114.5 452.3 443.3 20.0 19.6 58.3 57.2 413.8 405.6 1636.6 1360.5 2050.4 1766.1 38.0 32.7
83 -121.1 -120.0 419.2 415.3 21.3 21.1 192.7 190.9 512.2 507.4 1500.6 1410.9 2012.8 1918.3 36.3 34.6
84 -121.0 -120.6 445.7 444.4 19.7 19.7 185.3 184.7 529.7 528.1 1583.4 1374.6 2113.1 1902.7 35.1 31.6
Source: Economic Planning Board, The Sumnary of Government Budget. various issues
, Consumer Price Statistics, various issues
And also see Tables 17a, 17b and Appendix 46.
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Chapter 7
INCOME DISTRIBUTION EFFECT OF INTERVENTION
Our interest here is income distribution between small and
large farms and between low- and high-income groups in urban areas.
Although the same price is applied, the relative benefit or loss due to
changes in relative prices differs between farms of different sizes and
among different urban income groups.
We consider here three three different categories of the
distributional effect of price policies; that is, the instantaneous
effect (at t=t0 ), the short-run effect (at t=to + 1), and the long-run
effect (t > t0 + 1). each for the case of direct price intervention
(with the border price evaluated at the nominal exchange rate) and for
the case of total price intervention (with the border price evaluated at
the free-trade equilibrium exchange rate). The instantaneous
distributional effect refers to the case where the quantity produced (or
the quantity consumed) stays constant despite price changes. In
actuality, however, changes in the price of products and inputs affect
the quantity of farm output and input use as well as the quantity
consumed by the urban population. The short-run distributional effect
is where the impacts of changes in farm output, input use, and
consumption are reflected in a one-year time lag, whereas the long-run
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effects are these effects accumulated over time.10/
In all three cases, the distributional effects are measured in
terms of the proportional change in real income of each farm and urban
group due to price intervention. The necessary information on income and
expenditure were obtained from the Farm Household Economy Survey (1962-84)
and the Urban Household Living Expenditure Survey (1962-84). Farm
producers are classified on the basis of size of farm; small-scale farm
(less than 0.5 ha); medium-scale farm (0.5 - 1.5 ha); and large-scale farm
(with 1.5 ha or more)."_/
Urban households are also classified into three groups, based on
income; lowest 3 deciles as the low-income group, middle 4 deciles as the
middle-income group, and highest 3 deciles as the high-income group.
The results of our measurement are presented in Tables 18-21.
Table 18 represents the real income effect in rural area of direct
intervention and Table 19 that of total intervention. Table 20 gives the
real income effect in urban areas of direct intervention and Table 21 that
of total intervention.
10/ Changes in agricultural prices affect shifts in the supply
function and thereby influenced the factor prices of other
commodities and wages as well. In order to capture the effects of
price intervention on wages, an attempt was made to estimate the
wage functions both for rural and urban areas by means of general
equilibrium analyses. But the estimated results were not
satisfactory, and are not presented here.
11/ Not all large farms have large sales, and not all farms with large
sales are large-size farms. Even for judging the relative
distribution of benefits, therefore, farms must be classified by
income class, not by acreage class. But due to limited data
availability, the present study had to rely on classification by
acreage class.
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Effects of Price Support on Producer Income
Korean agriculture has been increasingly protected since the
early 1970s. For instance, the nominal protection rate for rice rose
from 14.5 percent in 1962 to 65.2 percent in 1984, while those for
barley, soybeans, and beef rose from 16.9, 15.3, and 4.4 percent to
88.9, 236.7, and 170.6 percent, respectively (see Table 8-2). The real
protection rate for rice rose from (-)29.2 percent in 1962 to 52.9
percent in 1984, while those for barley, soybeans, and beef rose from
(-)27.7, (-)28.6, and (-)35.4 percent to 74.8, 211.5 and 150.3 percent
over the same period (see Table 10-2). The benefits of protection are
measured in terms of the proportional changes in real income that
farmers gain beyond what they would have received in the absence of
protection. Large farms normally produce more and sell a larger portion
of what they produce than do small farms. Hence, the distribution of
price support benefits tends to be more heavily concentrated among large
farms. The results presented in Table 18 and 19 support this
hypothesis.
To take the distributional effects of direct intervention as an
example, the instantaneous benefit gained by small farmers in 1962 was
14.5 percent, whereas that for large farmers was 29.8 percent.
The difference in the absolute gain in real income (1980
prices) was even greater. The net increase in real income for small
farmers was 73,900 won per household, while that for large farmers was
340,000 won, more than four times as much. Over time, the instantaneous
distributional impact has become greater as producer prices have been
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increasingly subsidized. The relative net benefit the small farmer
received in 1984 was 18.3 percent, or 436,100 won per household,; that
for the large farmer was 44.5 percent, or 1,708,200 won.
If the overvaluation of the exchange rate is taken into
account, the impact on the distribution of income shows a different
pattern. As shown in Table 19, the distributional effects were negative
in most years of the 1960s for small and medium farmers, and negative in
all years for large farmers. In those years the rate of exchange rate
overvaluation was exceedingly high. In the early 1970s the
distributional impact became positive for all three groups. By 1984,
small farmers gained 14.9 percent and large farmers 38.4 percent in
terms of real income.
Both the short-run and the long-run distributional effects,
with changes in output and quantity of purchased inputs taken into
account, display a similar pattern of differences in real income
gains. The effect is much greater in percentage and absolute terms on
larger farms than smaller farms, resulting in a worsening of income
distribution within agriculture. Moreover, the smallest farms may be
hurt by price support programs which aim at maintaining domestic market
prices higher than international market prices because many farmers with
small holdings are net purchasers of food during the off season.
Insofar as small farmers purchase for cash, agricultural price supports
affect them primarily as consumers, causing a decline in real income.
Table 18. Real Income Effect in Rural Area of Direct Intervention -a
A) Instantaneous B) Short-Run C) Cumulative
small- medium- large- small- medium- large- * small- medium- large-
scale scale scale scale scale scale scale scale scale
Year farmers farmers farmers farmers farmers far ers farmers farmers farmers
less 0.5ha more less 0.5ha more less 0.5ha more
than - than than - than than - than
0.5ha 1.5ha 1.5ha 0.5ha 1.5ha 1.5ha 0.5ha 1.5ha 1.5ha
1962 .145 .229 .298 .187 .294 .410 .123 .171 .200
63 .083 .139 .180 .119 .201 .254 .138 .231 .289
64 .143 .233 .274 .185 .309 .377 .221 .372 .453
65 .160 .221 .260 .196 .277 .347 .229 .345 .442
66 .052 .053 .029 .057 .060 .037 .109 .134 .128
67 .020 .017 .006 .015 .015 .010 .060 .075 .061
68 .008 .027 .030 .074 .167 .256 .085 .070 .083
69 .055 .099 .118 .066 .121 .157 .081 .143 .179
70 .058 .103 .122 .075 .133 .179 .091 .158 .208
71 .105 .216 :262 .138 .279 .358 .146 .300 .385
72 .136 .318 .401 .188 .427 .574 .163 .523 .705
73 .244 .434 .571 .134 .528 .757 .322 .602 .870
74 .243 .358 .403 .283 .430 .503 .329 .510 .602
75 .081 .108 .109 .093 .128 .144 .151 .217 .248
76 .055 .139 .162 .084 .191 .242 .117 .261 .301
77 .106 .033 .416 .206 .576 .913 .156 .432 .647
78 .202 .419 .618 .250 .578 .871 .242 .533 .882
79 .169 .450 .696 .202 .541 .876 .207 .550 .909
80 .146 .412 .613 .168 .481 .744 .161 .462 .737
81 .132 .438 .757 .154 .510 .938 .145 .484 .921
82 .149 .398 .583 .179 .477 .772 .159 .452 .758
83 .176 .276 .485 .210 .330 .653 .194 .295 .628
84 .183 .331 .445 .213 .402 .584 .172 .394 .629
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,The Farm Household Economy
Survey, various issues
The Bank of Korea, The Price Survey, various issues
National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, The Rural Price
and Wage Survey, various issues
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation, Demand and Supply of
Livestock Products, various issues
Rural Development Administration, Standard Incomes of Crops and
Livestock , various issues
And also see Tables 8-2, d'-2, 13a, 13b and 13e.
a/ The proportional change in real income of each group of farmers due to
direct price intervention is calculated as follows:
y = (Y-YT)/Y'
y = (YF+YNF)/( ipCi+(l-r#i)pNA)
Y = (YT+YNF)/(Z iP~I+(1-ci )PNA)
y = - (Pi-:aijPj)Qi
F = 1:(P -Za. j )Q -I
where = proportional change in real income due to direct price
YD. intervention
y = real income
y' = real income in the absence of direct price intervention
yF = nominal farm income
YF = nominal farm income in the absence of direct price intervention
YNF = nominal off-farm income
P. = output price of product i
P! = output price of product i in the absence of direct price
intervention
Pc = consumer price index of product i1,
pg = consumer price index of product i in the absence of direct
price intervention
PNA = consumer price index of nonagricultural sector
Pj = price of input j
Pj = price of input j in the absence of direct price intervention
Q = output of product i
Q = output of product i in the absence of direct price intervention
= share of product i in household budget
a = technical coefficient
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Figure 13
Direct Producer Real Income Effect
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Figure 14
Direct Producer Real Incomne Effect
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Figure 15
Direct Producer Real income Effect
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Table 19. Real Income Effect in Rural Area of Total Intervention-
a) Instantaneous B) Short-Run C) Cumulative
small- medium- large- small- medium- large- small- medium- large-
scale scale scale scale scale scale scale scale scale
Year farmers farmers farmers farmers farmers farmers farmers farmers farmers
less 0.5ha more less 0.5ha more less 0.5ha more
than - than than - than than - than
0.5ha 1.5ha 1.Sha 0.5ha 1.5ha 1.5ha 0.Sha 1.5ha 1.5ha
1962 .156 .028 -. 058 .113 -. 019 -. 114 .113 -. 019 -. 114
63 .133 .014 -. 022 .121 -. 006 -.046 .101 -.031 -.074
64 .008 -.122 -.184 -.014 -.152 -.217 -.026 -.170 -.238
65 .008 -.111 -,198 -.011 -,136 -.228 -.030 -.162 -.257
66 -.055 -.191 -'260 -.095 -.241 -.313 -.119 -.270 -.341
67 -.175 -.219 -.283 -.141 -.287 -.349 -.167 -.318 -.383
68 -.082 -.210 -.280 -.134 -.271 -.341 -.182 -.322 -.390
69 -.044 -.161 -.193 -.082 -.210 -.285 -.141 -.274 -.345
70 .055 .004 -.013 -.034 -.134 -.189 -.096 -.204 -.252
71 .033 -.014 -.033 .025 -.023 -.044 -.020 -.079 -.101
72 .038 .086 ,122 .060 .120 .163 .038 .089 .129
73 .092 .127 .147 .117 .167 .196 .115 .165 .198
74 .246 .261 .256 .280 .315 .320 .271 .300 .300
75 .052 -.004 -.043 .032 -.033 -.076 .044 -.016 -.058
76 -. 041 -. 025 -. 011 -. 042 -. 024 -5006 -. 041 -. 024 -. 007
77 .044 .185 .281 .074 .251 .376 .077 ,259 .386
78 .196 .393 .600 .236 .481 .751 .249 .509 .800
79 .204 .465 .683 .236 .536 .824 .252 .575 .888
80 .174 .384 .554 .195 .440 .646 .214 .487 .721
81 .123 .346 .593 .142 .400 .645 .161 .456 .760
82 .120 .300 .460 .138 .350 .549 .159 .404 .641
83 .135 .216 .406 .154 .253 .490 .170 .282 .561
84 .149 .275 .384 .168 .343 .469 .179 .368 .540
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, The Farm Household Economy
Survey, various issues
The Ban.k of Korea, The Price Survey, various issues
National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, The Rural Price and
Wage Survey, various issues
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation, Demand and Supply of
Livestock Products, various issues
Rural Development Administration, Standard Incomes of Crops and
Livestock , various issues
And also see Tables 10-2, 10' -2, 13c, 13d and 13f.
a/ The proportional change in real income of each group of farmers due to
total price intervention is calculated as follows:
;T (Y-Y*)/y*
y = (YF +Y NF)/(2E3(iPj + (1-X'ij)PNA)
Y*= (Y*+
Y ( F YNF)/(ZpiCP*+ (1-o Kj)PNA)
yF = (Pi- a. ijPi)Q
Y*= r(Pt- :a. .Pt)Qt
F =j1jJ 1
where YT = proportional change in real income due to total price
intervention
y = real income
y* = real income in the absence of total price intervention
Y nominal farm income
*F
Y* = nominal farm income in the absence of total price interventionF
YNF = nomonal off-farm income
YNF = nominal off-farm income in the absence of total price inter-
vention
P. = output price of product i
Pt = output price of prod.uct i in the absence of total price
1 intervention
p = consumer price index of product i
p = consumer price index of product i in the absence of total
1 price intervention
PNA = consumer price index of nonagricultural sector
P* = consumer price index of nonagricultural sector in the absence
NA of total price intervention
Pj = price of input j
P,* = price of input j in the abssnce of total price intervention3
Qi = output of product i
1
Q* = output of product i in the absence of total price intervention
I
= share of product i in household budget
aj= technical coefficient
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Figure 17
Total Producer Real Income EFFect
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Figure 18
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Effects of Price Support on Consumer Income
A roughly reverse situation arises in the case of urban
consumers. Food prices affect urban consumers in proportion to the
ratio of expenditure on food to income. Generally, lower-income urban
consumers spend a much higher proportion of their incomes on food than
do those with higher incomes.
According to the estimated results in Table 20, the
instantaneous and short-run distributional effects of direct
intervention (or nominal protection) resulted in reducing real income
for all income groups in most years during 1962-84. Direct intervention
alone in 1984 had the effect of reducing real income by 4.3 percent for
the low-income group and by 2.2 percent for the high-income group.
When the effects of indirect intervention (i.e., exchange rate
overvaluation) are added (Table 21), the distributional effect was to
increase real income for all groups until the mid-1970s. This is
because urban consumers consumed food at lower prices than would have
prevailed in the absence of government intervention, especially
intervention in exchange rates. After 1976, however, government
intervention had the effect of reducing the real income of all urban
consumers. In 1984, for example, direct and indirect intervention
resulted in reducing the real income of the low-income group by 3.8
percent and that of the high-income group by 1.7 percent. But the
incremental expenditure in terms of absolute amount is much larger for
the high-income group because of a larger initial expenditure.
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In summary, price support programs have tended to provide
benefits primarily to larger farms and to high-income urban consumers.
Conversely, a very large number of small farmers and urban lower income
earners were helped relatively little by price supports.
As the Korean economy continues to grow, however, product lines
will become increasingly diversified, and the pattern of consumption
will undergo a substantial change. As the variety and volume of non-
agricultural goods in the domestic market increases, the relative share
of grain in household expenditure falls. The average share of rice in
the cost of living was almost 20 percent in South Korea in 1975, but it
had declined to 10 percent in 1984. It is expected to decline further
as real income grows. Consequently, the distributional impact of
agricultural price support policy on urban wage earners will be much
smaller than on farm producers.
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Table 20. Real Income Effect in Urban Area of 'Total Intervention2/
Year Low Income Middle Income High.IncomeGroup Group Group
1962 .130 .080 .051
63 .084 .046 .022
64 .110 .071 .044
65 .089 .062 .030
66 ..100 .060 .038
67 .104 .060 .034
68 .082 .049 .026
69 .068 .039 .023
70 .054 .030 .017
71 .012 .008 .004
72 -.039 -.024 -.020
73 .024 .013 .007
74 .104 .066 .041
75 .079 .049 .029
76 -.072 -.033 -.021
77 -.072 -.050 -.033
78 -.037 -.026 -.020
79 -.043 -.030 -.019
80 -.035 -.024 -.016
81 -.044 -.031 -.021
82 -.049 -.035 -.022
83 -.054 -.039 -.026
84 -.033 -.025 -.017
Source Economic Planning Board, Consumer Price Statistics, various issues
various____issues___, Urban Household Living Expenditures Survey,
various issues
And also see Tables 10'-1 and 10'-2.
k CPI* rkp* + ( 1 _ >:,gk)p*N 
a!yT CPIk CPI - %PA1
where *k = proportional change in real income of income group k due to total
yT price intervention
CPIk = consumer price index of income group k
CPIk = consumer price index of income group k in the absence of total
price intervention
P. = consumer price index of product i in the absence of total price
k intervention
PNA = consumer price index of nonagricultural sector in the absence of
total price intervention
= share of product i in household budget of income group k
- 157 -
Figure 19
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Chapter 8
RELATIVE PRICE VARIABILITY
A common argument for government intervention in agricultural
prices is to prevent the transmission of world price variability to
domestic prices. In order to evaluate the extent to which agricultural
pricing policies in Korea have prevented the transmission of world price
variability to domestic prices, the degree of domestic price variability
in the absence of direct and total intervention was examined relative to
actual price variability. The mean and variance were calculated for the
respective relative price series of each product for the total period
(1960-84) and for two sub-periods (1960-71, 1972-84). Since the
conventional variance statistics may not reflect the frequency of change
or the year-to-year fluctuation of prices, a Z-statistic based on the
following formula was calculated as a supplement to the variance to
examine the volatility in annual prices.
N
E (Pt-P t1)
t t-lt=2
N-1
where Pt m Product price in year t
to = Starting year of the sample period (1960)
N = Number of observations
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In addition, the variances of annual per capita output and
consumption, and simple correlation coefficients between domestic prices
and quantities, were calculated. The results are shown in Table 22 and
Table 23.
Relative Price Variability
The first three lines in Table 22 give the estimated means,
variances, and Z-statistics of the producer price of rice under three
alternative price scenarios: the domestic price, the border price
evaluated at the official exchange rate, and the border price evaluated
at the free trade equilibrium exchange rate. The next three lines give
the respective means, variances, and Z-statistics of the consumer price
of rice.
One can observe that the variance of the domestic producer
price for 1960-84 was much higher than that of the corresponding border
price evaluated at the official exchange rate and slightly higher than
that of the border price evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate,
whereas the Z-statistic was the lowest, approximately 32 percent and 14
percent of the two respective border prices. To look at the
corresponding statistics for the two subperiods (1960-71 and 1972-84),
not only the variances but also the Z-statistics of the domestic price
maintained successively the lowest level in contrast to the highest
level for the entire period 1960-84.
What caused these differences in the estimated variability
statistics between the entire period and the two subperiods? As already
discussed in Chapter 2, government policy throughout the 1960s was
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directed at stabilizing rice prices at a low level but shifted in the
late 1960s toward maintaining rice prices at a high level. This results
in the smaller variances and Z-statistics.
The variances and Z-statistics of the consumer price,
calculated in lines 4-6, indicate approximately the same pattern of
change as those of the producer prices. The variance of the domestic
consumer price for the entire period was much higher than those of the
two respective border prices, while the Z-statistic was the lowest. For
the 1960-71 period, however, both the variance and Z-statistics of the
domestic consumer price were only slightly higher than the two
corresponding border prices, and for the 1972-84 period they were much
lower than those of the two respective border prices. These differences
in magnitude of the estimated variability statistics between the entire
period and the subperiods can be explained by the same reasoning applied
to producer rice prices. It is also to be noted that both the variances
and Z-statistics of the border price evaluated at the equilibrium
exchange rate tend to be much higher than those of the border price
evaluated at the official exchange rate. This is mainly ascribable to
larger year-to-year fluctuation of the equilibrium exchange rate when
compared with that of the official exchange rate.
Lines 7-9 provide the estimated mean, variances, and Z-
statistics of the producer price of barley, and lines 10-12 the
corresponding variability statistics of the consumer price of barley
under the three alternative price scenarios. The variance of the
domestic producer price for the entire period was much larger than that
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of the border price evaluated at the official exchange rate but
substantially lower than that of the border price evaluated at the
equilibrium exchange rate. The Z-statistics, on the other hand, reveal
the least year-to-year fluctuation for the entire period. For 1960-71,
both the variance and the Z-statistics of the domestic producer price
were about the same in magnitude as those of the border price evaluated
at the official exchange rate but much higher than those of the border
price evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate. For 1972-84, both the
variance and the Z-statistics were the lowest, resulting in a pattern of
variability similar to that of the producer price of rice.
In the case of the consumer price of barley, the domestic price
shows the lowest variances and Z-value for the two subperiods as well as
for the entire period. This largely reflects government policy efforts
to maintain the barley consumer price at a stable level through consumer
subsidization, irrespective of international price changes.
Changes in the annual relative producer price of soybeans under
the alternative price scenarios are summarized in lines 13-15, and those
in the consumer price in the lines 16-18. Both the variance and the Z-
value of the domestic producer price indicate the highest degree of
variation not only for the entire period but also for the two
subperiods. Notwithstanding Korea's heavy dependency on imports,
changes in the domestic market price were largely insulated from changes
in the world market price.
Lines 19-21 show the estimated means, variances, and Z-
statistics of the producer price of beef, and lines 22-24 the
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corresponding three variability statistics of the consumer price.
Noticeable for beef prices is that the differences in the magnitude of
variability among different price scenarios are unusually large, both
for the entire period and the subperiods. The variance of the domestic
producer price for the entire period was about 11 times and 30 times as
large as those of the two respective border prices, and the Z-statistics
were 4.5 times and 2.8 times as large as those of the two border
prices. For 1960-71, however, the Z-statistic of the domestic producer
price was substantially lower than that of the two border prices, while
the variance was higher relative to those of the two border prices. For
1972-84, the two variability statistics revealed about the same order of
magnitude as for the entire period. As for the consumer price of beef,
the variance and the Z-value of the domestic price were the highest for
the entire period and for the two subperiods, with the exception of the
1960-71 period, when the Z-statistic of the border price evaluated at
the equilibrium exchange rate was the highest.
Lines 25-27 present the three corresponding variability
statistics for the three respective producer prices of pork, and lines
28-38 those for the consumer prices of pork. A comparison of the
variances for the entire period indicates that the degree of variability
in the domestic producer price was close to those in the border prices
evaluated at the official and equilibrium exchange rates. The
corresponding Z-value indicates that the year-to-year changes in the
domestic prices were slightly greater than that for the border price
evaluated at the official exchange rate but smaller than that for the
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border price evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate. For 1960-71,
both the variance and the Z-value of the border price evaluated at the
official exchange rate were the lowest. For 1972-84, the variance of
the domestic price was the smallest, whereas the Z-value was the largest
for the border price evaluated at the official exchange rate.
In the case of the consumer price for the entire period, the
domestic price displayed the least year-to-year fluctuation, while it
recorded a higher degree of variability when measured in terms of
variance. For 1960-71 the domestic price recorded the highest degree of
variability in terms of variance but the lowest degree of variability in
terms of Z-statistics or in terms of year-to-year fluctuation. For
1972-84, both the variance and the Z-statistics were the lowest of the
three alternative price scenarios.
Output and Consumption Variability
Table 23 provides a comparison between the variance of per
capita output and that of per capita consumption for each product.
For rice, the variance of per capita consumption exceeded that
of per capita output for both the entire period and the two subperiods,
reflecting relative stability of consumption compared with production.
This stability of consumption relative to output is mainly due to the
government's discretionary policy of filling the demand-supply gap by
importation or from the existing stock of rice.
For barley, the degree of variability in per capita output was
higher than that in per capita consumption for the entire period and for
1960-71, while that in per capita consumption recorded higher
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Table 22. Mean, Vn-iance aa.d Z-statisticsa/ of Major Agricultural Prices
Prices 1960-84 1960-71 1972-84
Mean Variance Z-stat. Mean Variance Z-scat. Mean Variance Z-stac
Rica Pu.p/PM (1) 400.1 14932.8 1639.2 283.8 2262.9 2240.7 507.5 2634 8 1130.2
PR P/PNA (2) 263.6 6006.3 5121.1 236.1 2784.7 2212.2 288.9 7647.5 7582.5
P*' /PN (3) 401.0 14568.5 11705.2 444.4 5608.5 3818.3 360.9 19499.3 18378.7
PL, C/PNA (4) 424.7 18306.1 2343.7 300.3 2132.6 2328.1 539.5 5751.7 2356.8
C6/PM (5) 349.2 9840.6 5115.1 276.1 1985.6 1389.7 416.7 7609.1 8267.4
P (6) 504.4 12432.3 12790.0 513.3 6661.8 4299.3 496.3 17614.6 19974.5
3arley P I,P/PNA.(7) 249.5 4791.4 1722.6 194.0 2844.1 2879.6 300.8 1117.6 743.6
P / iP/PNA (8) 163.8 2832.4 2356.5 148.9 1941.3 2192.6 177.5 3265.0 2495.2
P p/Pm (9) 250.6. 7772.2 7043.3 281.0 5575.6 8212.1 222.5 8157.7 6054.2
P CIPNA (10) 233.7 2370.7 2104.1 211.3 2693.6 2420.5 254.3 1186.1 1836.4
PCIPNA (11) 253.0 5092.2 3514.0 205.8 2584.7 2665.0 296.7 3437.5 4232.3
P C/PgA (12) 349.0 7600.4 9859.8 351.7 8602.6 11299.5 346.5 6663.5 8641.5
Soybean Ps p/PNA (13) 376.8 19513.3 7076.3 263.3 3354.7 6896.7 481.7 11526.2 9766.8
P4 p/PNA (14) 194.5 2758.4 1724.5 168.2 1655.7 1759.2 218.8 2547.2 1724.5
PtP/IPt (15) 294.3 6059.1 3529.7 318.1 4763.8 3641.6 272.3 6250.5 3434.9
P .c/PNA (16) 436.2 31474.3 4667.3 284.2 3261.6 4229.8 576.5 16507.1 5037.4
PS C/PNA (17) 301.0 7738.7 1912.4 220.1 1713.1 1671.4 375.6 1689.2 2116.3
M I c/PE (18) 410.9 4726.6 3935.3 385.1 4985.8 4226.9 434.8 3304.0 368S.5
Seef P F.P/PRA (19) 2628.3 2014923.5 220027.5 1412.0 123264.2 26103.5 3751.1 1134864.1 384117.0
PF, P/ PA (20) 1537.4 184425.3 4S793.3 1197.6 54214.5 43578.8 1851.2 30356.1 53205.5
'f P/PiA (21) 2263.5 -68544.5 78037.0 2247.0 56572.6 66670.2 2278.8 79107.2 87655.2
P F CIPNA (22) 3500.2 2160282.6 161629.5 2194.3 347192.0 92338.3 4705.5 806942.9 220260.6
P F,C/PNA (23) 2086.9 346332.3 58323.8 1542.1 82915.2 48293.5 2589.8 62550.0 66810.9
PIF#.C/P- (24) 2885.8 108655.9 102243.8 2697.1 84343.8 1197.61.3 3059.9 67901.9 8742L.2
Pork P P/PNA (25) 1457.5 304626.7 143551.4 1014.5 30632.0 41762.5 1866.4 209205.6 229680.5
PJK,P/PNA (26) 1149.3 330774.5 120314.5 714.3 16741.8 23432.5 1550.8 284825.0 198060.3
P K Plph (27) 1877.8 330786.0 165320.7 1364.9 65132.1 49468.6 1631.6 268946.0 263349.3
P?K,C/PNA (28) 187i.6 438800.3 127000.0 1302.8 71038.2 35014.6 2396.6 203933.5 205141.5
P°K C/PNA (29) 1463.6 453238.6 151343.0 933.1 19454.7 30769.6 1953.4 353965.5 253366.6
PnR CPN) (30) 1991.3 349623.9 210888.5 1645.8 56564.0 60883.2 2310.3 406304.3 337816.5
. K .Cj NA I_ _ __ __L-__ _ _
Source: Tables 8-1, 8'-1, 10-1, 10'-I. Appendix 32a and 32b.
-zx ' - I P P.)N-1
where to - starting year of the sample period
N - number of observations
Pt - price variable
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Figure -21
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Figure 22.
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Figure 23
,I Producer Price of Barley
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Figure 24
Consumer Price of Barley
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Figure 25
Produccer Price of Soybean
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Figure 26
Consumer Price of Soybean
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Figure 27
Producer Price of Beef
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Figure 28
Consumer Price of Beef
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Figure 29
Producer Price of Pork
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Figure 30
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variability in 1972-84. This higher variability reflects the various
administrative measures for increasing barley consumption through the
mid-1970s and the rapid decline in consumption thereafter.
In the case of soybeans, per capita consumption recorded much
higher variability than per capita output for the entire period and for
the two subperiods. This is because per capita consumption increased at
a much faster pace with the increase in imports, while domestic
production remained almost static.
Comparison of the two variances for beef indicates that the
variability of per capita consumption was higher than that of per capita
output for the entire period and for the 1972-84 period. This is also
ascribable to rapidly increasing per capita consumption with income
growth relative to stable domestic production. In the case of pork,
domestic output grew about at the same pace as consumption, resulting in
almost equal magnitude of variances. The estimated simple correlation
coefficients between output and consumption indicate that the higher the
degree of self-sufficiency, the higher the simple correlation
coefficient for that product.
From the above analysis, one can derive the following
conclusions: (1) the variances and Z-statistics of domestic prices for
each subperiod were in general smaller than those for the entire period,
reflecting the shift toward increased protection in the early 1970s and
at the same time the government's efforts to stabilize domestic prices
during each subperiod, at a lower level prior to 1970 and at higher
level after 1970; (2) both the variances and Z-statistics of the
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domestic prices of rice and barley for producers and consumers are lower
than those of the two respective border prices for each subperiod,
reflecting a price policy deliberately designed to prevent the
transmission of world price variability to domestic prices; (3) the
variability of border prices evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate
is much higher than that of the border prices evaluated at the official
exchange rate for all products.
Table 23. Variances of Output per Capita and Consumptiont per Capita
1960-84 1960-71 1972-84
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance
Rice Output per capita 126.8 211.4 122.6 98.8 130.6 284.6
Consumption per capita 134.0 155.3 128.3 67.1 139.3 179.0
Barley Output per capita 39.5 145.0 46.7 53.6 32.9 138.1
Consumption per capita 42.6 125.0 48.0 36.0 37.6 155.3
Soybean Output per capita 6.6 1.2 6.1 .7 7.1 1.3
Consumption per capita 11.1 32.1 6.8 1.1 15.0 28.4
Beef Output per capita 1.4 .3 .9 .1 1.9 .1
Consumption per capita 1.6 .7 .9 .1 2.3 .4
Pork Output per capita 3.6 3.4 2.3 .2 4.8 3.4
Consumption per capita 3.6 3.5 2.3 .2 4.8 3.6
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Between Output(Q s/L) Between Output(Q /L)
and Consumption(Qp/L) and Consumer Prices(Pi,c/PNA)
Rice .650 .214
Barley .820 
-.596
Soybean .117 .206
Beef .912 .825
Pork .9:A .618
Source: Appendix 16c, 16d.
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Figure 31
Output, Consumption and Price
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Figure 32
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Figure 33
Output, Consumption and Price
! soybean
output Connsuptton Cons. Pr ce
kglponson keup.eson 100 woaniks
I 30E - .. 
2tI S o.
I 1O < 2-f
1 1944 1948 1972 1976 1980 1984
Year
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__________________ 
- 181 -
Figure 34
Output, Consumpttion and Price
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Figure 35
Output, Consumption and Price
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Chapter 9
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT OF INTERVENTION
Since the enactment of a Grain Management Law in 1950, the
grain market in Korea has been characterized by a dualistic system
combining free-market transactions and government control, with the
degree of government control varying from year to year. The Grain
Management Law remains the basic legal authority for the government's
food grain policy. The primary intent of the law was to enable the
government to obtain sufficient grain from farmers so as to stabilize
the national economy by exercising adequate control over grain
distribution and consumption. In 1963 and 1967 the main provisions of
the law were reaffirmed. The law gives the government full legal
authority to regulate the grain market. Free-market transactions occur
only by government sufferance. The government has the authority to
import or export grain and can give orders to grain dealers, shippers
and processors, and to hotels and restaurants whenever deemed
necessary. The following are among the programs operated directly or
indirectly by the government:
1. Procurement and supply of grain for the armed forces, for
government institutions, and for other ministries for relief
and work programs;
2. Price support of grain at harvest time through direct
purchase from farmers;
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3. Stabilization of prices or maintenance of price ceilings on
grain in urban areas during periods of seasonal price rises;
4. Grain loans in kind to farmers during spring shortage
periods;
5. Provision of relief grain;
6. Payment of wages in kind for government work programs;
7. Provision of seed grain to farmers in disaster areas;
8. Import and export of grain.
The wide range of government grain programs in Korea reflects
chronic grain deficits and the belief that direct government action is
necessary to maintain economic stability and ensure a steady flow of
grain supplies to consumers. It is also consistent with the belief that
the provision of grain to the people is a government obligation and that
it is the responsibility of the government to take such action as may be
considered appropriate or necessary.
In the early years the government acquisition program mainly
centered on rice, but more recently the share of barley has
substantially expanded. Whenever the government could not secure
sufficient domestic grain, the gap has been filled by imports. During
the 1950s the market share of government rice in total marketing was
less than 10 percent, but had expanded to nearly 30-50 percent in the
1980s. The government handled almost 90 percent of the barley marketed
in 1984.
The government acquires grain from farmers at prices set by the
government during or after the harvest season. In determining purchase
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prices for grain, a number of formulas are considered, including (1)
cost of production criteria; (2) price parity ratio; (3) income parity
ratio; and (4) international market prices. In practice, however, none
of these criteria has been used as the only basis for determining
government purchase prices of rice and barley. The purchase prices
estimated on the basis of these formulas are used for reference only.
In other words, the method of determining government purchase prices has
varied from year to year, depending on political and economic
conditions.
In the absence of a standard formula, therefore, different
government agencies tend to have different opinions. The Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries is tempted to set the purchase price as high
as possible, with a view to enhancing farm incomes and domestic
production of grain, while the Economic Planning Board, whose main
concern is general price stability, tends to set it as low as
possible. The resistance of the Ministry of Finance, whose interest is
to minimize treasury outlay, is another restraint against higher
prices. These differences in viewpoint -- often called the
"interministerial purchase price war" -- cause a delay in final
determination of purchase prices, resulting in delayed purchases to the
detriment of farm producers. The types of information referred to in
determining rice purchase prices and final prices are presented in
Appendix Table 49.
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Impact of Seasonal Price Stabilization on Grain Marketing
In the 1960s the Korean government expanded the scale of grain
operations through increased purchases from farmers. In addition to the
original function of supplying grain for institutional uses, the
government began to put emphasis on seasonal price stabilization through
direct sales in the market during the non-harvest season, when prices
normally rise. These direct sales accounted for almost 80 percent of
the total government grain supply by 1984. In recent years there has
been much criticism of the increasing share of government operations in
the grain market.
As shown in Appendix Table 50, when the market share of
government-controlled rice (including imports) was relatively low in the
1960s, the rate of seasonal variation in rice prices ranged from 15 to
25 percent. But with the increased share of government rice, seasonal
price fluctuations were substantially dampened, and the range was
reduced to 4-9 percent throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.
The policy of maintaining a low rate of seasonal variation in
market prices causes a substantial impact on grain marketing. The major
ones are as follows:
(1) Because there is little or no incentive for grain dealers
to invest in storage and other marketing facilities, it is difficult to
develop efficient distribution links between farm producers and urban
wholesalers. The consequence is that a substantial portion of free
market grain is distributed by small, poorly financed retailers who
operate in a disorganized and inefficient way.
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(2) Since grain is available at any time throughout the year,
urban consumers tend to purchase small quantities. Consequently, the
government must bear the heavy burden of storing it.
(3) The low profit margin rate for handling government grain,
usually fixed at 5-6 percent per bag, often causes grain dealers to
engage in fraudulent practices such as cheating on quantity as well as
selling lower-priced government rice at higher prices, thus impeding the
sound development of grain marketing.
The use of a uniform purchase price during the rice acquisition
period has also been subjected to criticism. More than 95 percent of
government acquisitions are concentrated in the November-January
period. Since farmers are paid the same price, regardless of when they
deliver the grain, they are tempted to deliver it as soon as possible.
This gives rise to a number of problems:
(1) Lack of incentives to retain grain for later sales
discourages farmers from investing in storage facilities. And because
acquisition is concentrated into a two-month period, the burden of
financing storage costs falls mostly on the government.
(2) The storage of excessively large quantities of government
grain often results in deterioration of its quality. This causes a
substantial price differential between government and non-government
rice, the difference being 20 to 30 percent. Taking advantage of this
price differential, intermediate grain dealers are inclined to pursue
illicit profit by fraudulently selling repolished government rice as
non-government rice.
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(3) The release of a large amount of funds within a short
period of time for acquisition causes a lump-sum increase in money
supply towards the end of each year.
One possible way of improving the acquisition program would be
to adopt differential pricing for varying months, the price difference
being large enough to cover storage costs. If the government were to
raise the purchase price for deliveries in later months, farmers would
have an incentive to hold their grain. In addition, there is no
particular reason why the purchase program should be limited to only a
three-month period each year. Extending the purchase period would
alleviate budgetary constraints. Furthermore, the concentration of
purchasing power toward the year-end in rural areas would also be
avoided.
This deseasonalization policy has been pursued not because
policymakers are ignorant of the various adverse impacts but because
their tendency is to care only about short-run impacts, i.e., impacts on
the wholesale price index (WPI). Because seasonal stabilization of
grain prices is viewed as having an anti-inflationary effect, emphasis
has been placed upon dampening seasonal rises. The government
customarily uses the change in the wholesale price index (WPI) to
measure price stability. A rise in the price of rice is automatically
reflected in this index via its weight (4.6 percent in 1980) as the base
year). If the price of rice rises to its seasonal peak (say 20
percent), the wholesale price index automatically rises about 0.9
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percent, other prices remaining unchanged. This rise in the wholesale
price index is viewed as inflationary by policymakers.
Seasonal price variation per se should not be viewed in terms
of general price stabilization objectives. A seasonally adjusted price
index should be used as a stabilization indicator.
Impact of Ceiling Price System on Meat Marketing
The prices of beef and pork have long been subjected to
government control. Under the system, consumer prices of beef and pork
were linked to the prices of live cattle and hogs in producing areas as
well as to the wholesale prices of carcasses at auction markets. This
system proved unable to maintain meat prices at stable level.
In August 1981 the government deregulated the consumer price of
meat. At the same time, the government decided to sell imported meat,
mainly beef, only by auction on wholesale markets; that is, meat
retailers were given autonomy in determining consumer prices by adding
marketing costs and appropriate profit margins to the wholesale prices
at auction. The government apparently believed that domestic beef
production plus imports of 25,000 MT in 1979, combined with a sizeable
decline in domestic demand due to recession, caused the price of beef to
drop. That resulted in a sharp fall in the domestic supply of beef in
1981, leading to a sharp rise in beef prices despite the imports.
The government then adopted "government-posted prices" which
set a ceiling on the retail prices of beef and pork. This ceiling price
system still exists, although the ceiling has occasionally been
raised. While wholesale prices are determined at the daily auction held
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at wholesale markets in major cities, the retail prices are directly
controlled by the government.
As long as the wholesale prices of carcasses remain low enough
to guarantee adequate profits for retailers, the system should cause
little or no problem. In most cases, however, the government sets the
ceiling price at such a low level that the auction price exceeds the
ceiling price, leaving little or no profit. According to a survey
conducted by the NLCF, beef retailers' nominal profit margin averaged
only 2.0 percent. With such a low profit margin, beef retailers cannot
survive legally.
Yet the number of meat retailers has been increasing despite
the virtual absence of a profit margin. In Seoul, for example, the
number of meat retail stores increased from 1, 977 to 1975 to 3,135 in
1981 and to 5,050 in 1984. This implies that meat retailing is actually
a profitable business, profits being made through irregular trade
practices. The major types of illegal dealings are (1) selling cheaper
imported beef labelled as Korean beef at higher prices; (2) cheating on
weight; (3) mixing lower quality meat with fats; (4) evading taxes and
auction commission fees by dealing in the black market.
Since it is virtually impossible to regulate the prices of live
animals in producing areas, it is also practically impossible to
regulate the wholesale prices of carcasses. Such being the case, the
only reasonable way to reform the system is to deregulate retail prices
while simultaneously taking steps to improve the marketing system.
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The Saemaul (New Community) Movement
Though the prime emphasis of the Saemaul Movement was
improvement of rural village infrastructure (roads, bridges, irrigation
and marketing facilities, etc.) to facilitate the utilization of
improved technologies and the marketing of higher-valued products, the
movement's initiative coincided in a complementary way with agricultural
pricing policy, especially higher support prices combined with promotion
of newly developed high-yielding rice varieties. From its inception in
1971, the Saemaul Movement was a goverment-initiated movement for
community development, strongly backed by the late President Park and
government agencies at all levels. With government support and
assistance, massive-scale investment projects were undertaken for the
improvement of physical infrastructure and farm income. As part of the
movement, rural people were mobilized as much as their own resources
would permit. As a determined government policy, implemented through an
authoritarian and bureaucratic administrative structure, the movement
has undoubtedly affected almost every aspect of rural Korea during the
1970s.
Considering the history of fatalism and economic stagnancy in
rural Korea, an authoritarian approach was both an inevitable and an
effective way of bringing about change in rural areas. It may have been
a necessary step in mobilizing resources at the village level as well as
the bureaucracy at all levels of administration. An authoritarian top-
down approach could be justified in the initial stage of development on
economic grounds as well. Rural Koreans did not have sufficient
.4
- 192 -
financial and technical resources to improve their own social and
economic status. Some kind of inducement mechanism was necessary to
stimulate the rural people. Government alone could perform this
function and provide momentum as an agent of change.
After ten years of experience, however, the question arises
whether this top-down authoritarian approach continues to be an
effective way of administering the rural development programs. There
are many examples of the authoritarian approach hindering rather than
encouraging farmers voluntary participation and leading to mal-
allocation of resources.
At the level of the central government, almost all agricultural
and rural development activities tended to be categorized under the
Saemaul level without direct participation by village farmers. The
centralized, authoritarian nature of the government (in particular the
fact that it has virtually complete control of local finance) enabled it
to exert great pressure on local administrators to produce immediate,
dramatic, and concrete results. At the local levels, officials tended
to define the Saemaul Movement in terms of the range of directives they
received from higher authorities, often with specific targets
attached. By and large they did not see themselves as representing or
reflecting the opinions, desires and needs of villagers in their
districts. Rather, they tended to be concerned with finding ways of
handling pressures from higher units to fulfill predetermined plans and
quotas. In the actual implementation process, therefore, officials at
all levels have been concerned with meeting their immediate targets,
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without giving appropriate attention to the adaptability of programs and
without concern for the end product -- that is, service to villagers.
Another criticism is that, since individual reputations and
promotions depend to a considerable extent on performance in achieving
the Saemaul targets determined by higher units, there has been a
tendency for a lower administration to overstress positive achievements
in reporting to superiors. This practice has often led to an inflation
of work performances, even to falsification of reports, so that the
ordered targets could be fulfilled on paper. There have been many cases
in which excessive bureaucratic zeal in carrying out an assigned task
has resulted in widespread resentment among rural people. Examples of
this kind of blind execution of instructions from superiors are
numerous. The planting of a new, high-yielding rice variety (Tongil)
represents the most conspicuous case.
With the aim of increasing rice production, the government
alloted, through administrative channels, a target of acreage to be
planted with the new rice variety. When it was first introduced in the
early 1970s, farmers were willing to adopt quotas because of the high
yields and favorable prices paid by the government. Market prices for
the new rice began to fall because of consumers' strong preference for
the traditional varieties, and farmers realized that they could make
more profit from traditional varieties. In 1978 the area planted to
high-yielding varieties reached 85 percent of the total paddy area, but
it has declined to 24 percent in 1984. Many farmers resisted the
quotas, but the government continued to insist that they grow the new
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variety. This led to severe conflicts between the public officials and
rice farmers. In many cases, local officials even destroyed seed beds
planted with traditional varieties.
As discussed above, the style of administration in the sphere
of rural development has been obviously inconsistent with the originally
enunciated ideology of voluntary participation and cooperation. There
is little evidence that the movement itself has promoted a process of
planning "from below" or incentives to implement projects voluntarily.
Although the various programs of the Saemaul Movement have undoubtedly
contributed to upgrading overall agricultural productivity, it is
doubtful that they were implemented in such a way as to foster the
profitability of individual farms. There has been a tendency to
emphasize the achievement of an aggregate target alone and to neglect
the profitability of individual farming. With the advent of
industrialization and urbanization, the rural people have been enhanced
to the extent that they are capable of making their own decisions in
seeking profits. Government authorities can no longer expect farmers to
submit passively to coercion. Although the national Saemaul
headquarters is maintained in Seoul (headed by President Chun's
brother), its position is nothing but symbolic with little substance and
appears to be largely divorced from villagers' participation. Its
village base has almost withered away. An important lesson is that the
success or failure of rural development programs depends ultimately on
the voluntary efforts of individual farmers as well as on local
agricultural-related administration.
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Chapter 10
POLICY REFORM EFFORTS
Although the Korean economy is basically oriented toward free
markets, government intervention in the farm products market, especially
in the grain market, has intensified over time. This intervention has
historically been justified on the ground that undesirable developments
that hinder the attainment of policy objectives would occur if the
determination of agricultural prices were left to market forces.
During the past three decades, economic calculations as well as
changes in the political climate have influenced the priorities given to
the objectives upon which agricultural policy and development strategy
have focussed. A multitude of constraints has also affected policy
direction. This chapter is about this shift in the priorities.
Motivations, Objectives, and Effects of Pricing Policies
During the 1950s the government's main efforts were directed
toward rehabilitation of the war-wrecked Korean economy and alleviation
of the postwar inflationary spiral. Policymakers were particularly
sensitive to the impact of farm product prices on urban wage earners'
costs and on inflation. In addition, the government wanted to provide
grain at less than open-market prices to wounded veterans and their
families, workers in critical industries, and to those who were assumed
to be less able than "normal" consumers to buy food at market prices.
Furthermore, the government wanted to minimize the annual payments that
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it had to make to landlords who were forced to sell land under the land
reform program of 1950. These landlords were given government bonds
whose face value was stated in quantities of rice.
Government investment in agriculture was severely limited
because of increasing budgetary requirements for rehabilitation works
and defense. About all that the budget was capable of financing in the
agricultural sector were maintenance of existing irrigation facilities
and importation of fertilizer. The policy of low agricultural prices
was reinforced by the easy availability of American grain on
concessionary terms from the United States. Although the importation of
aid grain contributed significantly to a stable food supply and general
economic stability, it presumably created a disincentive to increase
domestic production of grain.
By the early 1960s the economy had recovered from the war, and
the major objectives of economic policy shifted from rehabilitation to
expansion. The basic goal of policy, as envisaged in the first and the
second development plans, was to build a foundation upon which to attain
self-sustaining economic growth. The terms "increased domestic food
production" and "rural-urban income equity" appeared in almost every
policy document, and a Farm Products Prices Maintenance Law was
promulgated in 1961. The purpose of the law was "to maintain proper
prices of agricultural products to insure the stability of agricultural
production and the rural economy." The products covered by the law
included rice, barley, and other agricultural products as determined by
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the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (now the Minister of
Agriculture and Fisheries).
Despite stated objectives of food self-sufficiency and adequate
farm income, greater emphasis continued to be placed on general price
stability. Because of the leading role of grain as a wage good, a rise
in the price of foodgrain was believed to be one of the major causes for
a rise in the general price level. Therefore, stabilization of
foodgrain prices through increased imports has been one of the chief
considerations in the government effort to achieve price
stabilization. Low food prices for urban workers, whose expenditures
for food accounted for almost 60 percent of total living costs in the
mid-1960s, were not only rationalized in terms of equitable income
distribution but also served to protect industrial interests and capital
formation in the non-agricultural sector.
Yet it is a widely accepted notion that savings in the rural
sector, whether created by voluntary savings of farm surplus or derived
through such compulsory measures as land taxes, provide essential
sources of investment financing in the initial stages of
industrialization. In Japan, for example, heavy taxation of farmland
served as one of the important transfer mechanisms through which the
agricultural sector provided investment resources for the non-
agricultural sectors (Hayami, 1975). In Taiwan, an increase in
agricultural productivity and the resultant farm surpluses were
important sources of investment financing that accelerated the process
of industrialization (Hsieh, 1966). This hardly seems to have been the
- 198 -
case in Korea, however, for there is little evidence that the
agricultural sector provided sizeable financial resources for investment
in the non-agricultural sectors during the 1950s and 1960s. There was
not much farm surplus in the form of rural savings, and the political
atmosphere in Korea after World War II was such that it did not permit
heavy taxation of the rural sector. In the 1950s, farmers in general
had a negative cash flow. In the 1960s they were able to save a portion
of their income, but relatively little of their savings went into the
non-agricultural sector. Korean farmers began to achieve substantial
cash savings in the 1970s, but most farm savings remained on the farm in
the form of farm equipment purchases, housing improvements, and the
like. Moreover, government financial policy was not executed in such a
way as to transfer substantial sums of money out of agriculture to other
sectors (Ban, Moon and Perkins, 1980).
Agricultural price policy was a different story. When the
supply of labor was highly elastic and rural areas were overpopulated in
the initial stage of industrialization, low foodprices helped keep labor
costs down.
The persistent negative price policy for major food grains
eventually hindered efforts to increase food production.12/ But as
12/ One may question how one could assert that the government had
implemented "low food price policy" or "negative protection" in
the 1950s and 1960s in spite of the positive nominal protection
rates (NPRI) in those years. Even though the degree of
overvaluation had neither been calculated nor officially
announced, policymakers as well as academic circles were well
aware of the fact that the Korean won had been highly overvalued
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imports of aid grain were reduced, food grain imports caused a
substantial drain on foreign exchange reserves.
A rapid influx of rural migrants into urban areas during the
1950s and 1960s also made officials more aware of the need to improve
rural living conditions. Government officials became increasingly
concerned that the urban infrastructure might collapse in the face of
ever-increasing numbers of rural migrants. Meanwhile, rural poverty was
becoming urban poverty.
Another change also impelled the regime to reorient economic
policy toward agriculture. It was that rural people became increasingly
conscious of the widening gap in the standard of living between city and
rural areas. Historically, rural voters had tended to support passively
whichever regime happened to be in power despite its urban-biased
economic policies. Since the rural landlord class that could have
constituted a political pressure group had been erased by land reform,
the government felt no urgent concern about the political allegiance of
rural voters.
Although a group of Korean farmers have organized themselves
into the Catholic Farmers' Association (the only rural organization of a
grassroots nature in Korea), its membership is not large enough to exert
in those years, resulting in a persistent squeeze on
agriculture. The fact that the curb market exchange rates in
those years were nearly twice or three times as high as official
rates and that the effective exchange rates on exports (though
not applied to rice farmers due to the government monopoly on
rice exports) were substantially higher than the official rates
provide evidence of how highly the won was overvalued.
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institutionalized pressure on the government. And the National
Agricultural Cooperative Federation, as mentioned earlier, is totally
controlled by the government. In this respect, Korea contrasts strongly
with Japan. In Japan, coop members not only apply political pressure
directly to their elected representatives but also are able to make
their demands for protection effective through the cooperative movement
(Anderson and Hayami, 1986).
As a foreign cynic points out, the political impotence of
Korean farmers mean that the state could manage agriculture as "one
farm" (Wade, 1982). But over time the situation changed. Electoral
erosion for the late President park in rural areas in the 1971
presidential vote was perceived as an ominous popular reaction to the
bias against agriculture in economic development policy. The world food
crisis in the early 1970s and soaring grain prices in the world market
made it inevitable for the government to shift emphasis toward
agriculture.
The Shift to Positive Protection
Starting in 1969, the prices at which the government purchased
rice and barley steadily increased. Another major shift was initiation
of massive investment in the rural infrastructure under the Saemaul (New
Community) Movement. High priority was given to expansion of irrigation
facilities and paddy field consolidation projects. A rice self-
sufficiency program -- increased production from high-yielding varieties
combined with higher prices and input subsidization -- became the core
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of rural income policy, since rice was a key component of the crop mix
of the average farmer.
A more supportive agricultural policy was also reflected in a
shift from negative to positive protection for major agricultural
commodities. While the government undertook to liberalize imports of a
wide range of industrial items by the early 1970s, most tradable
agricultural products were controlled by the Trade Notice, the
surveillance list, or special laws, such as the Grain Management Law and
Livestock Development Law. There was thus strict management of
agricultural trade to ensure that there would be imports only to fill
domestic shortages (Yang, 1985). The average effective rate of protection
for rice rose from (-26) percent in 1960-69 to 39 percent in 1970-79 and
to 74 percent in 1980-84. For beef, protection rose from (-)20 percent
in 1960-69 to 40 percent in 1970-79 and to 112 percent in 1980-84 (see
Table 12). In terms of the intersectoral flow of resources between the
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (as measured in Table 17c),
the agricultural sector provided more than 22 percent of total GDP
during the 1962-69 period, but in the early 1970s the financial flow
reversed. The total of price-related and non-price-r lated transfers
from the non-agricultural to the agricultural sector amounted to about
15 percent of total GDP in 1970-79 and 34 percent in 1980-84. The
government investment bias (GIB) (as measured in Table 16), rose from
.4-.8 in the 1960s to 1.0-1.3 in the 1970s and to 2.0 by the mid-1980s,
implying that the agricultural sector came to receive more and more
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investment resources relative to what it contributed to growth of
national output.
Owing to expanded cultivation of high-yielding varieties,
improved farming techniques, and expanded investment in the rural
infrastructure, a remarkable increase was recorded in aggregate farm
output in the 1970s, especially in grain production. Total food
production measured in terms of the index increased from 55-60 in the
early 1960s to 120-130 in the late 1970s (see Table 4). Despite this
rapid growth in overall food production, self-sufficiency in grain
production declined from 93.9 percent in 1965 to 73.0 percent in 1975
and to 38.9 percent in 1984. This decline was mainly due to increasing
demand for wheat, corn, and soybeans. Self-sufficiency in rice,
however, was nearly attained by the late 1970s.
The effects of government policy on farm income can be measured
by the growth of farm household income relative to that of urban wage-
earners. During the 1960-69 period, when the government's economic
policy was urban-biased, the annual average growth rate of income for
urban wage earners was 14.6 percent, whereas that for farm households
was only 3.5 percent. During the 1970-76 period the situation was
reversed: farm household income increased at an annual rate of 9.5
percent, while that of urban wage-earners increased at a rate of only
4.6 percent, resulting in substantial improvement of farm income
relative to urban earnings. Since the late 1970s, however, farm income
has risen at a slower pace than that of urban wage-earners.
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The Government Deficit as a Constraint
Although increases in food costs were bothersome to the
industrial sector, industry was not in a position to block the
increases, partly because of Korea's bitter experience during the 1973-
74 world food crisis. But the urban interest in cheap food,
particularly for lower income groups, was not totally ignored by the
government, which decided that the burden of supporting agriculture by
means of higher prices could not be placed on food consumers only. The
policy choice was a two-price system for staple food grains -- that is,
higher purchase prices for producers and lower selling prices for urban
consumers, with the financial burden borne by the government.
A two-price system for barley was put into effect beginning
with the 1969 summer crop, and for rice beginning in the fall of 1969.
Until 1968, the selling prices of rice were determined by adding
intermediate handling costs to the original acquisition prices,
resulting in no financial loss to the government. Beginning with the
1969 crop, selling prices (except in 1971) fell below the costs of
acquisition and intermediate handling. After 1973, this difference
continued to widen, and the loss incurred by the government amounted to
20-25 percent per 80 kilo bag every year.
In the case of barley, the price differences were even wider.
Government efforts to keep barley prices at a low level for consumers
were motivated by a desire to induce consumers to substitute barley for
rice. Prior to 1969, market prices of barley had been maintained at
around 65 percent of rice prices. But with the increasing subsidy, the
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price of barley for urban consumers was lowered to 40 percent or less of
the rice price (see Appendix Table 16b). Other administrative measures,
such as requiring all restaurants to serve non-rice items on Wednesdays
and Saturdays, were also taken to save rice. However, as per capita
income grew, the average consumer became less responsive to changes in
the relative price of barley because of a relatively stronger preference
for rice. The two-price policy for barley no longer exerted an effect
on the marginal rate of substitution between rice and barley.
Administrative measures to influence rice consumption were abandoned
(without a formal announcement) in the late 1970s.
The two-price policy may have saved rice and alleviated upward
pressure on consumer prices, but implementation caused government costs
for grain operation to increase at an accelerating pace. During 1970-
84, the total financial loss amounted to 2,073 billion won
(approximately US$3.5 billion).
If the deficit had been paid for out of the general budget
account, the effect would have been a reduction in budget expenditures
for other sectors. So far as the grain operation was concerned, this
was not the case. Faced with increasing budgetary requirements in non-
agricultural sectors, especially for defense purposes, the government
relied upon inflationary financing. Most of the deficit has been
financed through a long-term overdraft from the central bank and also
partly through the issue of short-term grain bonds with a one-year
maturity period. The outstanding balance of long-term borrowing
totalled 1,710 billion won (approximately US$2.5 billion) at the end of
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1984. Repayment of grain bonds has been financed either by long-term
overdrafts or the reissue of grain bonds. Whichever method may be used,
the result is an increase in money supply.
Appendix Table 31 shows how this net increase in the money
supply contributed to overall monetary expansion. It accounted for
about 22 percent of the total increase in money supply in 1972, rose as
high as 98 percent in 1975, and thereafter accounted for approximately
one-fourth of the total increase in the money supply.
A net increase in the money supply is bound to cause upward
pressure on the general price level.13/ This is because lumpsum funds
released at the time of grain acquisition are very likely to be spent
immediately by farmers. For this reason, the two-price policy was self-
defeating. The expanding scale of the government deficit finally became
a serious constraint to agricultural price policy.
An important lesson is that either a grain deficit must be
financed from the general account budget or an attempt must be made to
eliminate the deficit by narrowing the differential between purchase and
13/ In Japan, the grain deficit arising from the two-price policy for
rice is financed by the national budget. The effect of such
financing on income distribution is exactly opposite to that of
financing with an overdraft from the central bank. Financing
from the general account means that the funds are derived in
principle from tax revenue. In as much as direct tax is
concerned, higher tax rates are applied to higher income
earners. Therefore, financing the grain deficit from the general
account has the effect of transferring income from higher income
groups to lower ones.
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selling prices. In other words, once the government price is set, the
price must cover all costs.
As long as the government makes grain purchases from farmers,
there are two ways to narrow the differential: a relative reduction in
the purchase price, or a relative increase in the selling price.
According to the analysis in the foregoing section, a 10 percent rise in
the real price of grain would have the positive effects of increasing
rice production by 2 to 3 percent and of boosting farm household income
by 7 to 8 percent. From the opposite view, the same percentage rise in
the real price of grain would result in only a 0.5 percent increase in
the general price level and a 1.0 percent increase in the consumer cost
of living. In view of this trade-off, one easily reaches the conclusion
that the government selling price must be raised to eliminate the grain
deficit. Such action would probably save the government more than it
would cost the private sector.
Seeking Substitutes for Price Support
Are there less expensive ways to increase farm income? Many
economists and public officials argue that farm income should be
improved through programs other than subsidies of agricultural prices.
One possibility would be to increase agricultural productivity,
particularly labor productivity, and thereby reduce the domestic cost of
producing food. However, there is limited scope for doing this. The
small size of Korean farms is the main restraint. With average size of
one hectare per farm, the possibility of substituting capital for labor
is limited.
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Many people have begun to advocate an easing or even a repeal
of the three-hectare ceiling on individual ownership of farmland. Their
belief is that such action would expedite the concentration of
landholdings by increasing the transferability of land titles. Although
the proposed relaxation could pave the way for some farmers to expand
the scale of their farming operations, the trend in South Korea has not
been toward larger holdings. As explained elsewhere, the proportion of
medium-sized farms has been increasing, while the proportion of farms
with more than 3.0 hectares has been declining. Since the market price
of farmland is much higher than the value of the land as determined
through the capitalization of income obtained by farming, there is a
strong tendency to hold agricultural land as an asset. This tendency is
most conspicuous among the medium-sized farmers, who are in a better
position to achieve financial stability by supplementing their farm
incomes with off-farm earnings. This suggests that the average size of
farm in Korea will remain static for quite a long time to come.
Another way to achieve rural-urban income parity would be to
foster rural industries. The share of farm income from non-agricultural
activities remained, as of 1984, little more than 10 percent in Korea,
whereas it is as high as 80 percent in Japan and 70 percent in
Taiwan.14/ This suggests that policies to increase rural people's
14/ This wide difference in the share of non-agricultural income is
partly due to differences in industrialization and partly due to
Korea's relative neglect of rural development throughout the
postwar decades. In the course of Korea's industrialization,
industrial activities have been heavily concentrated in urban
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access to non-agricultural employment in rural areas could be a
substitute for agricultural price supports.
This approach is not new. In fact, a rural industrialization
program was launched in Korea in the early 1970s under the Saemaul (New
Community) Factory Program. According to official statistics, a total
of 741 factories had been established in rural areas by 1982. But
because of lack of effective linkages with related industries, marketing
inefficiency, poor management, and so on, only about 400 have survived.
Given current infrastructural conditions in rural Korea,
however, the expansion of off-farm employment sources cannot be achieved
in a short period of time. Promotion of off-farm employment through
rural industrialization can only be achieved in the context of a long-
term goal that involves concerted regional planning.
The government's institutional framework for decisionmaking is
another limiting factor in the pursuit of rural industrialization. In
areas. In contrast, Japan and Taiwan followed a path in the
initial stage that utilized much of the farm labor force in rural
industrialization that involved less movement of workers. A
number of factors are responsible for the urban concentration of
industrialization in Korea. First, Korea pursued an outward-
looking development strategy with heavy emphasis on exports from
an early stage. Rather than developing domestic markets,
entrepreneurs focussed primarily on export markets for which
generous incentives were provided. With readily available port
facilities and other conveniences, Seoul and Busan gave easier
access to export markets and thus offered more favorable location
for business activities (Ho, 1977). Second, the highly
centralized nature of the government administration that is still
the norm has added to the geographical concentration of
industries. Seoul is the place where major governmental
decisions affecting all facets of business operations were
made. In this situation, concentration seems inevitable. (Park,
1986).
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Korea there are six ministries which are responsible for policies
affecting the rural population: the Economic Planning Board, the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Construction, and the
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Despite the establishment of a
Coordination Group in the Economic Planning Board, it appears to be
extremely difficult to reach agreement on comprehensive programs which
require a trade-off between agricultural and non-agricultural rural
investment.
The limited possibility of growth in agricultural productivity
and limited success in rural industrialization will continue to give
farmers an incentive to seek more income through governmental price
supports. The continuation of such supports was emphasized in a Korea
Times editorial:
Although it may be a natural consequence of the rapid
industrialization of Korean society as a whole, a too sudden
degeneration of agriculture must be averted because, once the
farms are left to ruin, it will be all but impossible to restore
them. It has been reported that about half a million people give
up farming every year, most of them owners of lands too small to
be economical. The exodus from the farms poses another grave
social problem of unemployment, since the present industrial
facilities are not yet sufficient to absorb all those leaving the
villages.
Some government economic planners, however, are advocating a
policy of discontinuing or drastically curtailing the farm price
support program in order to reduce the budgetary deficits
accruing from it. Some others also hold the view that as a move
to hold down general inflation the imports of foreign farm goods,
which are much cheaper than local produce, must be broadly
liberalized. We strongly doubt the wisdom of such moves which
seem to ignore the strategic importance of domestic food
production as a vital national resource (May 15, 1979).
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There is also the possibility that expansion of off-farm
employment opportunities may cause (1) a further rise in farmland prices
due to increased demand for residential and industrial sites; (2)
overinvestment in farm machinery because of a rise in rural wages; and
(3) a decrease in incentives for farming. Thus, rural
industrialization, which is thought to be a substitute for agricultural
price increases, may, paradoxically, exert an upward pressure on
agricultural prices. On the other hand, as pointed out by Anderson and
Hayami, the political costs of higher food prices for urban consumers
will decline as the share of food costs in urban household budgets
declines (Anderson and Hayami, 1986).
Quantitative Specification of the Determinants of Price Support
The present section quantifies the relationship between the
level of domestic price support and the potential determinants of price
policy decision-making in Korea. In an attempt to measure the
explanatory power of the selected policy determinants for each product,
the following log-linear multiple-regression model was employed:
lnP a + a lnP + a2 lnPl + a3DO + a4DP + e
where:
pD = Domestic nominal producer price
pB = Corresponding border price
PI Domestic inflation rate
DO = Dummy variable for the year of crop failure
= 1 if the year of crop failure
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= 0 otherwise
DP = Political dummy variable
= 1 if the year of election
= 0 otherwise
The estimated results are presented in Table 24. Overall, the
model fits the data reasonably well with high R-square, and judging from
the statistical significance level of the estimated coefficients the
results seem to be consistent with the previous discussion of the
political economy of pricing policy.
The estimated coefficients for the border price, or
transmission elasticities, are not significantly different from zero for
rice, barley, soybeans, and beef. As already stated, the level of
border prices has rarely been taken into consideration in determining
the level of price support in Korea. Despite a heavy dependency on
imports, the government has persistently pursued a policy of insulating
the domestic prices of these products from world price changes. Only
for pork was the border price positively correlated with the domestic
producer price, reflecting the high comparative advantage of Korea's
swine-raising industry.
The estimated coefficients associated with domestic inflation
are highly significant for all products, and surprisingly the magnitudes
of the coefficients are close to unity for all products. This suggests
that changes in the general price level are important determinants of
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Table 24. Estimated Coefficients for Determinants of
Price Intervention
Independent Variable
Dependent Constant Polt-
Variable Term Border In- Output ical
Price flation Dummy Dummy R2
(PB) (PI) (DO) (DP)
Price of:
Rice(PR) .219 .112 1.163 .02 .072 .991
(.456) (.977) (21.029) (.390) (Z.416)
Barley(PB) .388 .103 .990 .291 .073 .974
(.564) (.579) (11.609) (2.752) (.893)
Soybean(PS) (-).025 .160 1.173 (-).119 .984
(.030) (.896) (13.893) (1.717)
Beef(PBF) 1.138 .127 1.398 .083 .044 .996
(1.126) (.580) (12.220) (2.344) (.938)
Pork(PpK) .831 .305 .980 .109 (-).021 .989
(1.760) (2.839) (10.576) (1.890) (.333)
* Estimation based on 25 observations (1960-84).
Figures in parenthesis are t-values.
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producer prices, whether they are determined by discretionary government
policy or by market forces. As for the political dummy, the coefficient
for the rice price equation is the only one having statistical
significance. This reflects that policy decision-making pertaining to
rice price support has historically been conditioned by the political
motivation of the regime in power. In view of the overwhelming
importance of rice for both farm producers and consumers in Korea, the
problem of determining the level of rice price support has been one of
the major political issues in presidential and congressional elections.
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Appendix
Tables and Figures

Appendix 1. GNP, Exports and Imports, 1955-84
Year GNP ('75 Constant Prices) GNP in Per Capita GNP Exports Imports
Total Agriculture U.S. Dollars Nominal Real
(Billion Won) (Million US$) (US$) (Million US$) (Million US$)
1955 2,423 1,182 1,414 .65 134 18 342
56 2,390 1,100 1,459 66 132 25 386
57 2,570 1,204 1,672 74 143 22 442
58 2,711 1,292 1,897 80 152 17 378
59 2,815 1,288 1,980 81 151 20 304
60 2,846 1,261 1,996 79 144 33 346
61 3,005 1,414 2,103 82 149 41 316
62 2,071 1,330 2,315 87 155 55 422
63 3,351 1,456 2,718 100 175 87 560
64 3,672 1,684 2,876 103 178 119 404
65 3,885 1,668 2,006 105 177 175 463
66 4,378 1,861 3,671 125 204 250 716
67 4,669 1,751 4,274 142 225 320 996
68 5,196 1,774 5,226 169 257 455 1,463 ,.
69 5,911 1,961 6,625 210 304 623 1,824
70 6,363 1,933 7,986 248 341 835 1,984
71 7,242 1,936 9,367 285 374 1,067 2,394
72 7,678 2,031 10,573 316 397 1,624 2,522
73 8,761 2,164 13,504 396 471 3,225 4,240
Appendix 1. (Cont.)
Year GIIP ('75 Constant Prices) GNP in Per Capita GNP Exports Imports
Total Agriculture .S. olars Nominal Real
(Billion Won) (Million US$) (US$) (Millicn US$) (Million US$)
1974 9,438 2,336 18,549 535 585 4,460 6,852
75 10,092 2,496 20,852 591 591 5,081 7,274
76 11,500 2,703 28,680 800 760 7,715 8,774
77 12,976 2,817 37,429 1,028 923 10,047 10,811
78 14,233 2,850 51,960 1,406 1,176 12,710 14,972
79 15,155 2,799 62,374 1,662 1,278 15,056 20,339
80 14,359 2,074 61,203 1,605 1,130 17,505 22,292
81 15,243 2,467 67,191 1,735 1,121 21,254 26,131
82 16,239 1,408 70,797 1,800 1,093 21,853 24,251
83 17,663 2,509 75,280 1,884 1,105 24,445 26,192
84 18,979 2,642 81,073 1,999 1,124 29,245 30,631
Source: The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues..
Korea Developnient Institute, various issues.
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Appendix 2. Trends in the Share in GNP of Gross Domestic Inve,tment,
Domestic Saving and Foreign Saving
Gross Domestic Foreign StatisticalYear Investment Saving Saving Discrepancy
1955 12.3 5.2 7.1
1960 10.9 0.8 8.6 1.5
1965 15.0 7.4 6.4 1.2
1970 26.8 17.3 9.3 0.2
1975 30.0 19.1 10.1 0.8
1980 31.3 21.9 9.4 -
1984 30.0 27.4 2.3 0.3
Average for period:
1954-56 11.0 3.3 7.7 -
1961-63 14.8 5.0 9.9 (-)0.1
1971-73 24.2 18.2 6.6 (-)0.6
1981-82 28.6 20.3 7.6 0.7
Source: The Bank of Korea, National Income Statistics, various issues.
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Appendix 3., Industrial Origin of GNP and Average Annual
- Growth Rates for the Selectud Period
Unit: Billion won at 1975 constant prices
Year Total Agri. & Mining & SOC. &
Forestry Manufacturing Other Services
1955 2,423 1,182 173 1,068
1960 2,846 1,261 288 1,297
1965 3,885 1,668 508 1,709
1970 6,363 1,933 1,240 3,190
1975 10,092 2,496 2,774 4,822
1980 14,359 2,074 4,333 7,952
1984 18.979 2,642 5,834 10,503
Average Annual Growth Rate:
1962-66 9.3 8.8 14.3 8.4
1967-71 11.6 2.5 22.3 13.7
1972-76 10.6 7.4 16.4 9.4
1977-81 4.1 (-)3.3 4.9 5.8
1962-84 8.6 3.2 13.8 9.6
Source: The Bank of Korea, National Income Statistics, various issues.
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Appendix 4. iSectoral Contribution to GNP Growth, 1962-84
Unit: Billion won at 1975 constant prices
Total Agri., Forestry Mining & SOC. &
Year GNP & Fisheries Manufacturing Other Services
1962 3,071 1,330 340 1,401
1984 18,979 2,642 5,834 10,503
Increase(1984-62) 15,908 1,312 5,494 9,102
Contri- 100.0% 8.3% 34.5% 57.2%bution
Source: The Bank of Korea, National Income Statistics, various issues.
Appendix 5. Rates of Self-Sufficiency forMajor Grains
Unit: %
Year All Grain Rice Barley Soybean Corn
1955 92.1 100.0 87.3 100.0 100.0
1960 94.5 100.8 110.4 79.3 18.9
1965 93.9 100.7 106.0 100.0 36.1
1970 80.5 93.1 106.3 86.1 18.9
1975 73.0 94.6 92.0 85.8 8.3
1980 56.0 95.1 57.6 35.1 5.9
1984 48.9 97.8 131.8 24.0 3.7
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, various issues.
Appendix 6. Imports and Exports of Grain for Selected Years
Unit: 1,000 M/T
Year Imported Imported Exported
Rice Wheat Corn Soybean Barley Others Total Total
1955 0 51 9 23 2 85 1
1960 0 381 0 36 0 51 468 24
1965 0 496 60 0 106 7 669 26
1970 0 1,254 283 36 542 0 2,115 5
1975 481 1,584 532 61 354 0 3,012 0
1980 581 1,810 2,234 417 0 5,042 0
1984 0 2,648 3,223 694 0 6,565 0
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Appendix 7,' Government Revenues and Expenditures, 1955-84
Unit: Billion won
Gov't Gov't Deficit Share in GNP Deficit/ Rate of
Year R venue Expenditure e c Revenue Expenditure Deficit Expenditure Inflation
1955 11.7 13.6 1.9 10.2% 11.9% 1.7% 14.0 43.8
56 18.3 23.2 4.9 12.1 15.3 3.2 21.1 31.4
57 30.0 32.5 2.5 15.2 16.5 1.3 7.7 16.2
58 36.2 44.4 8.2 17.7 20.7 3.0 18.5 (-)6.3
59 39.4 42.2 2.8 18.1 19.4 1.3 6.6 2.4
60 41.4 44.6 3.2 16.9 18.2 1.3 7.2 11.6
61 49.5 58.8 9.3 17.0 . 21.2 3.2 5.4 13.8
62 67.2 85.7 18.5 18.9 24.1 5.2 21.6 8.8
63 72.4 82.0 9.6 14.4 16.3 1.9 11.7 20.5
64 77.4 82.4 5.0 10.8 11.5 0.7 6.1 35.1
65 97.5 102.3 4.8 12.1 12.7 0.6 4.7 10.3
66 144.1 160.7 16.6 13.9 15.5 1.6 10.3 8.6
67 183.2 210.1 26.9 14.3 16.4 2.1 12.8 6.5
68 264.4 312.4 48.0 16.0 18.9 2.9 15.4 8.1
69 344.8 437.5 92.7 16.0 20.3 4.3 21.2 6.9
70 487.6 512.3 24.7 17.8 18.7 0.9 4.8 9.4
71 565.7 642.1 76.4 16.8 19.0 2.2 11.0 8.6
72 654.0 846,5 192.5 15.7 20.3 4.6 22.7 13.8
73 757,7 844.7 87.0 14.1 15.7 1.6 10.3 6.9
Appendix 7. (Cont.)
Unit: Billion won
Year Gov't Gov't Deficit Share in GNP Deficit/ Rate of
Year R venue Expenditure Revenue Expenditure Deficit Expenditure Inflation
1974 1,117.7 1,418.6 300.9 14.9 18.9 4.0 21.2 42.1
75 1,692.5 '2,158.6 466.1 16.9 21.6 4.7 21.6 26.5
76 2,511.4 2,909.7 398.3 18.1 21.0 2.9 13.7 12.2
77 3,184.9 3,660.5 475.6 17.6 20.2 2.6 13.0 9.0
78 4,385.2 5,001.0 615.8 18.1 20.6 2.5 12.3 11.6
79 5,769.8 6,210.1 440.3 18.5 19.9 1.4 7.1 18.8
80 7,280.8 8,454.5 1,173.7 19.5 22.7 3.2 13.9 38.9 X
81 9,246.7 11,357.6 2,110.9 20.2 24.8 4.6 18.6 20.4
82 10,074.3 12,296.4 2,222.1 19.4 23.7 4.3 18.1 4.7
83 11,595.5 12,546.1 950.6 19.9 21.5 1.6 7.6 0.2
84 13,039.6 13,962.5 922.9 20.0 21.4 1.4 6.6 0.7
Source: Economic Pianning Board, Korea Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Ministry of Finance, Annual Report an Government Financing, various issues..
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Appendix 8. Share in GDP and Gross Investment of
of Public Enterprises
Unit: %
Share in Share in Share inYear Total GDP Non-agr. GDP Gross Investment
1970 9.2 13.0 18.9
1975 8.3 11.3 33.2
1980 9.6 11.6 27.6
Source: Sagong, I. and Song, D.H., Improving Public Enterprises
Management, Korea Development Institute, 1982.
Appendix. 9a. Indices of Agricultural Output for Food and Non-Food Products
(1979-80=100)
Food Non-FoB) Total Food/
Grains Vegetables Fruits Edible Livestock Totala-/ Total- Total Non-FoodOil
Year
Weight: 477.3 204.7 36.1 13.2 194.1 926.7 73.3
1960 68.9 12.8 11.7 10.0 19.1 39.6 52.6 .752
61 78.2 15.8 10.7 13.2 19.3 44.4 56.6 .784
62 70.6 17.0 14.0 14.5 19.9 41.9 54.9 .763
63 77.7 15.9 12.7 14.9 23.8 45.8 57.9 .791
64 92.6 20.5 16.5 19.5 24.8 54.0 71.0 .761
65 89.8 21.3 22.4 22.1 21.5 52.6 67.1 .785
66 97.3 27.3 24.2 29.5 22.4 58.3 83.2 .700
67 88.1 29.1 26.1 35.1 23.6 55.1 79.0 .697
68 86.6 34.0 29.2 39.1 27.6 57.2 83.7 .683
69 99,7 33.9 31.1 47.8 36.7 65.8 91.9 .716 0
70 96.2 32.8 31.9 55.6 38.3 64.6 89.3 .723
71 95.2 40.0 30.0 68.2 39.1 65.9 93.5 .705
72 94.4 38.9 38.7 65.4 43.8 69.2 117.7 .588
73 96.6 38.8 47.3 71.5 49.2 70.1 122.7 .571
74 100.2 40.8 52.1 78.5 56.7 74.7 117.6 .635
75 109.3 63.9 56.9 111.3 49.8 83.2 123.4 .674
76 117.8 80.8 61.6 155.6 68.8 95.8 118.8 .806
77 122.1 83.9 80.8 134.2 71.1 100.2 119.3 .840
78 121.9 76.2 84.8 143.5 92.2 103.3 113.1 .913
79 118.5 109.4 93.1 130.7 103.9 111.4 108.4 1.028
80 77.8 .98.3 91.9 76.8 90.1 85.4 100.5 .850
81 104.3 97.8 114.6 92.5 103.3 102.8 94.9 1.083
82 104.0 101.9 133.8 153.4 118.8 108.6 101.4 1.071
83 108.1 111.9 158.8 177.1 154.6 121.5 97.9 1.241
84 112.1 91.5 139.6 196.1 164.1 120.8 106.4 1.135
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
a/ Mushroom also included in the category of food.. b/ Non-food includes leaf tobacco, ginseng,
cocoon, cotton, medicinal crops, hop and
straw.
Appendix 9b. Indices of Agricultural Output for Tradable and Non-Tradable Products
(1979-81=100)
\ ~~~~~~~Tradable (Importable) NnTaabe/ 1/2
Year\ Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork Total (1) (2)
I ight 372.6 38.4 17.9 47.0 67.7 1,000.0 
1960 64.5 124.4 52.4 27.9 29.7 41.2 51.5 .800
61 73.3 122.4 67.7 32.7 28.2 45.9 47.1 .97562 63.8 114.0 64.0 40.3 28.6 43.5 46.7 .931
63 79.5 76.3 64.2 46.9 33.8 47.4 45.4 1.04464 83.7 125.6 66.9 72.0 29.8 56.1 49.9 1.12465 74.1 149.4 71.7 55.9 26.8 54.6 63.1 .865
66 82.9 167.0 66.3 51.9 27.8 61.1 63.5 .962
67 76.2 158.7 82.8 49.5 29.2 56.9 58.5 .9i368 67.6 171.9 100.8 39.4 28.9 59.1 72.6 .81469 86.6 170.5 94.1 69.5 32.6 67.7 73.4 .922
70 83.4 162.9 95.3 83.9 28.4 66.4 83.5 .795
71 84.6 154.3 91.3 64.1 36.4 68.0 87.5 .777
72 83.7 163.6 92.0 84.1 34.5 70.7 87.8 .805
73 89.1 147.3 101.0 111.4 43.0 74.0 87.0 .851
74 94.1 141.6 130.9 152.4 42.8 77.8 90.0 .864
75 98.8 173.4 127.6 56.5 40.5 86.1 95.3 .903
76 110.3 177.7 121.2 91.8 70.2 97.5 100.5 .970
77 127.1 81.2 130.9 117.9 58.1 101.6 99.4 1.022
78 122.7 133.3 120.3 128.1 82.5 104.0 110.3 .943
79 117.8 147.0 105.6 111.9 119.3 111.1 102.4 1.085
80 75.1 74.1 88.9 95.4 83.2 86.5 93.7 .92381 107.1 78.9 105.5 92.6 97.5 102.3 103.9 .985
82 109.5 68.6 95.9 110.6 121.5 108.0 103.3 1.045
83 114.3 75.4 93.0 156.6 169.1 119.8 117.1 1.02384 120.2 68.8 104.2 187.8 156.8 119.7 115.3 1.038
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics.Yearbook, various issues.
a/ Non-tradable goods mean agricultural services whiose share of total value added in agriculture
is only about 2.2%.
Appeudix 10.- Government Revenues and Expenditures
for Selected Years
Unit: Billion won
Year Gov't Gov't Budget Share of Deficit in Rate of
Ravenues Expenditures Deficit Total Budget GNP Inflation
1955 11.7 13.6 1.9 14.0 1.7 43.8"
1960 41.4 44.6 3.2 7.2 1.3 11.1
1965 97.5 102.3 4.8 4.7 0.6 10.3
1973 487.6 512.3 24.7 4.8 0.9 9.4
1975 1,692.5 2,158.6 466.1 21.6 4.7 26.5
1980 7,280.8 8,454.5 1,173.7 13.9 3.2 38.9
1984 13,039.0 13,962.5 922.9 6.6 1.4 0.7
Source: Korea Statistics Yearbook, The Economic Planning Board, 1955-84.
0
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Appendix 11. Estimation of Tarirr Equivalent(ta), 1960 84
a) ~~ ~ ~~~b) dm r I
YEAR p.zp d a) p/ S-P p d Pr Export subsidy (A) X (B) Tarifr
Pm x *M P x Pd P * 
(1908s100.0) (1968=100.0) (A) (B) (C)
1960 1.001 nJ na 2.362 na 1.500
61 1.032 na na 1.181 fl 1.500
62 1.076 na na 1.105 na 1.500
63 1.009 1.239 0.887 1.457 1.292 1.506
64 1.102 1.225 0.8Z9 1.313 1.180 1.375
65 1.218 1.20Z 1.013 1.148 1.13 1.355
f6 1.147 1.077 1.005 1.192 1.269 1.479
67 1.094 1.040 1.052 1.229 1.293 1.507
68 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.282 1.282 1.404
69 0.97G 1.001 0.975 1.278 1.240 1.452
70 0.963 1.029 0.938 1.283 1.201 1.400
71 na 1.037 na 1.296 na 1.400
72 no 1.008 na 1.203 no 1.400
73 na 1.02 na 1.230 na 1.400
74 na 1.305 na 1.211 na 1.400
75 na 1.499 no 1.17 na 1.330
78 na 1.271 na 1.157 na 1.330
77 na 1.228 nn 1.110 nRi 1.330
78 . 1.200 1.171 1.025 1.049 1.076 1.254
79 na 1.100 na 1.067 na 1.254
80 na 1.330 nn 1.062 nR 1.254
81 nn 1.410 na 1.042 na 1.254
82 1.283 1.352 0.949 1.041 0.988 1.151
83 na 1.338 na 1.030 na 1.151
84 ns 1.311 nn 1.025 ni 1.151
Source: Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, various issues.
Korea Development Institute, Stabilization Measures and Restructuring Export Support System
(Unpublished), 1985.
Frank, Kim and Westphal, Trade and Development in Korea Seoul, 1975.
a I/Px I Tndex of doaestic prices or imported goods/Index of doacestic Prices of
exportable oods(1968=100.0)
b) r 
) P.a /1 P x= Index of import prices(CIF)/lndex of export Prices(FOB).
c) 1 4- ts l-actual export subsidly ratio(export subsi(ly Per dollar export)
d) Tarirf equivalent of 19.4X estimated for 1953 by Fnank. Kin and Westphal
(Trade and Development in Korea. 1975) vas used as a base to es'ivate those for 1983-70 Per;od.
1978 and 1982. and those ror other years are guess estimates.
d f
(1 + tu)t a(1+ts)t( - - X 1.1654
d f
(I+ tm)1968 1+ 0.40.1
vhere: 1.1054 5 = 1.1654
(1+ ts)19G8 1+ 0.282
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Appendix 12. Estimation of Free Trade Equilibrium Foreign Exchange Rates (E*), 1960-84
ifr Equiva- Forei6n Exchange Export Foreign Excha- Foreign Exch Exchanre
YEAR lent Demand a) Subsidy Rate nge Supply b) -ange Defic- latq c)
1-ts Od 1-ts 4s It Oo0 E
(million US S) (million US S) (million USS (Von/lUS S)
1960 1.500 37 2. 362 117 262 17fi
61 1.500 344 1.181 140 18 258
82 1.500 455 1.105 163 292 290
63 1.508 578 1.457 17G 402 33S
64 1.375 432 1.313 211 221 414
65 1.355 488 1.148 290 198 434
6G 1.479 778 1.102 455 323 452
67 1.507 1.064 1.229 . 643 421 448
08 1.494 1.547 1.282 S80 667 484
69 1.452 1.945 1.278 1.151 794 4'9
70 1.400 2.182 1.283 1.37t 803 507
71 1.400 2.034 1.206 1.610 1.018 578
72 1.400 2.7G8. 1.268 2.227 541 540
73 1.400 4.020 1.236 4.121 499 503
74 1.400 7.450 1.211 5.388 2.071 570
75 1.330 7.997 1.167 5.884 2.113 078
78 1.330 10.120 1.157 9.457 683 571
77 1.330 13.284 1.140 13T074 210 548
78 1.254 1S,718 1.049 17.161 1.557 556
79 1.254 24.121 1.007 19.531 4.500 619
80 1.254 23.347 1.082 22.577 5.770 784
81 1.254 32.416 1.042 27.269 5.147 813
82 1.151 31t504 1.041 28.064 3,204 835
83 1.151 32.581 1.030 30.383 2.108 850
84 1.151 35.563 1.025 33.651 1.912 867
Source: The Bank or Korea. Econosic Statistics Yearbook. various issues, amn. Sang Voo.'Semi-Annual Model
of the Korean Economy, The Korea Dv,lopment Institute. September. 1985.
a) Includes imports of goods and services only. i.n. excludes unrequitted transfers such as
donations. and repayments of roreixn lnans. intmr.s-t payments, with dravals or roreign inveLtnr-
b) Includes imports of goods and services only. i.e. excludes inflow of foreign aids. foreign loan.
relier aids. roreign investment.
c) Estimation of E' is based on the rollowinn forxular:
E ACo +0 1 t n dOd + -- s ess)
E-z ~ - -I' + 7t + 11 Eo
where: Eo = Nominal exchange rate
n d a Elasticity of roreign exchange demand wvr to exchange rate(Estimated as 0.225 by lPne. Sang 'Joo. KDI. 1985)
C s Elasticity of roreign exchange supply w/r.to exchange rate
(Estimated as 1.03 by Man. Sanx Voo. KIO. 185)
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Appendix 13. Adjusted Price Indices, 1960-84
Year WPIF CPIA CPI p PYear F A cPIK NA NA
1960 38.2 14.0 6.1 7.7 7.5
61 38.4 11.9 6.6 8.3 10.9
62 38.3 13.7 7.1 8.7 12.2
63 38.6 19.0 8.5 9.5 13.7
64 38.9 19.4 11.0 11.8 15.1
65 39.5 18.7 12.5 14.2 16.9
66 40.6 23.7 14.0 17.0 19.3
67 40.9 23.1 15.4 19.0 21.2
68 41.5 26.6 17.1 21.1 24.1
69 42.8 29.3 19.2 23.1 26.1
70 44.5 32.8 22.3 25.6 28.5
71 45.5 37.9 25.3 27.4 30.9
72 46.9 36.4 28.3 30.2 21.0
73 52.9 35.4 29.2 31.4 31.0
74 65.0 48.9 36.3 38.0 40.4
75 69.3 58.2 45.2 45.1 47.4
76 73.1 59.2 52.1 51.1 50.1
77 76.9 62.4 57.4 55.6 53.6
78 79.6 71.9 65.7 62.5 62.5
79 87.5 91.2 77.7 76.6 75.7
80 100.0 118.1 100.0 100.0 104.3
81 106.7 138.4 121.3 117.0 118.3
82 110.2 142.5 130.1 129.7 131.6
83 111.3 143.2 134.5 136.0 136.3
84 114.1 144.9 137.6 139.8 139.1
Source: Economic Planning Board, Consumer Price Statistics,
various issues.
The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various
issues.
Korea Development Institute, various unpublished issues.
a/ WPIF = Weighted average of Korea's major trading partners' WPI
.CPIA = Domestic CPI adjusted to exchange rate rate over-
valuation
= (E*/Eo). PT + (1-O)PNT
CPIK = Domestic CPI (1980 = 100.0)
PNA Nonagricultural CPI (1980 = 100.0)
P*NA = Nonagricultural CPI adjusted to exchange rate over-
NA valuation
= (E*/E)ppA/(i+tna) + (1-?)PNT
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Appendix 14* Indices of Prices of Tradables and Nontradables in CP
1960-84
Year be T p T NT
Year - a PT PNT NA NA
1960 .6976 .4354 6.10 6.26 10.33 5.68
61 .6976 .4354 6.61 6.71 11.09 6.10
62 .6976 .4354 7.05 7.14 11.46 6.49
63 .6976 .4354 8.84 7.82 12.64 7.10
64 .6976 .4354 11.92 9.03 16.51 8.20
65 .6843 .4375 13.32 10.75 19.93 9.76
66 .6843 .4375 14.41 12.98 21.80 13.17
67 .6843 .4375 15.74 14.75 24.18 14.96
68 .6843 .4375 17.19 16.90 26.32 17.07
69 .6843 .4375 19.36 18.97 26.32 19.20
70 .6843 .4375 22.38 22.21 29.68 22.50
71 .6843 .4375 25.51 24.97 31.17 25.17
72 .6843 .4375 28.28 28.36 32.99 28.56
73 .6843 .4375 29.27 29.05 34.82 29.25
74 .6843 .4375 36.93 34.95 42.82 35.09
75 .6197 .3830 46.97 42.26 49.61 42.36
76 .6197 .3830 53.64 49.60 54.01 49.29
77 .6197 .3830 59.02 54.71 58.17 54.02
78 .6197 .3830 67.72 62.28 64.20 61.48
79 .6197 .3830 78.44 76.42 77.68 76.01
80 .6197 .3830 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
81 .6197 .3830 123.50 117.82 116.42 117.33
82 .6197 .3830 128.64 132.37 125.97 132.02
83 .6197 .3830 130.75 140.67 129.16 140.26
84 .6197 .3830 132.26 146.25 130.27 145.65
Source: Economic Planning Board, Consumer Price Statistics, various issues.
-a/ c = Share of tradables in CPI
= Share of tradables in nonagricultural CPI
P = Index of prices of tradables in CPIT
P,T = Index of prices of nontradables in CPI
PT = Index of prices of tradables in nonagricultural CPINA
pNT = Index of prices of nontradables innonagricultural CPI
NA
Appendix i5. Transfer Receipts and Capital Inflow
Unit : million US. dollars
Net Transfer
Year Foreign Remittence Sub- Net Total TotalYear ~~~~~~~~~~Capital Toa Ttl
Aid & Others total Inflow Inflow Imports Net Inflow/Imports
1960 232 40 272 - 272 379 .718
61 197 51 248 - 248 344 .721
62 219 17 236 5 241 455 .53063 233 26 259 64 323 578 .55964 143 52 195 22 217 432 .502
65 136 71 207 47 254 488 .520
66 144 76 220 196 416 778 .53567 119 110 229 210 439 1064 .413
68 126 101 227 314 541 1547 .35069 121 124 245 568 813 1945 .418
70 161 19 180 536 716 2182 .328
71 106 64 170 556 726 2634 .276
72 22 148 170 524 694 2768 .251
73 - 190 190 591 781 4620 .169
74 - 232 232 733 965 7459 .12975 - 226 226 1060 1286 7997 .161
76 - 349 349 1302 1651 10120 .163
77 - 222 222 1496 1718 13284 .129
78 - 472 472 2053 2525 18718 .135
79 - 439 439 1627 2066 24121 .086
80 - 449 449 1896 2345 28347 .083
81 - 501 501 1793 2294 32416 .071
82 - 554 554 1449 2003 31504 .064
83 - 578 578 1052 1630 32581 .050
84 - 540 540 957 1497 35563 .042
Source The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
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AppendLx 16. Proportion of Total Agricultural Land by Farm Size
Unit: %
Under 0.3- 0.5- 1.0- .1.5- 2.0- OverYear 0.3 ha 0,5 -1.0 - 1.5 2.0 3.0 3.0 ha
1960 5.3 11.4 27.9 37.0 37.0 17.3 1.2
61 5.1 10.6 28.7 37.1 37.1 17.4 1.1
62 5.4 10.6 29.6 36.4 36.4 16.7 1.3
63 5.5 10.6 28.9 36.5 36.5 16.8 1.6
64 5.1 10.0 28.3 36.8 36.8 17.0 2.7
65 3.8 8.6 26.7 22.9 17.6 15.3 5.1
66 3.7 8.4 27.0 23.5 16.8 14.7 6.0
67 3.6 8.2 27.0 23.9 16.4 14.2 6.7
68 3.5 8.1 26.7 24.3 16.2 14.0 7.2
69 3.4 8.0 26.7 24.5 16.3 14.0 7.0
70 3.4 7.3 27.8 25.2 15.4 13.6 7.3
71 3.4 8.0 27.3 25.3 15.8 13.4 6.8
72 3.5 8.0 27.4 25.5 15.7 13.2 6.7
73 3.4 8.0 26.8 25.3 16.1 13.3 7.0
74 2.9 7.0 28.3 25.2 16.0 13.4 7.2
75 3.0 7.2 29.6 25.3 15.5 12.8 7.0
76 3.1 7.2 29.7 25.4 15.0 12.5 6.8
77 3.2 7.5 29.8 25.4 15.0 12.2 6.5
7E 2.9 7.9 30.2 26.0 15.2 11.9 6.4
79 3.2 8.0 30.4 26.0 15.0 11.5 6.0
80 2.9 6.6 27.8 27.0 16.4 12.8 6.5
81 3.0 7.7 30.8 26.7 15.1 11.1 5.6
82 2.9 7.4 20.5 27.1 15.5 11.2 5.4
83 2.9 7.4 30.3 27.2 15.6 11.2 5.4
84 2.8 7.2 30.0 - 27.4 15.8 11.4 5.4
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, various issues.
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Appendij..16a.'Producer Prices of Major Agricultural Products
Unit: -Wi,000/MT
Year Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
1960 16.4 10.6 15.0 81 56
61 20.3 14.5 15.2 89 64
62 21.6 16.2 16.3 95 91
63 34.4 28.3 27.2 102 87
64 42.8 37.0 41.7 119 125
65 40.1 27.9 43.5 193 156
66 42.3 26.5 48.9 227 141
67 46.6 30.6 65.0 291 191
68 54.9 33.5 45.5 376 276
69 67.9 38.9 49.6 401 228
70 76.3 42.4 76.8 471 291
71 95.9 58.8 79.3 571 357
72 121.8 75.2 99.1 752 322
73 127.6 77.0 116.3 812 457
74 184.4 97.3 143.2 913 529
75 233.2 136.4 175.7 1,001 778
76 278.0 138.9 238.4 1,662 1,038
77 282.7 188.7 314.5 2,158 1,058
78 382.9 214.6 335.2 3,035 1,650
79 428.4 247.6 254.3 2,984 1,312
80 562.6 317.7 528.2 3,616 1,778
81 656.7 368.3 766.7 5,360 3,090
82 682.1 417.7 727.2 6,517 3,073
83 686.8 430.2 306.7 7,184 2,750
84 704.5 443.6 797.9 6,760 2,196.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Price Survey, various issues.
National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, Rural Price and
Wage Survey, various issues.
Union of Livestock Cooperatives, Demand & Supply of Livestock
Products, various issues.
- 240 -
-.Appen d:-. 16b.!Consumer Prices of Major Agricultural Products
Unit: Mi,000/MT
Year Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
1960 19.0 12.6 17.1 128 7Q
61 22.9 17.0 17.0 152 80
62 23.6 18.1 17.7 163 97
63 37.6 28.9 28.7 172 105
64 46.0 39.1 42.4 200 143
65 43.6 32.0 44.9 265 193
66 44.9 31.6 51.8 297 205
67 49.3 36.1 70.5 350 243
68 56.8 34.1 47.8 568 342
69 66.6 37.3 57.3 672 357
70 77.2 46.4 83.4 772 372
71 93.5 59.9 90.0 940 517
72 131.2 71.8 116.0 1,093 523
73 132.1 75.0 126.3 1,145 610
74 174.6 79.4 158.6 1,342 713
75 228.8 108.9 196.1 1,597 1,090
76 274.0 128.5 278.3 2,242 1,400
77 295.5 169.6 353.1 2,870 1,435
78 321.6 185.4 388.3 3,133 1,893
79 403.1 175.0 438.4 3,522 1,838
80 622.6 202.6 612.1 4,670 2,233
81 789.0 335.1 859.9 6,578 3,713
82 825.8 301.0 875.9 7,432 3,645
63 798.7 384.1 984.1 8,318 3,328
64 - 806.8- 420.5 1,016.8 . 7,902 2,567
Source: Economic Planning Board, Consumer Price Statistics, various issues.
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Appendix 16c.1 Agricultural Production
Unit: 441,000/MT
Year Rice Barley Soybean Wheat Corn Beef Pork
1960 3,150 1,098 138 164 14 13.0 58.0
61 3,047 1,110 130 159 14 13.3 60.0
62 3,463 1,113 165 164 16. 16.8 38.0
63 3,015 746 156 139 18 21.1 55.3
64 3,758 1,227 156 190 20 31.9 62.5
65 3,954 1,459 163 184 35 27.3 55.9
66 3,501 1,632 174 193 40 29.4 95.8
67 3,919 1,550 161 191 34 32.0 72.2
68 3,603 1,680 201 211 60 35.8 61.8
69 3,195 1,666 245 224 63 33.1 76.8
70 4,090 1,591 229 219 63 37.3 82.5
71 3,939 1,510 232 196 68 39.5 89.9
72 3,997 1,600 222 149 64 40.2 94.0
73 3,957 1,443- 224 100 54 44.9 91.9
74 4,212 1,388 246 74 61 51.5 95.1
75 4,445 1,700 319 97 58 70.3 106.8
76 4,669 1,759 311 82 60 74.8 118.2
77 5,215 814 295 45 84 77.4 151.2
78 6,006 1,348 319 36 113 74.3 171.6
79 5,797 1,508 293 42 100 86.5 223.0
80 5,565 811 257 92 149 93.1 235.2
81 3,550 859 216 57 154 69.3 209.3
82 5,063 749 257 66 145 61.5 237.5
83 5,175 815 233 115 117 66.1 294.9
84 5,404 804 226 21 101 91.0 340.9
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, variouz issues.
Union of Livestock Cooperatives, Demand & Supply of Livestock
Products, various issues.
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.Appendix 16d, Consumption of Agricultural Products
Unit: 1,000/MT
Year Rice Barley Soybean Wheat Corn Beef Pork
1960 3,126 995 174 484 74 13.0 58.0
61 3,092 1,230 148 399 70 13.3 60.0
62 3,407 1,235 185 593 52 16.8 38.0
63 3,136 1,166 166 978 107 21.1 55.1
64 3,709 1,017 165 777 84 31.9 62.5
65 3,925 1,377 163 682 -97 27.3 55.9
66 3,532 1,488 174 651 73 29.4 95.8
67 3,954 1,719 185 991 77 32.0 72.2
68 3,822 1,702 223 1,342 158 35.8 61.8
69 3,946 1,742 262 1,479 244 33.1 76.1
70 4,394 1,497 266 1,421 333 37.3 82.5
71 4,777 1,644 281 1,656 365 39.5 80.9
72 4,362 1,717 261 2,033 465 40.2 90.2
73 4,296 1,740 298 1,896 437 44.9 90.1
74 4,641 1,771 291 1,497 594 51.5 95.4
75 4,699 1,848 372 1,704 697 70.3 98.8
76 4,646 1,796 418 1,816 894 75.5 109.0
77 5,045 1,523 437 1,981 1,353 81.6 141.3
78 5,784 1,125 538 1,691 1,890 114.7 178.0
79 6,764 1,286 675 1,741 2,914 113.8 225.3
80 5,402 1,407 733 1,924 2,517 100.0 235.2
81 5,366 1,182 727 2,098 2,533 93.2 209.3
82 5,404 872 792 1,950 2,930 106.5 237.5
83 5,303 696 907 1,924 4,228 115.5 294.9
84 5,526 814 940 2,724 -3,305- 106.5 340.9
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, various issues.
Union of Livestock Cooperatives, Demand & Supply of Livestock
Products, various issues.
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Appendix 16e. Trade of Agricul tural Products
Unit: 1,000/MT
Year Import Export
Rice Barley Soybean Wheat Corn Beef Pork Rice Barley Pork
1960 - ~- 36 390 60 - - 24 --
61 - 121 22 354 56 - - 6 42-
62 - 30 16 398 36 - - 62 431 -
63 118 170 10 815 89 - - 6 42 0.2
64 - 151 9 607 64 - - 14 97 -
65 - 71 - 496 62 - - 1 7 -
66 32 - - 460 33 - - 63 437-
67 113 - 29 909 49 - -- --
68 216 106 17 1,026 131 - -- - -
69 55 67 24 1,369 174 - -- - 0.7
70 541 - 36 1,254 284 - -- - -
71 907 - 61 1,384 315 - -- --
72 584 254 31 1,778 422 0.3 -- - 3.8
73 437 350 73 1,772 456 - -- 1.8
74 206 299 66 1,427 573 - 0.3 -- 4.0
75 481 354 61 1,584 532 - 0.4 -- 8.4
76 168 - 119 1,857 890 0.7 - - - 4.6
77 - 322 151 1,979 1,370 6.4 - - - 5.0
78 - - 223 1,578 1,.791 44.4 8.6 80 - -
79 501 - 422 1,642 2,881 31.7 7.3 - - 0.3
80 580 - 417 1,810 2,234 - - - - 0.2
81 2,245 - 529 2.095 2,355 24.7 - - - -
82 269 - 535 1,940 2,814 41.5 - - --
83 216 - 724 1,861 4,167 51.0 - - - -
84 - - 694 2,648 3,223 24.0 - 135 - 0.3
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Statistics for Grain Management, various issues.
Union of Livestock Cooperatives, Deniand & Supply of Livestock Products, various issues.
Appendix 17-I Share in Total Agricultural Output Value
of Specified Products
Unit: %
Total ~~~~~Food Crops SpecialYear Total Sub-Total Rice Barley Soybean Other CerealsYF Fruits Vegetables Livestock crop/
1961 100.0 83.9 59.3 16.9 1.2 6.5 0.8 3.6 5.3 6.4
1965 100.0 64.5 38.2 12.4 2.1 11.8 2.4 9.5 11.2 12.4
1970 100.0 57.0 37.4 11.0 2.2 6.3 2.7 13.2 14.1 13.0
1975 100.0 57.5 40.1 8.8 2.8 5.8 4.2 15.2 11.3 11.8
1980 100.0 44.5 34.1 4.2 1.8 4.4 3.9 22.6 19.1 9.9
1984 100.0 43.2 35.8 3.1 1.8 2.5 5.1 14.8 27.6 9.3
Source: 11inistry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
a/ Includes pulses, potatoes and other miscellaneous cereals.
E/ Includes tobacco, ginseng, fibre crops, oil crops. coccoon, etc.
Appendix 18- Share in Total Planted Acreage
of Specified Productsa/
Unit: %
Year Total Food Crops rruits Vegetables Sps_/Year Total Sub-Total Rice Barley Soybean Other Cereal sCrrot eetbe psLCia
1961 100.0 89.6 36.9 31.4 9.5 11.8 0.7 3.8 5.9
1965 100.0 90.4 34.5 33.7 8.7 13.5 1.2 4.3 . 4.1
1970 100.0 84.8 34.6 30.9 8.6 10.7 1.7 7.2 6.3
1975 100.0 80.2 38.7 24.2 9.9 7.4 2.4 7.8 9.6
1980 100.0 71.7 44.6 13.0 6.8 7.3 3.6 13.0 11.8
1984 100.0 70.9 45.5 12.8 8.6 4.0 4.0 11.7 14.0 @
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Stat3stics Yearbook, various issues.
a/ Data does not include the planted acreage of feed crops.
E/ Includes pulses, potatoes and other miscellaneous cereals.
c/ Includes tobacco, ginseng, fibre crops, oil crops, etc.
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Appendix 19.1 Irrigation Status
Unit: 1,000 ha
Total
Year Cultivated Paddy Irrigated (C)/ (C)/
Acreage Acreage Paddy (A) (B)
(A) (B) (C) % %
1955 1,995 1,187 497 20.4 34.3
1960 2,025 1,206 499 24.6 *41.4
1965 2,256 1,286 538 23.8 41.8
1970 2,298 1,284 745 32,4 58.0
1975 2,240 1,277 790 35.3 61.9
1980 2,196 1,307 893 40.7 68.3
1984 2,152 1,320 947 44.0 71.7
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, various issues.
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Appendix 20.!Cultivated Acreage, Rural Population, Number of
Farm Households and Average Farm Size
Cultivated Rural No. of Average Average
Year Acreage Population Farm Size of Size of Farm
Households Holdings Family
(1000 ha) (1000) (1000) (ha) (Person)
1965 2,275 15,812 2,507 0.91 6.3
1970 2,295 14,432 2,483 0.93 5.8
1975 2,240 13,244 2,397 0.94 5.6
1980 2,196 10,827 2,155 1.02 5.0
1984 2,152 9.015 1,974 1.09 4.6
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, various issues.
Appendix 21. Distribution f Farm Household by Size of
Holding for Selected Years
0.5 ha 0.5 - 1.0 - 1.5 - 2.0 - 3.0 haYear Total or less 1.0 ha 1.5 ha 2.0 ha 3.0 ha or more
1965 100.0 35.8 31.6 16.5 9.3 5.6 1.2
1970 100.0 31.6 34.3 18.5 8.0 5.1 1.5
1975 100.0 30.3 36.2 18.9 8.2 4.8 1.6
1980 100.0 28.8 35.0 20.6 9.4 5.1 1.5
1984 100.0 28.8 36.8 20.3 8.4 4.4 1.2
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, various issues.
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Appendix 22.1 Farmland Acreage under Tenancy
Unit: 1,000 ha
Year Total Rented (B)/
Acreage Acreage (A)
(A) (B) %
1965 2,256 370 16.4
1970 2,317 408 17.6
1975 2,240 307 13.7
1980 2,196 461 21.3
1983 2,167 581 26.8
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Farmland Bureau, l
various issues.
Appendix 23.JLand Tenure Status for Selected Years
(By Type of Ownership)
Owner Partial FullYear Total Operator Tenant Tenant
1975 100.0 65.6 30.3 4.1
1980 100.0 55.9 39.6 4.5
1983 100.0 40.2 56.9 2.3
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Farmland Bureau;
various issutes.
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Appendix 24.t Fertilizer Productioii aL; C, .Jowion,
1965-84 (;lutrient oasis)
Year Production Consumption
Total per Ha
(1,000/MT) (1,000/MT) kg/ha
1965 75 393 118
1970 590 563 162
1975 860 886 282
1980 1,345 828 285
1984 1,394 792 281
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural
Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Appendix 25. Fertilizer Price Subsidies, 1970-84,
(Manufacturers v.s. Farmers)
Unit: 1,000 won/M/T
Gov't anlnSaeExoSubsidy Subsidy
Year* Purchas5 Costs Srceb/ Price/ Rate for d/ Rate fo
Prc~ oPricrie rc-Manufacturers-4 Farmers-
(A) (B) (C) (D) % %
1970i 24.8 2.7 23.7 16.0 55.0 (-)31.3
1971 26.7 3.4 22.9 21.4 24.8 8.8
1972 28.2 3.7 22.3 25.0 12.8 25.6
1973 31.1 3.3 24.7 34.5 (-)9.9 38.0
1974 49.3 3.9 31.6 27.3 80.6 (-)1.5
1975 78.2 6.0 51.1 37.8 106.9 (-)19.3
1976 86.0 7.2 93.8 48.6 77.0 (-)78.2
1977 93.2 8.0 87.0 55.4 68.2 (-)d2.6
1978 107.0 10.1 89.9 66.5 60.9 (-)20.0
1979 128.9 19.2 92.3 87.6 47.1 16.6
1980 191.3 20.4 123.1 145.1 31.8 29.2
1981 237.0 19.3 178.2 154.7 53.2 (-)2.7
1982 229.9 24.1 193.6 125.9 82.2 (-)34.6
1983 214.5 25.0 195.8 119.0 80.3 (-)43.5
1984 214.2 26.2 206.6 144.5 48.2 (-)24.8
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Fertilizer Division, various issues.
a/ Prices received by manufacturers.
i/ Prices paid by farmers.
c/ Fob price at the major port (evaluated at nominal exchange rate)
d/ (A/D - 1) X 100
C - B
- ~1) X100
Appendix.26. Financial Deficit in Fertilizer Account, 1975-84
Unit: Billion won
Total Total Misc Misc. Annual Accumulated
Year Sales Gov't Costs;- Revenue-/ Deficit Deficit
Proceeds Payment
1975 99.1 152.2 17.6 0.7 70.0 130.1
1976 126.5 105.6 19.3 0.5 (-)2.0 101.1
1977 144.6 130.9 19.1 2.9 2.6 103.5
1978 170.3 168.9 26.2 5.1 19.7 123.2
1979 166.9 188.1 34.2 7.1 48.3 171.5
1980 195.4 234.6 90.9 4.4 125.7 297.2
1981 290.6 359.3 99.8 6.4 162.3 459.5
1982 241.7 265.8 99.4 6.5 117.0 576.5
1983 280.6 292.5 92.5 6.7 97.7 674.2
1984 304.2 312.1 97.4 67.8 37.5 711.7
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Fertilizer Division, various issues.
a/ Includes handling, transportation costs and export subsidy.
I/ Compensation from general budget account.
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Appendix 27..j Government Purchase Price for Rice, 1969-84
Nominal Rate of Real Rate of
Year Price Increase Pricea Increase
(won/80kg) (%) (won/80kg) (%)
1969 5,150 22.6 38,148 11.7
1970 7,000 35.9 44,872 17.6
1971 8,750 25.0 49,157 9.5
1972 9,888 13.0 48,470 -1.4
1973 11,372 15.1 51,000 5.2
1974 15,760 38.5 52,533 3.0
1975 19,500 23.7 52,561 0.1
1976 23,200 19.0 50,108 -4.7
1977 26,260 12.1 48,450 -3.3
1978 30,000 15.4 42,553 -12.2
1979 36,600 22.0 45,636 7.2
1980 45,750 25.0 45,750 0.2
1981 52,160 14.0 40,560 -11.3
1982 55,970 7.3 38,787 -4.4
1983 55,970 0 35,832 -7.6
1984 57,650 3.0 38,408 7.2
.Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food Bureau, various issues.
a/ Deflated by the index of prices paid by farmers (1980=100).
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Appendix 28.!covernment Purchase Price versus
Selling Price for Rice, 1960-84
(won/80kg bag)
Purchase Selling Price Handling Loss or B/A
Year Price Price Difference Cost Gain (%)
(A) (B) (C=B-A) -(D)
1960 1,059 1,216 157 157 0 114.8
1961 1,550 1,792 242 242 0 115.6
1962 1,650 1,888 238 238 0 114.4
1963 1,060 2,312 252 251 0 112.2
1964 2,967 3,450 483 346 137 116.3
1965 3,150 3,350 200 394 -194 106.3
1966 3,306 3,900 594 446 148 118.0
1967 3,590 4,100 510 507 3 114.2
1968 4,200 5,200 1,000 496 504 123.8
1969 5,150 5,400 250 578 -328 106.2
1970 7,000 6,500 -500 664 -1,164 92.9
1971 8,750 9,500 750 738 12 108.6
1972 9,888 9,500 388 792 -1,180 96.1
1973 11,372 11,264 -108 915 -1,028 99.1
1974 15,760 13,000 -2,760 1,488 -4,248 82.5
1975 19,500 16,730 -2,770 1,996 -4,766 86.2
1976 23,200 19,500 -3,700 2,424 -6,124 84.1
1977 26,260 22,420 -3,840 3,372 -7,212 85.4
1978 30,000 26,500 3,500 5,088 8,588 88.3
1979 36,600 32,000 -4,600 7,126 -11,960 87.4
1980 45,750 44,000 -1,750 9,750 -11,500 96.2
1981 52,160 53,280 1,120 10,184 -9,064 102.1
1982 55,970 52,280 -3,690 9,358 -13,048 93.4
1983 56,970 52,280 .5,690 14,782 -16,312 93.4
1984 57,650 54,260 -3,390 16,262 -19,652 94.1
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food Bureau, various issues.
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Appendix 29. Government Purchase versus Selling Prices
for Barley, 1964-84
(won/76.5kg bag)
Purchase Selling Price Handling Lcss or B/A
Year Price Price Difference Costs Gain M
(A) (B): (C=8-A) (D) (C+D) (%
1964 1,147 1,377 230 na na 120.1
1965 2,295 2,463 168 na na 107.3
1966 2,295 2,463 168 na na 107.3
1967 2,490 2,632 142 a a 105.7
1968 2,640 2,750 110 na na 104.2
1969 3,348 2,750 -598 439 -1,037 82.1
1970 3,850 3,100 -750 548 -1,298 80.5
1971 4,890 4,300 -590 672 -1,262 87.9
1972- 6,357 4,800 -1,557 na na 75.5
1973 6,993 6,000 -933 909 -1,902 85.8
1974 6,091 8,320 -771 1,412 -3,603 91.5
1975 11,100 8,320 -2,780 1,446 -4,226 75.0
1976 13,000 9,200 -3,800 1,749 -5,549 70.8
1977 15,500 10,120 -5,380 2,462 -7,842 65.3
1978 18,500 10,120 -8,380 4,068 -12,448 54.7
1979 22,000 10,120 -11,880 9,618 -21,498 46.0
1980 26,400 17,595 -8,805 12,546 -21,350 66.0
1981 29,700 19,355 -10,345 13,691 -24,036 65.2
1982 33,780 28,000 -5,780 9,473 -15,253 82.9
1983 33,780 30,800 -2,980 10,009 -12,989 91.2
1984 39,181 .31,420 -7,761 10,490 -18,251 80.2
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food Bureau, various issues.
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Appendix 30.'G-F Deficit by Kind of Grain, 1970-84
Unit: Billion won
Year Rice Bar ~~~Other Wheat
Year -. Rice . Barley Ceel lurTotalley ~Cereals FlourToa
1970-76 57.3 108.4 (-)5.5-1/ 128.0g/ 288.2
1977 21.9 43.3 2.1 - 63.1
1978 154.0 14.5 9.4 - 159.1
1979 185.1 28.5 4.9 - 208.7
1980 140.0 106.8 5.1 - 241.7
1981 21.8i/ 126.8 4.5 - 144.1
1982 17.9S/ 115.7 3.1 - 130.5
1983 259.9 85.1 8.0 - 337.0
1984 350.2 76.2 - - 426.2
Total 1,208.2 705.3 31.6 128.0 2,073.1
Relative 58.3 34.0 1.5 6.2 100.0Share (0/) 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food Bureau, various issues.
a/ Represents profit.
E/ Price subsidy due to high international price
c/ A large portion of loss incurred in sales of domestic rice was
compensated for by profits generated by sales of imported rice.
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Appendix 3L.jLong-term Overdraft due to Grain Operation
-and Its Share in Total Money Supply, 1970-84
Unit: Billion won
Year Annual Balance Money Increase in A/B
in Overdraft Supply (M1) Money Supply
(A) (B) %
1970 0 308 56
1971 0 358 50 -
1972 36 519 161 22.4
1973 50 730 211 23.7
1974 160 946 216 74.1
1975 230 1,182 236 97.5
1976 130 1,544 362 35.9
1977 150 2,173 629 23.8
1978 154 2,714 541 28.5
1979 (-)68 3,275 561 -
1980 130 2,807 532 24.4
1981 220 3,982 175 -
1982 200 5,799 1,817 11.0
1983 250 6,783 984 25.4
1984 OW/ 7,597 814 -
----------------------------------------------------------------------- __-
Total 1,710
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food Bureau,
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
a/ GMF deficit was compensated for from the general budget account.
,Appendix .32a. Prevailing Relative Prices, 1960-84
(Producer Prices)
YEAR BARLEY, SOYBEAN BUTF PORK RICE BARIEY SOYPEAtA BEI IF PORK
----- [~~~~~~~~~~~~ICE 
-- 1-EA-~Rt_-1lAPt _-pHA
VIOOO/MT V1000/14T w1000/HT W1000/MT VlOOO/HT
19G0 0.040 0.915 4.939 3.415 212.9 137.6 194.7 1051.3 726.861 0.714 0.749 4.384 3.153 24q.4 175.3 183.7 1075.8 773.662 0.750 0.755 4.398 4.213 249.6 187.2 188.4 1097.8 1051.5
63 0.823 0.791 2.965 2.529 361.6 297.5 280.0 1072.3 914.664 0.864 0.974 2.780 2,921 3062.2 313.1 352.8 1006.9 1057.765 0.f96 1.085 4.813 3.890 282.2 190.3 306.1 1358.3 1097.906 0.G26 1.15G 5.36G 3.333 249.6 150.4 288.6 1339.6 832.167 0.657 1.395 6.245 4.099 245.3 161.1 342.2 1532.1 1005.668 0.610 0.829 6.849 5.027 260.0 158.6 215.5 1780.6 1307.069 0.573 0.730 5.920 3.358 293.0 168.2 214.5 1738.1 985.8
70 0.556 1.007 G.173 3.814 297.6 165.4 299.5 1836.9 1134.9
71 0.613 0.827 5.954 3.723 345.0 211.5 285.3 2054.3 1284.4
72 0.617 0.814 6.174 2.644 399.4 246.6 324.9 2465.7 1055.8
73 0.603 0.911 6.364 3.582 402.7 243.0 367.0 2562.6 1442.2
74 0.528 0.777 4.951 2.869 479.3 252.9 372.2 2373.2 1375.0
75 0.585 0.753 4.292 3.336 516.7 302.2 389.3 2217.7 1723.7
76 0.503 0.864 5.877 3.761 540.1 271.8 466.6 3174.3 2031.4
77 0.007 1.112 7.034 3.742 508.4 339.3 565.G 3880.6 1902.6
78 0.045 1.007 9.117 4.950G 532.5 343.2 5 6. 1 4854.3 2639.1
79 0.578 0.504 6. 905 3.063 r)5r8. 9 323.0 331.8 3893.0 1711.780 0.565 0.939 0.427 3.160 562.0 317.7 528.2 3016.0 1778.0
81 0.501 1.168 8.162 4.705 561.4 314.9 C15 .4 4581.9 2041.4
82 0.612 1.0or)r 9.554 4.505 525.9 322.0 560.7 5024.6 2369.383 0.626) 1.175 10.400 4.004 505.0 316.3 593. 1 5282.0 2021.9
84 0.G30 1.133 9.595 3.117 504.1 317.4 570.9 4836.9 1571.3
Source: Computed from Appendix 13 and 1ia.
Appendix 32b. Prevailint Relative Prices, 19G0-84
(Consumer Prices)
YEAR BARLEY SOYBEAII BEEF PORK RICE BARLEY SOYBEA!J. BEEF PORK
__-i1(-CE i---R1~iC RICE -RICE PHA .- <N _----INA PHA PlA
V1000I/HT VI000/HT w1000/1T VIOOOIMT VlOOO/HT
1960 0.6G3 0.900 6.737 3.684 246.0 163.5 221.9 161.3 908.561 0.742 0.742 6.638 3.493 276.8 205.5 205.5 1837.4 967.082 0.767 0.750 6.907 4.110 272.7 209.2 204.5 1883.5 1120.963 0.709 0.763 4.574 2.793 395.3 303.8 301.7 1808.2 1103.964 0.850 0.922 4.348 3.109 385.2 330.8 358.8 1692.3 1210.065 0.734 1.030 G.078 4.427 30G.8 225.2 310.0 1865.0 1358.366 0.704 1.154 6.615 4.566 265.0 186.5 305.7 1752.7 1209.867 0.732 1.430 7.099 4.929 259.6 190:1 371.2 1842.7 1279.468 0.600 0.842 10.000 G.021 269.0 161.5 226.4 2689.8 1619.669 0.560 0.8G0 10.090 5.360 288.0 161.3 247.7 2905.5 1543.570 0.001 1.080 10.000 4.819 301.1 181.0 325.3 3010.8 1450.8 n
71 0.641 0.963 10.053 5.529 336.4 215.5 323.8 3381.9 1860.1
72 0.547 0.884 8.331 3.986 430.2 235.4 380.4 3583.8 1714.9
73 0.568 0.956 8.668 4.618 416.9 230.7 398.6 3613.5 1925.1
74 0.455 0.908 7.686 4.084 453.8 206.4 412.2 3488.3 1853.3
75 0.476 0.857 6.980 4.764 506.9 241.3 434.5 3538.1 2414.9
76 0.4G9 1.016 8.182 5.109 536.2 251.5 544.6 4387.7 2739.9
77 0.574 1.195 9.712 4.856 531.4 305.0 635.0 5161.0 2580.5
78 0.576 t.207 9.742 5.886 514.4 29G.5 621.1 5011.1 3027.8
79 0.434 1.088 8.737 4.560 525.9 228.3 572.0 4594.9 2397.980 0.325 0.967 7.501 3.587 622.6 202.6 602.1 4670.0 2233.0
81 0.425 1.135 8.337 4.706 674.5 286.5 765.8 5623.1 3174.0
82 0.304 1.061 9.000 4.414 636.7 232.1 075.3 5730.0 2810.383 0.481 1.232 10.414 4.167 587.2 282.4 723.6 0115.8 2440.9
84 0.521 1.260 9.794 3.182 577.3 300.9 727.5 5654.0 1836.7
Source: Computed from Appendix 13 and 16b.
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Appendix.33a. Border Prices of Major Agricultural Products2/
(Producer Price Equivalent)
Year Riceb- Barl eyb/ Soybean Beef Pork
$/MT $/MT $/MT $/MT $/,'T
1960 145.2 84.3 92.6 700.0 540.0
61 130.8 52.1 109.1 750.0 520.0
62 149.6 106.6 108.7 700.0 490.0
63 149.6 99.3 108.2 710.0 440.0
64 176.7 111.3 129.1 720.0 540.0
65 170.5 81.2 122.2 740.0 470.0
66 171.4 136.9 125.4 860.0 480.0
67 192.6 144.3 125.3 900.0 500.0
68 188.6 114.0 127.6 930.0 500.0
69 205.2 104.9 108.5 1,030.0 570.0
70 203.1 130.0 116.8 1,100.0 530.0
71 160.3 102.1 144.8 1,170.0 530.0
72 147.5 99.9 137.5 1,260.0 560.0
73 269.5 164.9 227.9. 1,700.0 690.0
74 458.0 256.3 285.6 1,810.0 1,150.0
75 434.0 296.7 260.9 1,570.0 1,100.0
76 282.3 222.2 260.9 1,810.0 1,370.0
77 235.5 182.4 323.1 2,040.0 1,540.0
78 352.5 186.1 271.9 2,100.0 2,750.0
79 309.0 199.4 316.5 2,790.0 2,680.0
80 392.6 261.6 308.7 3,400.0 2,480.0
81 451.5 294.0 338.4 3,600.0 4,140.0
82 458.2 227.0 268.9 3,300.0 4,560.0
83 494.4 210.7 279.1 3,600.0 3,070.0
84 529.0 291.3 294.0 3,100.0 2,600.0
Source: The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, various issues.
Union of Livestock Cooperatives, Demand & Supply of Livestock
Products, various issues.
FAO, Trade Yearbook, various issues.
a/ CIF prices
b/ Converted from milled(brown)to polished basis, using conversion ratio of
0.93 for rice and 0.67 for barley
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Appendix 33b. Border Prices of Miajor Agricultural Products a/
(Consumer Price Equivalent)
Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
.Year #1000/MT 1000/.MT W1000/MT w1000/MT wlOOO/MT
1960 12.5 9.2 9.5 64.2 45.8
61 19.5 11.4 17.0 117.6 78.4
62 22.9 18.3 17.3 116.6 80.0
63 25.2 19.9 18.6 119.3 74.8
64 43.3 34.4 33.1 184.8 139.0
65 49.2 31.1 38.7 238.4 157.4
66 52.0 46.9 42.5 279.7 164.5
67 60.4 50.9 48.3 298.9 176.3
68 62.4 40.2 47.2 346.8 196.0
69 68.4 40.7 45.1 402.1 224.1
70 74.9 52.1 50.5 463.3 227.3
71 73.6 46.3 67.6 554.7 271.3
72 77.2 55.3 79.9 666.8 307.9
73 129.4 77.9 115.3 856.4 377.1
74 203.4 124.0 155.8 934.7 579.8
75 252.4 172.3 172.4 1010.6 715.5
76 186.9 150.1 200.4 1228.0 898.2
77 165.6 168.3 239.0 1438.0 986.4
78 239.3 189.2 242.8 1508.3 1649.0
79 251.2 200.4 312.0 1903.3 1605.9
80 415.1 348.0 364.3 2797.0 1880.5
81 553.2 479.2 467.6 3484.3 3443.1
82 591.5 370.5 463.5 3579.1 3945.7
83 601.1 319/9 448.1 4099.5 2941.4
84 708.2 398.0 558.1 3739.2 2526.9
Source: The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, various issues.
Union of Livestock Cooperatives, Demand & Supply of Livestock
Products, various issues.
FAO, Trade Yearbook, various issues.
And also see Appendix 35.
a! (Border price X Nominal exchange rate) + Handling and marketing costs
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Appendix 34a. Effect of Direct Intervention on Relative Producer Prices, 1960-84
(Evaluated at the Effective Nominal Exchange Rates, Ee) d
Year Relative 8order Prices(1000 won/MT) Direct Nominal Protection Rates(NPRO) b/
Rice/NA Barley/NA Soybean/NA Beef/NA Pork/NA Rice/NA Barley/NA Soybean/NA Beef/NA Pork/NA
1960 272.1 162.7 178.8 1352.0 1043.1 -.218 -.155 .088 -.222 -.303
61 226.4 92.9 194.7 1338.4 927.9 .084 .885 -.056 -.196 -.166
62 254.0 186.5 190.2 1225.0 857.6 -.017 .003 -.010 -.104 .277
63 288.9 197.7 215.5 1413.7 876.1 .252 .504 .327 -.242 .044
64 405.6 263.4 305.5 1703.9 1277.8 -.107 .189 .155 -.409 -.172
65 355.4 172.2 262.1 1590.3 1010.0 -.206 .125 .166 -.146 .086
66 317.0 260.9 239.0 1639.4 915.0 -.212 -.401 .207 -.183 -.091
67 337.7 253.1 219.7 1578.2 876.8 -.273 -.363 .557 -.029 .147
68 317.2 191.7 214.6 1563.9 840.9 -.180 -.172 .004 .139 .555
69 326.5 166.9 172.7 1639.2 907.1 -. 101 .008 .242 .060 .087
70 316.0 202.3 181.8 1711.8 824.7 -.058 .-.182 .648 .073 ..376
71 260.1 165.6 235.0 1898.5 860.0 .326 .277 .215 .082 .494
72 241.0 163.2 224.7 2058.7 915.0 .657 .510 .446 .198 .154
73 418.4 256.0 353.9 2639.2 1071.2 -.037 -.051 .037 -.029 .346
74 576.7 322.7 359.5 2279.0 1448.0 -.168 -.216 .036 .041 -.050
75 543.1 371.3 326.5 1964.6 1376.5 -.049 -.186 .192 .129 .252
76 538.5 368.2 323.7 1947.8 1364.7 .746 .117 .632 .601 .353
77 234.6 181.0 320.6 2024.1 1528.1 1.175 .875 .764 .918 .245
78 286.3 151.2 229.2 1705.4 2233.2 .860 1.272 1.428 1.847 .182
79 208.2 134.3 308.1 1879.7 1805.7 1.684 1.405 .557 1.071 -.052
80 235.1 168.6 199.0 3041.4 1683.7 1.223 .884 1.654 .650 .112
81 273.8 178.4 206.1 3017.3 2519.7 1.050 .766 2.193 1.098 .052
82 268.8 133.1 157.8 1936.2 2684.5 .956 1.418 2.525 1.596 .036
83 290.6 123.8 164.0 2115.6 1804.1 .738 1.554 2.617 1.497 .120
84 312.7 169.1 173.8 1832.5 1536.9 .612 .843 2.285 1.640 .022
Source: Computed from Appendix 13, 14, 32a and 33a.
a/ Ee Effective nominal exchange rate = E0 x (i+t5)
where E = Official nominal exchange rate
ts u Export subsidy rate
b/ NPR Domestic producer price/Pna Domestic producer price
0 Border price/Pna Border price
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Appendix 34b. Effect of Direct Intervention Relative Consumer Prices, 1960-84
(Evaluated at the Effective Nominal Exchange Rates, Ee) a/
Relative Border Prices(1000 won,'MT) Direct Nominal Protection Rates(NPRC) t/
Year
Rice/NA 8arley/NA Soybean/NA Beef/NA Pork/NA t; ce/NA Barley/NA Soybean/NA Beef/NA Pork/NA
1960 318.8 213.4 226.8 1612.8 1195.7 -. 227 -. 234 -. 022 .030 -. 240
61 269.9 152.2 235.8 1626.8 1090.4 .025 .351 -. 128 .129 -. 108
62 300.2 237.4 227.2 1520.8 1045.9 -. 092 -. 119 -. 100 .238 .072
63 355.2 271.3 262.8 1679.6 1061.6 .113 .120 .149 .065 .040
64 463.2 353.9 352.9 1969.6 1481.r -. 160 -. 066 .017 -. 142 -. 183
65 392.0 241.1 306.2 1883.1 1238.2 -.217 -. 065 -. 032 -. 010 .097
66 357.7 318.8 289.2 1914.6 1118.3 -. 260 -. 415 .056 -. 084 .082
67 380.9 314.2 295.0 1867.5 1091.7 -. 319 -. 397 .258 -. 013 .172
68 365.5 232.5 270.9 1986.2 1113.3 -. 264 -. 305 -. 164 .355 .455
69 366.7 212.3 232.8 2095.3 1166.4 -. 215 -. 240 .065 .387 .323
70 361.7 247.9 237.1 2184.5 1068.5 -. 168 -. 270 .371 .378 .358
71 324.1 204.5 296.9 2429.4 1172.5 .038 .054 .091 .392 .587
72 303.9 215.7 309.6 2621.4 1203.1 .415 .092 .229 .367 .424
73 488.1 294.8 434.6 3206.5 1394.6 -. 146 -. 198 -. 083 .127 .. 381
74 629.2 378.6 467.7 2826.7 1759.4 -. 279 -. 455 -. 119 .235 .054
75 636.8 434.8 428.6 2520.1 1782.2 -. 204 -. 445 .014 .403 .355
76 407.8 326.8 430.9 2672.5 1961.7 .315 -. 230 .264 .i42 .397
77 326.5 324.8 469.1 2834.4 1961.6 .629 -. 061 .353 .820 .316
78 396.2 309.7 398.6 2492.1 2741.8 .299 -. 042 .557 1.011 .104
79 340.8 269.9 420.4 2601.1 2208.5 .543 -. 154 .360 .765 .086
80 429.9 357.8 375.9 2925.0 1973.8 .448 -. 434 .602 .597 .130
81 483.9 416.8 408.0 3066.5 3044.5 .394 -. 313 .877 .833 .043
82 466.7 290.9 363.5 2835.8 3147.5 .365 -. 202 .858 1.019 -. 107
83 450.4 238.8 334.3 3075.8 2215.2 .304 .183 1.166 .989 .104
84 514.3 289.0 403.5 2720.2 1845.5 .122 .041 .802 1.078 -. 005
Source: Computed from Appendix 13, 14, 32b and 33b.
a/ Ee - Effective nominal exchange rate = Eo x (1+ts)
where E0 a Official nominal exchange rate
t' Export subsidy rate
b/ NPRC Domestic onsumer price/Pna Domestic onsumer price - 1D Consumer equiv. border price/Pna Consumer equiv. border price
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Appendix 35. Marketing Margins and Handling Costs of Major Agricultural Products
Unit: V1,866'MT
Rice Barley Soybean
Beef Pork
Year Market Handling Market Handling Market Handling
Margins Costs Margins Costs Margins Costs
1361 1.3 1.7 2.1 1.33 2.7 7.80 t@.1 11.8
61 1.9 1.7 2.3 2.6B 2.4 IC 23.3 13.4
62 1.5 2.5 I.5 2 SB 2.1 I.IC 25.6 16.3
63 S.6 3.7 2.4 4.6 2.8 l.EC 27.1 17.7
64 2.6 4.2 4.6 2 t.3 2 7c 31.4 24.a
65 t.3 2.9 4.7 2.8 3: 3.4 5 .C 41.6 32.4
66 2.4 4.5 5.4 4.4 4.7 3.8 46.6 X4.A
67 2.6 5.6 6.1 5.8 3.8 5.3 55.8 48.8
6S 3.3 6.3 2.7 5.9 7.1 4.8 93.2 57.5
69 3.1 6.3 4.8 6.5 3.4 4.5 115.5 61.3
71 4.5 7.2 6.1 5.7 3.8 4.4 121.2 62.5
71 3.# 8.3 3.6 7.2 12.4 4.8 147.6 86.5
72 16.8 3.2 7.2 8.8 28.7 5.2 171.6 87.3
73 12.2 3.9 1.9 10.4 19.7 5.3 173.8 182.5
74 8.8 11.4 3.6 11.9 34.1 7.5 211.7 119.t
75 23.7 18.6 11.2 18.5 35.1 11.1 15i.7 183.1
76 25.3 25.8 23.7 18.3 58.6 15.5 352.1 235.2
T7 21.3 31.3 57.1 22.3 61.1 22.5 456.6 241.1
78 26.5 42.2 68.3 32.2 93.7 28.5 491.9 318.8
79 38.8 63.6 51.7 53.2 137.9 28.9 553.8 388.8
83 87.7 89.1 63.5 275.7 145.3 31.6 733.2 375.1
81 123.8 121.3 65.1 164.8 188.4 48.7 1,832.7 623.8
82 123.3 127.3 25.6 173.1 221.6 45.3 1.166.8 617.4
83 188.4 117.1 32.6 123.8 176.6 55.5 1,385.9 559.1
84 97.8 184.8 32.4 130.3 263.3 51.8 1,244.6 431.3
Source: The Bank of Korea, Price Survey, various issues
Econoaic Planning Board. Annual Regort on The Price Survey, various issues
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. foodgrain Fdministration Summary, 1?77
-,JaJor idacatorsox Hgracuuturac Policies. 1385
a) Marketing margin Consumer p ice - WholesaLe price
A: Marketing margin adjusted according to the following forrul3r:
Consuaer price - (Wholesale price * Administrative price) / 2
b) Figures represent transportation costs, storing costs and other operational costs.
B: Values estimated based on the ratio (16.6a%) of margins for the period, 1366-1978
C: Values estimated based oc the ratio (6.351) of aargins for the period. 1366-1375
Appeadix 36. Estimation of Supply Elasticities and Cross-elasticities Using Simultaneous
Translog Profit Functions
Items Prices of Output Prices of Input Fixed Input
Rice Barley Pulses Fruits Livestock Other Labor Machinery Materials Land Average
Rice .506 -.094 -.020 .028 .328 .268 -.416 -.052 -.547 .999
Barley -.576 .731 .181 .366 .308 .005 -.727 .007 -.296 .447
Pulses -.432 .620 1.198 .566 1.010 .449 -.102 -.139 -.775 .843
Fruits .365 .773 .349 .456 -.844 -.083 -.334 -.271 -.411 .931
Live- 1 567 .239 .229 -.310 -.085 -.624 -.775 .067 -.307 .574
stock
Others .838 .002 .067 -.020 -.409 ..537 -.326 -.048 -.642 .668
Source: The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, The Farm Household Economy Survey, 1964-84.
The National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, Ihe Rural Price Survey, 1964-84.
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Appendix 37. Supply Elasticities Estimated by Other Researchers
Item P riod ElasticitiesItem Period Short-Run Long-Run Authors - Remarks
Rice 1956-67 .29 - NACF(1968)
1957-69 .33 - NACF(1971)
1955-70 .09-.21 .15 Ferris & Suh(1972)
1960-71 .23 .51 Seol(1972)
1961-71 .33 .53 MoonOl973)
1965-80 .57 - Huh(1982)
1970&79 .37-.52 - Braverman(1983) Cross-section
? .42 - " Time series
1964-83 .51 - Hyun(1985)
Barley 1955-70 - .85 Ferris & Suh(1972)
1961-71 .42 .52 Moon(1973)
1965-80 1.82 _ Huh(1982)
1964-83 .51 - liyun(1985) . All grain except
rice
Soybean 1955-70 - .88 Ferris & Suh(1972) Pulses
1965-80 .17 .21 Huh(1982)
1964-83 .51 - Hyun(1985) All grain except
rice
Beef 1955-70 - 1.24 Ferris & Suh(1972)
1959-78 .44 1.39 Huh(1980)
1963-83 .46 2.49 Huh(1984)
1965-83 .31 1.11 "
1969-83 .51 2.60 "
1970-83- .30 .46
1964-83 -.39 - Hyun(1985) Livestock total
Pork 1955-70 - .74 Ferris & Suh(1972)
1959-78 .61 - Huh(1980)
1965-83 .61-1.39 1.33-3.49 Huh(1984)
1969-83 1.14-1.25 4.15-7.46 "
1970-83 1.05 3.22
1964-83 -.39 - Hyun(1985) Livestock total
a/ Braverman, A., C. Y. Ahn, and J. S. Hammer(1983), Alternative Agricultural Pricing
Policies in the Republic of Korea; Their Implications for Government Deficits,
Income Distribution, and Balance of Payments, World Bank Staff Working Paper
No. 621
Ferris, J. N. and H. H. Suh(1972), An Analysis of Supply Response on Major Agri-
cultural Commodities in Korea, KASS Special Report No. 4, Korean Agricultural
Sector Study Team
Huh, S. H.(1980), Economic Analysis of the Korean Livestock Industry(Korean),
Korea Rural Economics institute
_ (1982), Agricultural Price Policy(Korean), Korea Rural Economics Insti-
tute
, et. al.(1984), Policy Development for the Stabilization of Livestock
Policies(Korean), Korea Rural Economics Institute
Hyun, K. N.(1985), An Analysis of Supply af Farm Products and Demand for Farm
inputs of Korean Farms, 1964-1983, Using Multi-Products Variable Profit
Function(Korean), Dissertation, Korea University
Moon. P. Y.(1973), Planning Foodgrain Policy: Alternative Foodgrain Policy
(Korean),.Korea Developmenlt Institute
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation(1968), "Factor Analysis of Supply
and Demand for Foodgrain and Their Price Structures"(Korean), Monthly Bulletin,
November
Seol, I. J.(1972), "Supply Response to Expected Price of Rice in Korea", Journal
of Agricultural Economics, Vol. XIV, Korean Agricultural Economics Association
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Appendix 38 Demand Elasticities Estimated by Other Researchers
Item Period Elasticities Authorsa/ RemarksPrice Income Auhr
Riice 11960-71 -1.24 .22 Saol( 1973)
1959-74 -.38 .10 Sung(1975)
1962-76 -.18 ,15 Lee(1978)
1962-78 -.72 .50 Choo(1980)
1965-80 -.23 .,22 Huh 1982)
1964-81 -.56 ,33 Lee 1984) Traditional Rice
" -.63 .02 " High Yield Rice
1970-84 -.20 -.17 Choo(1985)
? -.45 .62 Braverman, HY Rice (Urban)
? -,46 .78 Hammer & Ahn ' (Rural
7 -.53 1.00 (1985) T. Rice (Urban
?I -.50 1.00 "- (Rural)
Barley 1960-71 -.88 .17 Seal(1973)
1959-74 -.32 -.47 Sunq(1975)
1962-76 -.30 -.06 Lee(1978)
1962-78 -.79 -.49 Choo(1980)
1965-80 -.o9 -1.88 Huh 1982)
1964-81 -.50 -.20 Lee 1984
1970-84 -.15 -2.01 Choo(198 5)
7 -.15 -.20 Braverman, Urban
7 -.51 .33 Hammer & Ahn Rural
(1985)
Soybean 1959-74 -.21 1,37 sun (1975)
1962-76 -,24 .39 Lee(1978)
1962-78 -.13 .39 Choo(1980)
1965-80 -.50 .74 Huh (1982)
1964-81 -.40 .90 Lee(1984)
1970-84 -.23 .20 Choa(1985)
Beef 1959-74 -.81 .81 Sun (1975)
1962-76 -.84 1.17 Lee 1978)
1961-80 -.36 .61 Kim (1981)
1965-80 -.51 1.30 Huh (1982)
1969-80 -1.34 1.38 Cho (1982)
1965-81 -.81 1.48 Choo(1983)
1964-81 -1.27 1.39 Lee(1984)
1965-83 -.17 1.70 Huh(1984)
1965-83 -.59 1.32 Choo(1985)
Pork 1959-74 -.07 1,96 Sun (1975)
1962-76 -.31 .65 Lee(1978-)
1961-80 -.58 .48 Kim 1981)
1965-80 -1.07 1.27 Huh 1982)
1968-81 -.88 1.03 Lee 1982)
1969-80 -1.53 1.19 Cho 1982)
1965-81 -.89 .96 Choo(1983)
1964-81 -1.37 1.08 Lee (1984)
1968-83 -.53 1.05 Huh(1984)
1965-83 -.91 .71 Choo(1985)
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Footnotes to Appendix 38.
a/ Braverman, A., J. S. Hammer and C. Y. Ahn(1985), "Multi-
Market Analysis of Agricultural Prices in Korea", in
Newbery, D. and N. Stern(eds): The Theory of Taxation
for Developing Countries, Final Revision Version
Cho, S. J.(1982), "A Study on Consumption Pattern of
Livestock Products", Presenting Paper, Korean Agri-
cultural Economics Association
Choo, Y. J., et. al.(1980), A Study on Supply and Demand
for Foodgrain(Korean), Working Paper No. 9, Korea Rural
Economics Institute
(1983), "Limitation of Food Demand Estimation
and An Alternative Approach"(Korean), The Korea Rural
Economics Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, Korea Rural Economics
Institute
(1985), A Study on The Long-Run Supply and Demand
Model for Food(Korean), Working Paper No. 102, Korea
Rural Economics Institute
Huh, S. H.(1982), Agricultural Price Policy(Korean), Korea
Rural Economics Institute
, et. al.(1984), Policy Development for the Stabi-
lization of Livestock Prices(Korean), Korea Rural Econo-
mics Institute
Kim, H. H.(1981), Stabilization and Efficiency of Feed
Importation(Korean), Korea Rural Economics Institute
Lee, S. W.(1978), Model Building for Agricultural Prediction
(Korean), Working Paper No. 98, National Agricultural
Economics Research Institute
Lee, J. H., et. al.(1984), An Analysis of Food Demand in
Korea(Korean), Working Paper No. 92, Korea Rural Econo-
mics Institute
Seol, I. J., et. al.(1973), An Analysis of Supply and Demand
Structures for Rice, Working Paper No. 53, National Agri-
cultural Economics Institute
Sung, B. Y.(1975), A Comprehensive Analysis of Food Economic
Problems(Korean), Working Paper No. 73, National Agricul-
tural Economics Research Institute
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Appendix d39a.4Short-Run Effect of Direct and Indirect Price Interventions
-- -_ on Relative Producer Prices, 1960-84
Year Rice Barley Soybean Beef PorkP SR ApSR pSR APSR - APSR
R ~~B S S F PK
1960 -.339 -.284 -.080 -.343 -.411
61 -.379 .082 -.459 -.540 -.523
62 -.498 -.487 -.494 -.542 -.372
63 -.298 -.158 -.257 -.575 -.415
64 -.397 -.197 -.219 -.601 -.441
65 -.442 -.207 -.179 -.399 -.235
66 -.437 -.572 -.138 -.416 -.350
67 -.460 -.526 -.159 -.278 -.147
-68 -. 399 -. 393 -. 264 -. 165 .140
69 -.323 -.242 -.066 -.204 -.182
70 -.259 -.357 .297 -.155 .083
71 .034 -. 004 -. 053 -. 156 .166
72 .528 .395 .334 .105 .065
73 -. 059 -. 071 .015 -. 050 .317
74 -. 304 -. 344 -. 134 -. 129 -. 206
75 -. 208 -. 322 -. 007 -. 060 .043
76 .725 .095 .600 .608 .327
77 1.198 .895 .783 .938 .258
78 .954 1.073 1.217 1.599 .079
79 1.239 1.006 .298 .728 -. 209
80 .828 .549 1.183 .357 -. 086
81 .789 .541 1.787 .831 -. 082
82 .783 1.204 2.239 1.365 -. 193
83 .634 1.402 2.401 1.348 .054
84 ,536 ,756 2.130 1.515 -. 026
Source: Computed from Table 7a and Appendix 10, 11, 12 and 29.
a/ APR =NPR = I Pit E*/EooP;
where. Pi = Domestic producer price of agricultural products.
E* = Free trade equilibrium exchange rate.
Eo = Nominal exchange rate. 
Pi = Border price of agricultural products (in won).
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Appendix 3'9b.1 Effect of Price Interventions on Relative Input Prices,
1960-84
NPR0 NPRSR NPRT
Fertilizer/NA Feed/NA Fertilizer/NA Feed/NA Fertilizer/NA Feed/NA
1960 .333 .387 -.522 -.503 -.535 -.516
61 -.033 .279 -.529 - -.379 -.382 -.185
62 .923 .319 -.157 -.422 .183 -.189
63 1.098 .356 -.193 -.479 .164 -.248
64 -.160 .248 -.567 -.357 -.446 -.177
65 .251 .188 -.232 -.271 -.086 -. 133
66 .258 .279 -.246 -.234 -.145 -.131
67 -.137 .222 -.477 -.259 -.417 -.173
68 -.089 .254 -.479 -.284 -.405 -.182
6- .000 .253 -.412 -.263 -.335 -.167
70 .179 .252 -.277 -.232 -.195 -.145,
71 .070 .272 -.355 -.234 -.283 -.149
72 -.108 .185 -.349 -.135 -.338 -.121
73 -.284 .134 -.432 -.100 -.444 -.120
74 -.019 .205 -.323 -.169 -.290 -.128
75 .351 .218 -.034 -.130 .015 -. 086
76 .934 .118 .639 -.053 .607 -. 071
77 .570 .079 .390 -.045 .340 -. 080
78 .352 .086 .176 -.056 .176 -.056
79 .054 .153 -.177 -.099 -.145 -.064
80 -.152 .161 -.342 -.100 -.314 -.061
81 .152 .127 -.032 -.053 -.018 -.039
82 .538 .093 .349 -.041 .369 -.027
83 .608 .065 .461 -.032 .465 -.029
84 .396 .056 .293 -.023 .286 -.027
Source: National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, Rural Price and
Wage Survey, various issues.
FA0, Trade Yearbook, various issues.
Appendix 39c. Three-Year Moving Averages of Nominal Protection Rate (Producer Price)
NPRD 
. NPRSR NPRT
Yedr Rice/ Barley/ Soybean/ Beef/ Pork/ Rice/ Barley/ Soybean/ Beef/ Pork/ Rice/ Barley/ Soybean/ Beef/ Pork/NA .'IA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1962 .424 .797 .613 .277 .353 -. 405 -. 230 -- 344 -. 475 -. 435 -. 277 -. 051 -. 226 -. 369 -. 30463 .416 .862 .401 .033 .312 -. 392 -. 188 -. 403 -. 552 -. 437 -. 154 .121 -. 167 -. 379 -. 21564 .380 .641 .534 -. 025 .346 -. 398 -. 281 -. 323 -. 573 -. 409 -.170 -. 013 -. 072 -. 411 -. 18665 .303 .682 . .596 -. 046 .285 -. 379 -. 187 -. 218 -. 525 -. 364 -. 185 .060 .015 -. 388 -. 17866 .008 .189 .431 -.OS0 .139 -. 425 -. 325 -. 179 -. 472 -. 342 -. 308 -. 181 -. 015 -. 370 -. 21267 -. 014 -. 070 .564 .049 .247 -. 446 -. 435 -. 159 -. 364 -. 244 -. 364 -. 347 .084 -. 271 -. 13368 .032 -. 147 .547 .209 .496 -. 432 -. 497 -. 187 -. 286 -. 119 -. 357 -- 430 .038 -. 192 -. 00269 .102 .044 .596 .336 .597 -. 394 -. 387 -. 163 -. 216 -. 063 -. 316 -. 308 .062 -. 113 .05970 .136 .133 .663 .397 .716 -. 327 -. 331 -. 011 -. 175 .014 -. 242 -. 246 .112 -. 069 .14371 .359 .331 .758 .378 .697 -. 183 -. 201 .059 -. 172 .022 -. 087 -. 107 .183 -. 074 .141
72 .676 .540 .841 .433 .721 .101 .011 .193 -. 069 .105 .175 .080 .284 .000 .19473 .670 .523 .563 .374 .688 .168 .107 .099 -. 034 .183 .208 .145 .134 -. 003 .22274 .433 .346 .457 .327 .426 .055 -. 007 .072 -. 025 .059 .068 .005 .086 -. 011 .06875 .102 .024 .309 .259 .425 -.190 - .246 -. 042 -. 080 .051 -. 172 -.230 -.018 - .056 .07376 .379 .064 .511 .477 .392 .071 -. 190 .153 .140 .055 .080 -. 176 .174 .147 .07777 .870 .460 .763 .785 .482 .572 .223 .459 .495 .209 .543 .203 .444 .464 .20378 1.150 .937 1.149 1.341 .408 .959 .688 .867 1.048 .221 .832 .657 .835 1.001 .19879 1.432 1.362 1.073 1.461 .223 1.130 .991 .766 1.088 .043 1.049 .995 .762 1.087 .03880 1.392 1.317 1.342 1.316 .144 1.007 .876 .899 .895 -. 072 .978 .925 .947 .937 -. 04881 1.454 1.136 1.602 1.049 .096 .952 .699 1.089 .639 -. 126 1.017 .755 1.151 .690 -. 097
62 1.178 1.119 2.272 1.213 .118 .800 .765 1.736 .851 -. 120 .843 .805 1.797 .891 -. 09883 .987 1.329 2.574 1.487 .109 .735 1.049 2.142 1.181 -. 074 .754 1.069 2.174 1.204 -. 06484 .826 1.346 2.587 1.660 .093 .651 1.121 2.257 1.409 -. 055 .659 1.130 2.270 1.419 -. 051
Source: Table 8-2, 10-2 and Appendix 39a.
Appendix 39d. Three-Year Moving Averages of Nominal Protection Rates (Consumer Price, Input Price)
(Consumer Price) (Input Price)
NPRC I4PRC NPRNR NPR1Year N T D TRice/ Barley/ Soybean/ Beef/ Pork/ Rice/ Barley/ Soybean/ Beef/ Pork/ Fert./ Feed/ Fert./ Feed/ Fert./ Feed/NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA liA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1961 .244 .283 .271 *.561 .256 -. 270 -. 137 -.251 -. 074 -. 267 .408 .328 -. 403 - -. 435 -. 245 -. 29762 .234 .311 .188 -.377 .214 -. 161 -. 014 -. 193 -. 055 -. 176 .662 .318 -. 293 -. 427 -. 012 -. 20763 .196 .193 .283 .307 .214 -. 188 -. 129 -. 124 -. 103 -. 168 .620 .308 -. 306 -. 419 -. 033 -. 20564 .14i .205 .329 .212 .219 -. 200 -. 082 -. 058 -. 142 -. 127 .39C .264 -. 331 -. 369 -. 123 -. 18665 -. 063 -. 054 .220 .085 .167 -. 318 -. 256 -. 092 -. 193 -. 121 .116 .238 -. 348 -. 287 -. 226 -. 14766 ,-.145 -. 196 .280 .115 .283 -.374 -. 373 -. 025 -. 167 -.025 .124 .230 -. 318 -. 255 -. 216 -. 14667 -. 137 -. 256 .231 .290 .456 -. 385 -. 453 -. 079 -. 056 .. 085 .011 .252 -. 401 -. 259 -. 322 -. 16268 -. 100 -. 175 .247 .493 .572 -. 365 -. 394 -. 059 .100 .172 -A75 .243 -. 456 -. .64 -. 386 -. 17469 -. 028 -. 115 .311 .658 .658 -. 309 -. 348 -. 011 .237 .247 .030 .253 -. 389 -. 260 -. 312 -. 16570 .092 .033 .417 .677 .712 -. 209 -. 234 .073 .259 .300 .083 .259 -. 348 -. 243 -. 271 -. 15471 .334 .161 .478 .666 .747 .012 -. 113 .144 .279 .357 .047 .236 -. 327 -. 200 -. 272 -. 13872 .331 .185 .290 .557 .741 -. 160 -. 077 .017 .218 .384 -. 107 .197 .197 -. 379 -. 355 -. 13073 .193 -. 033 .185 .471 .515 -. 260 -. 231 -. 046 .169 .214 -. 137 .175 -. 368 -. 135 -. 357 -. 12374 -. 071 -. 255 .080 .451 .457 -. 471 -. 413 -. 130 .159 .171 .016 .186 -. 263 -. 133 -. 240 -. 11175 .077 -. 291 .181 .614 .437 -. 124 -. 423 -. 016 .327 .178 .422 .180 .094 -. 117 .111 -. 09576 .386 -. 168 .335 .800 .512 .188 -. 283 .154 .543, .286 .618 .138 .332 -. 076 .3'21 -. 07977 .532 -. 052 .489 .966 .387 .355 -.144 .339 .747 .217 .619 .094 .402 -. 051 .374 -. 06978 .578 -. 046 .494 .974 .249 .409 -. 125 .359 .754. .091 .325 .106 .130 -. 067 .124 -. 06779 .483 -. 188 .552 .866- .160 .329 -.249 .421 .642 .000 -. 085 .133 -. 114 -. 085 -. 094 -. 06080 .510 -. 282 .658 .803 .137 .359 -. 335 .520 .575 -. 027 .018 .147 -. 184 -. 084 -. 159 -. 05581 .441 -. 302 .820 ;878 .063 .319 -. 344 .694 .681 .072 .179 .127 -. 008 -. 065 .012 -. 04282 .384 .029 1.001 .998 .044 .291 -. 140 .896 .839 -.055 .433 .095 .259 -. 042 .272 -. 03283 .288 .023 .969 1.073 .024 .. 217 -. 024 .890 .945 -.053 .514 .071 .368 -. 032 .373 -. 02884 .234 .129 1.059 1.071 .074 .170 .077 .931 .956 .002 - - - , _ 
_ _
Source: Table 8'-2, 10'-2 and Appendix 39b.
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Appendix 40a. Direct Short-Run Effect on Foreign Exchange Earnings by Coamditya/
Unit: million
US dollars
Rice Barley Soybearv Beef Pork
Year Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total
1960
61
62 59.2 -. 5 58.7 28.5 -. 7 27.8 3.2 -. 0 3.2 2.8 .0 2.8 4.4 -2.6 1.8
63 73.6 -. 6 73.0 15.5 -. 4 15.1 2.4 -. 0 2.4 2.1 .0 2.1 3.5 -2.0 1.5
64 74.4 -1.0 73.4 25.8 -1.0 24.8 3.9 -. 0 3.8 1.4 .0 1.4 5.9 -1.9 4.0
65 38.2 -. 6 37.6 27.7 -1.0 26.7 3.9 -. 0 3.9 -. 7 .0 -. 7 4.2 -1.9 2.3
66 -6.4 -. 0 -6.4 17.7 -. 4 17.3 3.8 -. 0 3.7 -2.6 . .0 -2.6 4.8 -1.5 3.3
67 -2.7 .0 -2.7 -15.2 .3 -14.8 4.9 -. 1 4.8 -. 9 .0 -. 9 7.0 -2.6 4.4
68 3.8 -. 1 3.7 -16.4 .5 -15.9 6.4 -. 1 6.3 4.7 -. 1 4.6 10.0 -4.5 5.5
69 32.6 -. 3 32.4 1.3 -. 2 1.1 6.3 -. 1 6.2 8.2 -. 1 8.1 15.4 -5.5 9.9
70 52.2 -. 3 51.9 5.9 -. 3 5.6 8.2 -. 1 8.1 9.9 -*3 9.6 18.0 -8.4 9.6
71 128.9 -. 7 128.2 4.6 -. 6 4.0 11.4 -. 1 11.4 10.5 -.4 10.1 18.6 -9.1 9.5
72 147.1 -1.2 145.8 17.9 -1.0 16.9 9.1 -. 1 9.0 7.6 -.4 7.2 22.4 -7.9 14.5
73 267.9 -1.8 266.1 24.7 -1.2 23.5 12.1 -. 1 12.0 13.6 -. 6 13.0 23.5 -13.0 10.4
74 258.8 -1.1 Z57.6 36.1 -. 8 35.3 13.7 -. 1 13.6 18.1 -. 9 17.2 28.8 -13.2 15.6
75 245.6 -. 4 245.2 -54.9 -. 1 -5S.0 11.5 -. 1 11.4 34.5 -. 9 33.6 26.4 -14.9 11.5
76 395.5 -1.5 394.0 -81.1 .2 -80.9 18.3 -. 1 18.2 63.4 -1.6 61.8 32.9 -13.7 19.2
77 557.0 -4.1 552.8 -37.2 -. 6 -37.8 35.5 -. 2 35.4 120.4 -2.2 118.2 43 1 -18.4 24.8
78 1,026.5 -6.0 1,020.5 24.4 -2.4 22.0 38.9 -. 3 38.6 195.3 -3.5 191.8 6U.5 -20.6 39.9
79 683.8 -8.9 674.9 60.4 -4.8 55.6 53.5 -. 3 53.2 256.7 -5.4 251.3 16.1 -17.9 -1.8
80 1,010.9 -7.3 1,003.6 -4.7 -3.5 -8.2 64.5 -. 5 64.0 292.4 -7.9 284.5 -9.9 -13.8 -23.7
81 1,289.0 -10.2 1,278.8 -11.8 -3.2 8.6 92.7 -. 6 92.1 277.Z -5.0 272.2 -62.1 -6.3 -68.4
82 939.8 -6.8 933.0 30.5 -2.0 28.5 97.3 -. 5 96.8 313.5 -3.4 310.1 -82.1 -8.3 -90.4
83 848.4 -5.6 842.7. 48.0 -2.2 45.8 108.8 -. 5 108.3 414.0 -5.6 408.4 -79.8 -12.6 -92.4
84 733.7 -6.0 727.7 72.5 -2.5 70.0 132.6 -. 6 132.0 353.4 -8.3 345.1 -70.2 -13.2 -83.4
Source: Rural Development Administration, Standard Incomes of Crops and Livestock, various issues.
Also see Table 13a, 13e and Appendix-33a.
Direct short-run effect on foreign exchange gain or loss of price interventions for each
product was measured by:
^ E (&Q1 &Di) pI -; ps
where &E1 * Gain in foreign exchange earnings
-Q; Change in output in the absence of short-run direct price Interventions
A0 - Change in consumption in the absence of direct price interventions
Ali Change in the use of tradable inputs to produce i In the absence of
short-run direct price interventions
PBI Border price of product i in U.S. dollars
P - Border price of input in U.S. dollars
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Appendix 40b. Direct Cunulative Effect on Foreign Exchange Earnings by Commidit a/
Unit: million
US dcllars
Year Rice Barlev Soybean Beef Pork
Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total
1960
61
.62 59.2 -. 5 58.7 28.5 -.7 27.8 3.2 -.0 3.2 2.8 .0 2.8 4.4 -2.6 1.8
63 97.2 -. 8 96.4 23.9 -. 6 23.3 3.9 -. 0 3.9 2.8 .0 2.8 5.3 -3.1 2.2
64 117.0 -1.7 115.3 54.0 -2.0 52.0 5.8 -. 1 5.7 2.2 .0 2.2 9.2 -3.2 6.0
65 78.8 -1.1 77.7 52.7 -2.0 50.7 6.2 -. 1 6.1 -. 7 .0 -. 7 7.5 -3.8 3.7
66 43.2 -. 6 42.6 87.8 -1.9 85.8 6.8 -. 1 6.7 -2.6 .0 -2.6 12.0 -7.1 4.9
67 22.7 -. 3 22.4. 60.9 -1.7 59.2 8.8 -. 1 8.6 -. 9 .0 -. 9 11.0 -5.2 5.8
68 13.2 -. 2 13.0 33.1 -1.1 32.0 11.9 -. 2 11.7 4.7 -. 1 4.7 12.5 -6.1 6.4
69 42.1 -. 4 41.7 23.8 -. 9 22.9 11.0 -. 2 10.8 9.3 -. 1 9.2 21.1 -8.2 12.9
70 65.4 -. 4 65.0 28.1 -. 8 27.3 13.7 -. 2 13.5 13.2 -. 6 12.6 24.4 -12.4 12.0
71 141.9 -. 8 141.0 19.3 -1.0 18.3 18.2 -. 2 18.0 14.1 -.8 13.3 27.6 -15.0 12.6
72 170.4 -1.5 168.8 36.3 -1.S 34.8 15.8 -. 2 1S.6 12.6 -. 7 11.9 33.0 -13.3 19.7
73 351.7 -2.6 349.1 64.3 -2.2 62.1 26.7 -. 3 26.4 22.1 -1.4 20.7 37.3 -22.7 14.6
74 469.9 -2.3 467.6 117.1 -2.0 115.2 38.0 -. 3 37.7 29.0 -2.2 26.8 S8.7 -31.2 27.5
75 441.8 -1.S 440.3 98.8 -1.9 96.9 34.2 -. 3 33.9 47.1 -2.7 44.4 55.0 -33.2 21.8
76 474.8 -2.4 472.4 19.3 -1.9 17.4 37.0 -. 3 36.7 76.0 -2.9 73.1 69.9 -30.4 39.5
77 627.6 -5.2 622.4 -16.1 -1.2 -17.2 57.2 -. 4 56.8 134.6 -3.4 131.2 89.3 -34.6 54.7
78 1,184.8 -7.9 1,176.9 54.2 -3.4 50.8 53.8 -.S 53.3 212.1 -5.0 207.1 159.5 -41.7 117.8
79 796,7 -11.9 784.8 102.1 -6.6 95.5 71.2 -. 6 70.6 290.2 -8.1 282.1 163.5 -57.4 105.1
80 1,183.3 -10.6 1,172.7 36.9 -5.3 31.6 78.4 -. 8 77.6 353.6 -14.0 339.6 124.0 -63.4 60.6
81 1,587.0 -14.9 1,572.1 77.0 -5.5 71.5 112.0 -1.0 111.0 331.2 -10.0 321.2 103.5 -42.1 61.4
82 1,300.4 -11.0 1,289.4 78.5 -3.7 74.8 110.2. -. 7 109.5 349.8 -6.2 343.6 68.4 -31.2 37.2
83 1,258.2 -9.7 1,248.6 94.2 -3.8 90.4 123.1 -. 7 122.4 457.2 -9.4 447.8 24.6 -41.0 -16.5
84 1,177.0 -10.8 1,166.2 138.4 -4.4 133.9 151.4 -. 9 150.5 406.1 -13.6 392.5 15.6 -40.5 -24.9
Source: Rural Development Administration, Standard Incomes of Crops and Livestock, various issues.
Also see Table 13b, 13e and Appendix 33a.
a/ Direct cumulative effect on foreign exchange gain or loss of price interventions for each
product was measured by:
b-EI (AQj AD!) p B . A'; P3
where A E1 a Gain in foreign exchange earnings
* Change in output In the absence of direct price interventions
&0D * Change in consumption in the absence of direct price interventions
&II Change in the use of tradable inputs to produce I in the absence
of direct price interventions
- Border price of product I in U.S. dollars
P Border price of input in U.S. dollars
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Appendix 40c. Total Short-Run Effect on Foreign Exchange Earnings by Commodit a/
Unit: million
US dollars
Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
Year Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total
196Z -63.3 .4 -62.9 12.2 -.0 12.2 -1.8 .0 -1.8 -.7 .1 -.6 -5.4 2.9 -2.5
63 -43.5 .2 -43.3 10.1 -. 1 10.0 -. 3 .0 -. 3 -1.4 .1 -1.4 -3.5 1.7 -1.8
64 -67.5 .5 -67.0 8.0 0 8.0 .3 .0 .3 -3.6 .1 -3.5 -3.8 1.3 -2.5
65 -71.3 .4 -70.9 14.0 -. 2 13.7 -. 1 -. 0 -. 1 -3.7 .1 -3.6 -2.4 1.4 -1.0
66 -96.5 .7 -95.8 1.9 .2 2.2 .3 -. 0 .2 -5.2 .1 -5.0 -4.8 4.5 -. 3
67 -112.7 1.0 -111.6 -23.2 .9 -22.4 .6 -. 0 .6 -4.5 .1 -4.4 -1.5 1.6 .1
68 -101.8 .8 -101.0 -24.1 1.0 -23.0 .9 -. 0 .9 -2.8 .1 -2.7 2.0 -. 6 1.4
69 -113.1 .9 -112.2 -7.9 .5 -7.4 1.2 -. 0 1.2 1.0 .0 1.1 4.6 -1.4 3.2
70 -81.8 .6 -81.3 -8.7 .3 -8.4. 3.4 -. 0 3.3 .0 .1 .1 6.9 -3.0 3.9
71 3.7 .2 3.9 -6.5 .0 -6.5 3.8 -. 0 3.7 .0 .1 .1 8.0 3.5 4.5
72 1.6 -. 4 1.3 22.0 -. 4 21.6 3.2 -. 0 3.1 -2.5 .0 -2.5 11.2 -3.7 7.5
73 10.8 -. 6 10.2 43.5 -. 7 42.8 3.0 -. 0 2.9 1.7 .0 1.7 11.7 -6.8 5.0
74 -129.2 -. 2 -129.4 67.9 -. 3 67.6 2.6 -. 0 2.5 3.6 .0 3.6 9.2 -4.2 5.0
75 -25.6 .6 -25.0 -72.7 .4 -72.3 1.0 -. 0 1.0 15.7 .2 15.9 7.7 -5.0 2.7
76 205.8 -0.4 205.4 -104.9 1.0 -103.9 7.6 -. 0 7.5 43.4 -. 6 42.9 9.6 -5.0 4.6
77 391.2 -2.8 388.4 -41.8 -. 2 -41.9 22.9 -. 1 22.8 95.9 -1.4 94.5 20.0 -10.8 9.3
78 779.7 -4.6 775.1 12.1 -1.7 10.4 - 28.8 -. 2 28.6 163.8 -2.8 161.0 19.3 -12.9 6.3
79 529.2 -7.0 522.2 48.3 -4.0 44.3 40.2 -. 3 39.9 214.8 -4.3 210.6 -32.2 -5.7 -37.9
80 778.5 -5.6 772.9 1.3 -3.3 -2.0 49.4 -. 4 49.0 238.0 -6.2 231.8 -64.5 4.6 -59.9
81 1,009.6 -7.8 1.001.7 2.9 -2.6 .4 75.5 -. 5 75.0 205.2 -3.3 201.9 -120.1 10.8 -109.3
82 806.0 -5.2 800.7 18.4 -1.7 16.8 84.7 -. 4 84.3 283.8 -2.8 281.0 -200.6 9.7 -190.9
83 686.7 -4.5 682.2 40.9 -1.9 39.0 98.0 -. 4 97.5 378.0 -4.7 373.3 -159.6 9.2 -150.4
84 598.3 -5.0 593.3 63.8 -2.2 61.6 114.7 -.6 114.1 325.5 -7.4 318.1 -140.4 8.3 -132.1
Source: Rural Oevelopment Adminstration, Standard Incomes of Crops and Livestock, various issues.
Also see Table 13c. 13f and Appendix-33a.
a/ Total short-run effect on foreign exchange gain or loss of price interventions for each
product was measured by:
AEt X (&Qj -AO') P8 - I* PsI I i II
where A E1 *Gain in foreign exchange earnings
* Change in output in the absence of short-run direct and indirect
price interventions
A0° * Change in consumption in the absence of direct and indirect price
interventions
AIl Change in the use of tradable inputs to produce I in the absence
of short-run direct and indirect price interventions
p1 * Border price of product I in U.S. dollars
PB Border price of Input in U.S. dollars
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Appendix 40d. Total Cumulative Effect on Foreign Exchange Earnings by Commodity a/
Unit: million
US dollars
Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork
Year Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total Output Input Total
1960
61
62 -63.3 .4 -62.9 10.2 -. 0 10.2 -1.8 .0 -1.8 -. 7 .1 -. 6 -5.4 2.9 -2.5
63 -66.7 .5 -66.2 10.1 -. 1 10.0 -1.0 .0 -1.0 -2.8 .2 -2.6 -6.6 3.7 -2.9
64 -97.2 1.0 -96.2 13.7 -. 2 13.5 -2.1 .0 -2.1 -6.5 .2 -6.3 -9.2 3.4 -5.8
65 -98.0 .7 -97.3 16.3 -. 3 16.0 -1.5 .0 -1.5 -7.4 .3 -7.1 -7.1 4.1 -3.0
66 -131.5 1.2 -130.3 10.8 .0 10.8 -. 4 .0 -. 4 -10.3 .4 -9.9 -13.4 11.2 -2.2
67 -167.0 1.8 -165.2 -29.7 1.1 -28.6 .4 -. 0 .4 -10.8 .4 -10.4 -8.5 6.2 -2.3
68 -162.6 1.6 -161.0 -64.9 2.3 -62.6 1.5 -. 0 -1.5 -8.4 .3 -8.1 -2.5 2.2 -. 3
69 -203.4 1.9 -201.5 -70.6 2.5 -68.1 2.2 -. 0 2.2 -3.1 .2 -2.9 2.3 -. 3 2.0
70 -161.1 1.3 -159.8 -85.9 2.1 -83.8 3.9 -. 1 3.8 -3.3 .4 -2.9 7.4 -3.3 4.1
71 -45.4 .8 -44.6 -55.0 1.3 -53.7 6.4 -. 1 6.3 -3.5 .4 -3.1 10.6 -5.2 5.4
72 -21.8 -. 0 -21.8 -9.4 .5 -8.9 6.2 -. 1 6.1 -5.0 .2 -4.8 15.7 -5.9 9.8
73 13.2 -. 6 12.6 23.7 -. 2 23.5 10.3 -. 1 10.2 .0 .2 .2 18.6 -11.6 7.0
74 -75.1 -. 5 -75.6 68.9 -. 3 68.6 15.1 -. 1 15.0 1.8 .2 2.0 26.5 -14.6 11.9
75 21.7 .3 21.4 -52.5 .2 -52.3 12.8 -. 1 12.7 14.1 .4 14.5 23.1 -14.9 8.2
76 188.6 -. 2 188.4 -112.0 1.1 -110.9 16.2 -. 1 16.1 39.8 -. 2 39.6 27.4 -13.0 14.4
77 396.1 -2.9 393.2 -51.3 .1 -51.2 33.0 -. 2 32.8 97.9 -1.5 96.4 41.6 -18.4 23.2
78 872.1 -5.7 866.4 13.2 -1.7 11.5 37.0 -. 3 36.7 172.2 -3.5 168.7 74.3 -24.7 49.6
79 618.2 -9.4 608.8 72.4 -5.0 67.4 52.9 -. 5 52.4 239.9 -6.3 233.6 61.6 -30.8 30.8
80 928.9 -8.4 920.5 25.6 -4.3 21.3 60.8 -. 6 60.2 289.0 -11.3 277.7 12.4 -23.9 -11.5
81 1,271.9-11.9 1,260.0 60.9 -4.6 56.3 92.4 -. 8 91.6 252.0 -7.7 244.3 -49.7 -4.5 -54.2
82 1,113.0 -8.8 1,104.2 62.1 -3.2 58.9 96.3 -. 6 95.7 320.1 -5.7 314.4 -187.0 7.6 -179.3
83 1,024.4 -7.9 1,016.5 83.6 -3.4 80.2 111.1 -. 6 110.5 417.6 -8.1 409.5 -187.3 16.8 -170.5
84 965.4 -8.9 956.6 126.7 -4.0 122.7 132.3 -. 9 131.4 372.0 -12.0 360.0 -176.8 19.8 -157.0
Source: Rural Development Administration, Standard Incomes of Crops and Livestock, various issues.
Also see Table 13d, 13f and Appendix 35a.
a/ Total cumulative effect on foreign exchange gain or loss of price interventions for each
product was measured by:
1 ( Q p - i - BIt P8
where AE 1 - Giln in foreign exchange earnings
&Q! X Change in output in the absence of direct and indirect price interventions
A* - Change in consumption in the absence of direct and indirect price
1 interventions
Al* Change in the use of tradable inputs to produce i in the absence
of direct and indirect price interventions
B * Border price of product i in U.S. dollarsP1
B Border price of input in U.S. dollars
Appeddix 41. Subsidies on Main Foodcrop
Per Unit Subsidy on Foodcrop Total Subsidy Total TariffYear Prodacer Subsidy Consumer Subsidy bn Foodcrop on Importe' Grain
Rice Barley Rice Barley
441000/MT W1000/MT 441000/MT WI1000/MT Billion won Billion won
1970 10.4 13.4 4.2 3.6 2.8 o.5
71 0.0 12.1 0.0 4.4 0.0 2.3
72 9.8 25.6 5.0 5.2 2.2 5.6
73 7.0 18.1 5.7 5.9 25.1 9.0
74 43.8 19.3 9.3 9.2 125.0 13.3
75 47.1 45.8 12.5 9.5 ' 90.6 19.0
76 61.4 61.1 15.2 11.4 20.8 13.5
77 69.1 86.4 21.2 16.1 37.9 15.1
78 75.6 136.4 31.8 26.6 113.3 14.5
79 192.0 219.4 44.5 64.2 142.5 29.880 82.8 197.1 60.9 82.0 121.9 38.4
81 42.7 224.7 56.7 89.5 12.4 47.9
82 104.7 137.4 58.5 61.9 
-6.2 34.1
83 138.5 104.4 92.4 65.4 141.3 48.3
84 144.0 170.0 101.6 68.6 207.2 61.7
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food Bureau, various issues.Office of Customs Admilnistration, Statiistical Yearbook of ForeignTra~de, various issues.
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Appendix 42. Revenue and Expenditures due to Agricul tural Pricing Pol icy
Unit: Billion won
Revenue Expenditures
Net
Year Profits from Imported Price Subsicy Expenditures
Tarif f eat Misc. ProductsI Total GrainD' Fertilizertc/ Machinery Livestock Total
1970 0.5 0. 5 2.8 4.2 1.4 - 8.4 7.9
71 2.3 t-)0.4 1.9 0.0 6.0 - - 6.0 4.1
72 5.6 - t-)0.3 5.3 2.2 9.8 _ - 12.0 6.7
73 9.0 - (-)o.5 8.5 25.1 13.0 _ _ 13.0 4.5
74 13.3 _ (-)0.2 13.1 125.1 30.1 - , 155.1 142.0
75 19.0 - - 19.0 90.6 63.5 0.5 - 154.6 135.6
76 13.5 - (-)0.1 13.4 20.8 -11.1 - 0.3 10.0 -3.4
77 15.1 1.6 (-)0.3 16.4 37.9 -0.3 0.1 1.1 28.8 22.4
78 14.5 53.1 (-)0.5 67.1 113.3 9.8 1.7 0.9 125.7 58.6
79 29.8 30.0 3.1 62.9 142.5 33.4 0.9 1.7 178.5 115.6
80 38.4 10.6 35.4 84.4 121.9 85.9 1.3 1.5 210.6 126.2
81 47.9 43.3 19.9 111.4 12.4 102.3 2.1 5.0 121.8, 10.7
82 34.1 86.6 24.5 145.2 -6.2 55.5 - 3.4 52.7 -92.5
83 48.3 73.7 27.5 149.2 141.3 33.6 _ 2.5 177.4 27.9
84 61.7 30.4 28.9 120.4 207.2 39.4 - 3.1 249.7 129.3
Source: The Office of Customs Administration, Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade, various issues.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
The Economic Planning Board, The Summary of Government Budget, various issues.
The Union of Livestock Cooperatives, Livestock Products Demand and Supply, 1985.
The National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, Fertilizer Yearbook, various issues.
a/ Negative figures represent loss in sales.
E/ Represents the total deficit in grain operation due to producer and consumer subsidies,
but excludes interest payments on the long-term draft of funds from the Bank of Korea
and on the short-term grain bonds.
c/ Represents the total deficit in the Fertilizer Account due to price subsidies for farmers
and manufacturers, but excludes interest payments on the long-term draft of funds from the
Bank of Korea.
Appendix 43. Actual Interest Rates and Implicit Subsidy Rates
by Major Category of Agricultural Credit, 1962-84
(Unit: X)
Actual Interest Rate Inflation Reference Implicit Subsidy Rate_
Year Short-Term Intermediate-Term Irrigation-Loan Rate Nominal Rate Short-Term Intermediate-Term Irrigation-Loan
1962 15.0 9.0 3.5 8.8 19.7 4.7 10.7 16.263 15.0 9.0 3.5 20.5 32.3 17.3 23.3 28.864 15.0 9.0 3.5 35.1 48.6 33.6 39.6 45.165 15.0 9.0 3.5 10.3 21.3 6.3 12.3 17.866 15.0 9.0 3.5 8.6 19.5 4.5 10.5 16.0
67 15.0 9.0 3.5 6.5 17.2 2.2 8.2 13.768 15.0 9.0 3.5, 8.1 18.9 3.9 9.9 15.469 15.0 9.0 3.5 6.9 17.6 2.6 8.6 14.170 15.0 9.0 3.5 9.4 20.0 5.0 11.0 16:5 !71 15.0 9.0 3.5 8.6 19.5 4.5 10.5 16.0 c72 13.8 9.0 3.5 13.8 25.2 11.4 16.2 21.773 12.0 9.0 3.5 6.9 17.6 5.6 8.6 14.1
74 12.0 9.0 5.0 42.1 56.3 44.3 47.3 51.3
75 12.0 9.0 5.0 26.5 39.2 27.2 30.2 34.2
76 12.4 9.2 5.0 12.2 23.4 11.0 14.2 18.4
77 13.0 10.2 5.0 9.0 19.9 6.9 9.7 14.9
78 13.0 10.5 5.0 11.6 22.8 9.8 12.3 17.8
79 14.8 11.5 5.0 18.8 30.7 15.9 19.2 25.780 15.0 12.5 5.0 38.9 52.8 37.8 40.3 47.881 15.0 17.9 5.0 20.4 32.4 17.4 14.5 27.482 11.7 16.3 5.0 4.7 15.2 3.5 (-)1.1 10.283 10.0 12.0 5.0 .2 10.2 .2 (-)1.8 5.284 10.0 10.0 5.0 .7 10.8 .8 .8 5.8
Source: flational Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, Agricultural Cooperatives Yearbook, various issues.
The Bank of Korea, The Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
a/ Reference rominal interest rate - (1 + rt) (1 + ITt) - 1 b/ limplicit subisdy rate = reference nominal
where: r*t = Real reference interest rate in the absence of subsidy where: i Actual nominal interest rate
Irt a Inflation rate charged
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Appendix 44.l Transfer to Agriculture (Implicit Credit Subsidy)
Unit: billion won
Lbql-Term
Year Short-Term Intermediate T rm Irrigation Total Credit
/ Subsidy SubsdC/Balance Subsidy Sub- Balan-Subsidy Sub- SubsidyBalance Ratiob/ ubsi dy_ a Ratio sidy ce Ratio sidy
1962 9.9 .047 .5 0.4 .107 - 6.1 .162 1.0 1.5
63 9.5 .173 1.6 1.0 .233 .2 6.6 .288 1.9 3.7
64 10.3 .336 3.5 1.0 .396 .4 7.0 .451 3.2 7.1
65 12.1 .063 .8 1.6 .123 .2 7.6 .178 1.4 2.4
66 12.0 .045 .5 3.4 .105 .4 6.3 .160 1.0 1.9
67 14.2 .022 .3 3.7 .082 .3 6.7 .137 .9 1.5
68 16.2 .039 S.6 5.1 .099 .5 7.9 .154 1.2 2.3
69 18.7 .026 .5 11.4 .086 1.0 9.6 .141 1.4 2.9
70 22.1 .050 1.1 30.5 .110 3.4 11.5 .165 1.9 6.4
71 25.5 .045 1.1 38.1 .105 4.0 13.7 .160 2.2 7.3
72 31.8 .114 3.6 44.7 .162 7.2 11.8 .217 2.6 13.4
73 44.0 .056 2.5 52.9 .086 4.5 14.1 .141 2.0 9.0
74 45.1 .443 20.0 60.0 .473 28.4 16.0 .513 8.2 56.6
75 92.4 .272 25.1 79.8 .302 24.1 17.9 .342 6.1 55.3
76 84.5 .110 9.3 113.4 .142 16.1 22.7 .184 4.2 29.6
77 105.2 .069 7.3 148.7 .097 14.4 29.6 .149 4.4 26.1
78 138.5 .098 13.6 190.7 .123 23.5 40.4 .178 7.2 44.3
79 124.0 .159 19.7 357.2 .192 68.6 47.3 .257 12.2 100.5
80 133.9 .378 50.6 529.5 .403 213.4 61.6 .478 29.4 293.4
81 253.3 .174 44.1 670.8 .145 97.3 74.8 .274 20.5 161.9
82 274.5 .035 9.6 715.8 (-).011 (c-7.9 95.3 .102 9.7 11.4
83 298.6 .002 .6 987.0 (-X.018 (-)17.8 125.5 .052 6.5 (-X10.7
84 366.1 .008 2.9 1,211.5 .008 9.7 154.1 .058. 8.9 21.5
Source: National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, Agricultural Cooperatives
Yearbook, various issues.
a/ Outstanding balance at the year-beginning
b/ Subsidy ratio = (1 + r*) (1 + Tt) - (1 + it)
c/ Amount of subsidy = balance X subsidy ratio
- 280 -
'Appendix 45a. Direct and Total Nominal Transfers due ta Output Price and Input Price Interventions
out of (-) and into (+) Aqricuiture (in biions units o Korean currenc of 1980
Transfers on Output Prices a
Year Rice Bc- ey Soybean Beef Pork All Products
Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1962 114.1 -969.0 36.6 -257.7 4.2 -38.0 1.1 -28.5 22.5 -47.9 178.5 -1341.1
63 685.9 -729.4 223.5 30.6 23.5 20.0 2.5 -36.4 20.0 -43.5 955.4 -758.7
64 219.1 -1100.0 147.3 -118.2 20.9 20.9 -10.2 -55.3 5.5 -60.9 382.6 -1313.5
65 -108.8 -944.0 73.6 -96.8 15.2 15.2 -.9 -29.6 12.0 -24.0 -8.9 -1079.Z
66 -50.7 -1318.6 -124.3 -550.7 17.1 21.4 -1.3 -48.9 7.1 -80.7 -152.1 -1977.5
67 -131.2 -1005.8 -85.7 -367.5 40.9 9.1 9.7 -26.6 26.0 -18.8 -140.3 -1409.6
68 50.3 -739.8 18.7 -231.6 14.6 -26.9 24.9 -18.9 49.7 8.8 158.2 -1008.4
69 187.5 -764.6 75.5 -123.4 22.4 -6.3 18.1 -20.4 26.0 -24.0 329.5 -938.7
70 231.4 -528.3 14.3 -182.5 42.2 16.1 21.4 -17.3 47.1 5.4 356.4 -706.6
71 663.6 .0 139.1 -13.8 25.3 6.3 25.9 -20.4 61.3 14.2 915.2 -13.7
72 892.2 552.7 202.8 110.2 3S.7 17.7 36.3 7.0 33.9 3.5 1200.9 691.1
73 156.2 -184.6 56.2 -44.2 21.6 2.1 20.5 -11.6 57.2 30.8 311.7 * -207.5
74 15.0 -1113.0 -19.9 -217.1 25.8 , -24.9 17.4 -24.9 18.3 -42.4 56.6 -1422.3
75 434.5 -729.2 -28.8 -268.1 33.8 -4.9 37.4 -15.0 58.2 1.8 535.1 -1015.4
76 1395.2 1104.0 106.0 28.6 63.3 48.2 107.5 80.6 85.0 53.0 1757.0 1314.4
77 1765.2 1603.0 142.5 125.4 87.8 76.0 157.1 139.0 82.4 55.6 2235.0 1999.0
78 1432.0 1207.9 255.4 228.0 90.7 82.0 227.4 210.4 83.6 33.2 2089.1 1761.5
79 1996.8 1698.1 293.3 241.1 33.5 19.4 182.9 140.8 4.4 -99.6 2510.9 1999.8
80 1150.2 899.5 128.9 91.4 73.6 61.8 144.3 88.4 64.4 -39.0 1561.1 1102.1
81 1457.5 1171.2 119.1 87.5 113.6 102.7 165.4 134.3 -125.6 -61.7 1730.0 1434.0
82 1380.6 1172.6 145.0 130.1 95.0 89.5 195.7 177.7 -47.6 -142.7 1768.7 1427.2
83 1203.0 1053.1 161.6 151.0 99.1 95.2 215.4 200.7 -17.9 24.8 1661.2 1524.8
84 1248.6 991.2 122.0 109.7 103.1 97.5 281.8 267.1 24.8 -21.6 1680.3 1443.9
Appendix..45-. Con d.
Transfers on Purchased Inputs All Producf and Sum of Transers
Year Fertilizer Feed CreditW/ All Inputs Input Prices GOPA
Direct Total Direct Total Direct lotal Oirect Total Oirect TOtal
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (11)+(18) (12)+(19) (*) (S)
1962 -21.0 9.6 -7.5 23.1 21.1 -7.4 46.4 171.3 -1287.3 9.6 .72.1
63 -16.4 7.5 -6.6 23.2 43.5 20.6 74.2 975.9 -684.5 39.1 -27.4
64 -.3 48.1 -6.6 18.2 64.5 57.5 130.8 440.2 -1182.7 15.0 -40.2
65 -15.1 19.2 -5.3 12.1 19.2 -1.2 50.5 -17.3 -1028.7 -.7 -44.4
66 -13.6 22.3 -9.6 15.4 13.6 -9.6 51.3 -161.5 -1928.7 -6.6 -79.4
67 8.6 54.0 -8.0 15.3 9.7 10.3 79.0 -129.8 -1330.7 -5.5 -56.6
68 4.4 48.4 -10.4 20.3 13.5 7.5 82.2 165.6 -926.2 6.5 -36.2
69 -3.1 35.6 -9.3 16.6 15.1 2.7 67.3 332.2 -871.3 11.4 -29.9
70 -10.5 20.7 -11.0 16.2 28.7 7.2 65.6 363.7 -640.9 12.1 -21.3
71 -9.9 28.2 -13.4 19.3 28.9 5.6 76.4 890.7 62.7 26.9 1.9
72 5.7 26.8 -9.2 9.2 47.3 44.9 83.4 1244.7 784.2 34.5 21.7
73 26.9 51.8 -9.2 8.6 30.8 48.5 91.2 360.2 -116.3 10.3 -3.3
74 1.9 35.5 -13.0 15.2 156.8 145.6 207.5 212.1 -1205.9 4.4 -25.1
75 -26.1 3.5 -17.3 14.2 122.3 79.0 140.0 614.0 -875.4 12.0 -17.1
76 -56.0 -45.3 -13.6 6.9 56.8 -12.8 18.4 1744.3 1323.8 29.9 22.7
77 -40.8 -31.8 -11.1 7.3 45.5 -6.4 21.0 2228.6 2019.9 35.9 32.5
78 -43.2 -32.0 -17.4 13.1 67.4 6.8 48.5 2095.9 1810.1 31.0 26.8
79 -7.9 19.5 -27.4 22.0 129.3 94.1 i70.9 2604.7 2170.4 38.9 32.4
80 15.7 49.7 -29.8 23.8 293.4 279.3 366.9 1840.4 1431.6 37.9 29.5
81 -16.1 4.4 -21.1 10.6 134.3 97.1 149.3 1827.0 1585.2 33.1 28.7
82 -32.2 -23.7 -22.4 11.1 8.8 -45.9 -3.8 1722.8 1423.5 31.9 26.4
83 -40.6 -34.7 -18.2 8.8 -8.0 -66.8 -33.9 1595.0 1491.6 28.8 26.9
84 -34.5 -28.5 -14.8 6.7 15.6 -33.6 -6.2 1646.7 1437.7 27.3 23.3
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, various issues
_____________________________The cost of Production Survey, various issues
National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, The Rural Price and Wage Survey, varlous issues
, Fertilizer Yearbook, various issues
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation, Oemand and Supply of Livestock Products, various issues.
Economic Planning 8oard, The Summary of Government Budget, various issues
The Bank of Korea, The Price Survey, various issues
, fhe Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues
FAO, Trade Yearbook, various issues
S/ All figures were deflated by CPI(1980ClO0.0)
Direct and total transfers calculated by:
Direct transfer a (PA PA) QA
Total transfer (P A - PA) QA
where PA - Domestic producer price of product A
PA * Border price of product A evaluated at the nominal exchange rate Eo
PI * Border price of product A evaluated at the free trade equilibrium exchange rate E*
QA ' Output of Product A
g/ Agricultural credit subsidy calculated by:
St a CJ(1+r*)(l+i1 ) - (1+it)]
where St a Amount of credit subsidy
Ct* Credit allocated to agriculture
r* - Real reference interest rate in the absence of subsidy(1O%)
rt * Inflation rate
it a Actual nominal interest rate charged
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AppendLx .45b.Direct and Total Nominal Transfers due to Value-Added and Non-Allocatable Input Price Interventions
out of(-) and into(+) Agriculture (in billions units of Korean currency of 1980)
Transfers on Value-Added
Year Rice Barley Soybean Beef Pork All Products
Oirect Total Oirect Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1962 101.1 -965.2 28.2 -254.9 3.5 -37.7 0.1 .- 25.2 16.1 -28.1 154.0 -1311.1
.63 677.6 -725.3 218.0 32.4 22.9 20.3 1.3 -32.2 14.6 -24.7 934.4 -729.3
64 219.1 -1078.8 147.3 -104.3 20.9 22.6 -11.5 -51.6 0.2 -46.4 376.0 -1258.5
65 -114.4 -937.6 70.4 -92.0 14.6 16.0 -2.2 -26.7. 0.8 -14.8 -30.8 -1055.1
66 -55.7 -1309.3 -127.9 -545.0 16.6 22.3 -3.2 -46.3 -0.5 -70.1 -170.7 -1948.4
67 -127.9 -984.4 -83.1 -352.6 41.2 11.0 7.7 -22.7 20.1 -7.5 -142.0 -1356.2
68 50.0 -719.9 19.9 -215.8 14.9 -24.1 21.8 -13.0 42.4 23.2 151.0 -949.6
69 185.9 -745.3 74.5 -112.5 22.2 -4.5 15.5 -15.7 19.3 -12.1 317.4 -890.1
70 226.5 -517.9 11.7 -175.8 44.7 17.5 18.4 -12.9 39.1 17.2 340.4 -671.9
71 629.2 15.0 136.4 -5.5 24.8 7.7 22.3 -15.2 51.4 28.3 864.1 30.3
72 896.5 572.4 205.3 122.6 36.0 19.4 33.2 10.1 27.8 9.6 1198.8 734.1
73 172.6 -153.1 64.4 -28.1 23.3 5.5 17.5 -9.2 51.0 37.0 328.8 -147.9
74 16.1 -1088.9 -19.4 -207.2 26.0 -22.2 23.3 -19.9 9.4 -32.1 55.4 -1370.3
75 420.6 -727.4 -36.1 -267.0 32.3 -4.6 32.1 -10.8 46.2 11.7 495.1 -998.1
76 1365.8 1080.2 93.5 18.6 60.3 45.7 102.9 82.9 76.0 57.6 1698.5 1285.0
77 1741.3 1584.3 137.1 121.3 84.7 73.5 153.3 141.6 75.1 * 60.3 2191.5 1981.0
78 1408.4 1190.4 246.5 221.5 88.1 80.1 222.4 214.2 71.2 42.5 2036.7 1748.7
79 1991.6 1710.9 291.2 246.1 33.2 20.2 174.5 147.7 -14.7 -84.6 2475.8 2040.3
80 1157.0 920.9 131.1 98.3 74.5 64.5 135.6 95.4 43.0 -22.2 1541.2 1156.9
81 1449.5 1173.4 117.2 88.0 112.5 103.0 158.9 137.5 -140.3 -52.6 1697.8 1449.3
82 1359.6 1157.2 140.3 126.6 92.8 87.9 190.7 180.2 -65.0 -134.0 1718.4 1417.9
83 1179.0 1032.6 156.0 146.2 96.6 93.1 211.4 203.0 -31.4 32.0 1611.6 1506.9
84 1129.3 975.3 117.7 106.2 101.0 95.7 277.5 269.1 14.4 -16.9 1639.9 1429.4
.AppeudL 4 45b. Coar. I d
Transfers on Purchased Inputs Not Allocatable Suar of Transfers on All Sum of Transfers as a
Year Other Inputs All Inputs Product and Input Prices Share of GOPA
Credit
Direct Total Oirect Total Direct Total Direct Total
(13) (14) (IS)1_T_ (16) (1I7)- (M11)+(16) (12)+(17) (I.) (I.)
1962 -3.8 2.7 21.1 17.3 23.8 171.3 -1287.3 9.6 -72.1
63 -2.0 1.3 43.5 41.5 44.8 975.9 -684.5 39.1 -27.4
64 -0.3 11.3 64.5 54.2 75.8 440.2 -1182.7 15.0 -40.2
65 -5.7 7.2 19.2 13.5 26.4 . -17.3 -1028.7 -0.7 -44.4
66 -4.4 *6.4 13.6 9.2 20.0 -161.5 -1928.4 -6.6 -79.4
67 2.5 15.8 9.7 12.2 25.5 -129.8 -1330.7 -5.5 -56.6
68 1.1 9.9 13.5 14.6 23.4 165.6 -926.2 6.5 -36.2
69 -0.3 3.7 15.1 14.8 18.8 332.2 -871.3 11.4 -29.9
70 -5.4 2.3 28.7 23.3 31.0 363.7 -640.9 12.1 -21.3
71 -2.3 3.5 28.9 26.6 32.4 890.7 62.7 26.9 1.9
72 -1.4 2.8 47.3 45.9 50.1 1244.7 784.2 34.5 21.7
73 0.6 0.8 30.8 31.4 31.6 360.2 -116.3 10.3 -3.3
74 -0.1 7.6 156.8 156.7 164.4 212.1 -1205.9 4.4 -25.1
75 -3.4 0.4 122.3 118.9 122.7 614.0 -875.4 12.0 -17.1
76 -11.0 -18.0 56.8 45.8 38.8 1744.3 1323.8 29.9 22.7
77 -8.4 -6.6 45.5 37.1 38.9 2228.6 2019.9 35.9 32.5
78 -8.2 -6.0 67.4 59.2 61.4 2095.9 1810.1 31.0 26.q
79 -0.4 0.8 129.3 128.9 130.1 2604.7 2170.4 38.9 32.4
80 5.8 -18.7 293.4 299.2 274.7 1840.4 1431.6 37.9 29.5
81 -5.1 1.6 134.3 129.2 135.9 1827.0 1585.2 33.1 28.7
82 -4.4 -3.2 8.8 4.4 5.6 1722.8 1423.5 31.9 26.4
83 -8.6 -7.3 -8.0 -16.6 -15.3 1595.0 1491.6 28.8 26.9
84 -8.8 -7.3 15.6 6.8 8.3 1646.7 1437.7 27.3 23.9
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, various issues
The Cost of Production Survey, various issues
National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, The Rural Price and Wage Survey, various issues
, Fertilizer Yearbook, various issues
National Livestock Coopeiatives Federation, Demand and Supply of Livestock Products, various issues
Economic Planning Board, The Sumiary of Government Budget, various issues
The Bank of Korea, The Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues
, The Price Survey, various issues
FAO, Trade Yearbook, various issues
a/ All figures were deflated by CPI (1980 * 100.0)
Direct and total transfers on value-added estimated by:
Direct transfer - (VAA - VAA)QA
Total transfer * (VAA - YAA)QA
where VAA a PA - r;aAjPi
VAA ' Pi - zaAjPi
VAA * PA - ZaAjPi
P a Price of purchased input j paid by farmers
Pi a Border price of purchased input j evaluated at official exchange rate Eo
Pt a Border price of purchased input j evaluated at free trade equilibrium exchange rate E*
QA a Output of product A ,
*Aj a Technical coefficient
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Appeu4dix .45c. Nominal Transfers into(+)/ out of(-) Agriculture
(in billions of units of Korean currency of 1980)
Non-Price Transfers Price-Related Total of Price- Total as a
Year Transfers Related &Non- Share ofTax & Misc. Public Research & Others Price Transfers GOPA
Charges Investment Extension Others Sub-Total Direct Total Direct Total Oirc Tota
(1). -727- -- 3T-- (4i- -7-S (6) (7) .(5)#(6) (5)+(77 =0).(
1962 !50.7 97.2 5.6 - 52.1 171.3 -1287.3 223.4 -1235.2 12.5 -69.2
63 -55.3 52.9 5.9 - 3.5 975.9 -684.5 979.4 -681.0 39.3 -27.3
64 -60.9 34.5 6.4 - -20.0 440.2 -1182.7 420.2 -1202.7 14.3 -40.9
65 -61.6 48.8 6.4 - -6.4 '-17.3 -1028.7 -23.7 -1035.1 -1.0 -44.7
66 -60.7 94.3 7.1 - 40.7 -161.5 -1928.4 -120.8 -1887.7 -5.0 -77.7
67 -44.2 79.2 7.1 - 42.2 -129.8 -1330.7 -87.6 -1288.5 -3.7 -54.8
68 -45.6 145.0 8.8 - 108.2 165.6 -926.2 273.8 -818.0 10.7 -32.0
69 -57.3 218.8 10.4 - 171.9 332.2 -871.3 504.1 -699.4 17.3 -24.0
70 -36.8 211.7 7.6 - 182.5 363.7 -640.9 546.2 -458.4 18.1 -15.2
71 -40.3 221.3 19.8 6.7 207.5 890.7 62.7 1098.2 270.2 33.2 8.2
72 -37.1 207.4 13.8 39.2 223.3 1244.7 784.2 1468.0 1007.5 40.6 27.9
73 -53.8 196.9 12.3 26.4 181.8 360.2 -116.3 542.0 65.5 15.5 1.9
74 -57.6 195.6 13.9 38.5 190.3 212.1 -1205.9 402.4 -1015.6 8-.4 -21.2
75 -66.8 269.0 12.6 39.6 254.4 614.0 -875.4 868.4 -621.0 17.0 -12.2
76 -87.5 318.2 18.6 49.1 298.5 1744.3 1323.8 2042.8 .1622.3 35.1 27.8
77 -107.3 319.2 18.6 60.3 290.8 2228.6 2019.9 2519.4 2310.7 40.6 37.2
78 -107.0 358.8 19.8 57.7 329.2 2095.9 1810.1 2425.1 2139.3 35.9 31.6
79 -130.4 397.7 21.8 88.7 377.7 2604.7 2170.4 2982.4 2548.1 44.5 38.0
80 -131.2 348.5 18.7 68.7 304.7 1840.4 1431.6 2145.1 1736.3 44.2 35.8
81 -117.4 458.1 17.2 75.4 433.4 1827.0 1585.2 2260.4 2018.6 41.0 36.6
82 -110.8 429.0 19.0 55.3 392.5 1722.8 1423.5 2115.3 1816.0 39.2 33.7
83 -115.2 398.7 20.3 183.3 487.1 1595.0 1491.6 2082.1 1978.7 37.5 35.7
84 -117.2 431.8 19.1 179.5 513.2 1646.7 1437.7 2159.9 1950.9 35.8 32.4
Source: Economic Planning Board, The Sunmary of Government Budget, various issues
Consumer Price Statistics, various issues
And also see Appendix 45a, 45b and 46.
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Appendix 46.1 Consumer Price Index
(1980 actual price = 100)
Food Part of CPI Non-Food Part of CPI Consumer Price Index
Year Actual Oirect Total Actual & Direct Total Actual Direct Total
CPIA CPIA CPI* CPINA CPI*A CPI CPI' CPI*
1960 4.7 4.3 5.3 7.7 7.5 6.1 6.3 6.6
61 5.1 4.9 6.0 8.3 10.9 6.6 6.9 8.9
62 5.5 5.4 6.9 8.7 12.2 7.1 7.3 10.0
63 7.3 6.5 8.4 9.5 13.7 8.5 8.3 11.5
64 10.0 9.8 12.0 11.8 15.1 11.0 11.0 13.8
65 10.8 11.0 12.7 14.2 16.9 12.5 12.9 15.2
66 11.6 11.9 13.8 17.0 19.3 14.0 14.9 17.0
67 12.5 12.9 15.0 19.0 21.2 15.4 16.5 18.7
68 13.8 13.6 16.1 21.1 24.1 17.1 18.0 20.8
69 16.0 15.6 18.2 23.1 26.1 19.2 20.0 22.8
70 19.4 18.7 21.2 25.6 28.5 22.3 22.8 25.5
71 23.1 21.3 23.7 27.4 30.9 25.3 24.9 27.9
72 26.2 22.6 24.1 30.2 31.0 28.3 27.1 28.2
73 26.9 26.7 28.5 31.4 31.0 29.2 29.5 30.0
74 34.3 34.3 39.3 38.0 40.4 36.1 36.S 39.9
75 45.2 45.3 50.4 45.1 47.4 45.2 45.2 48.6
76 53.3 47.0 48.6 51.1 50.1 52.1 49.4 49.5
77 59.5 50.5 51.5 55.6 53.6 57.4 53.5 52.8
78 69.4 62.8 64.6 62.5 62.5 65.7 62.6 63.4
79 79.0 68.9 72.0 76.6 79.7 77.7 73.4 76.5
80 100.0 86.8 91.7 100.0 104.3 100.0 94.6 99.1
81 127.5 111.3 115.7 117.0 118.7 121.3 114.7 117.5
82 130.7 114.3 117.8 129.7 131.6 130.1 123.4 125.9
83 132.4 116.2 118.7 136.0 136.3 134.5 127.9 129.1
84 134.4 123.9 126.0 139.8 139.1 137.6 133.3 133.7
Source: Economic Planning Board, Consumer Price Statistics Summary, various issues.
and Also Table 6, Appendix 11 and 12.
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Notes: CPIA =£("Ai P~Ai
CPIA = 'Ai Ai pT
CPIAAPNA = E*/E NA + ( 10) pN
l+na
CPI = (A CPIA + (1 -AA) CPINA
CPI* = OiA CPIA + '(1 -OA) CPIN*A
where CPIA = Food part of CPI in the absence of direct price interventions
CPI* a Food part of CPI in the absence of direct and indirect price
A interventions
CPI*A = Non-food part of CPI in the absence of direct and indirect
price interventions
CPI' = Consumer price index in the absence of direct price
interventions
CPI* = Consumer price index in the absence of direct and indirect
price interventions
= Share of food in the tctal consumption expenditures
= Share of tradable part of PNA
pAi = Price of agricultural product i in the absence of direct
price interventions
P*j = Price of agricultural product i in the absence of direct
Ai and indirect price interventions
t = Effect of trade taxes on PT
na =NA
PNTA = Index of prices of tradable part of PNANA N
p NT = Index of prices of nontradable part of PN
NA N
.Appendix 47a. AbSOlute Clha1nge of Real Income in Rural Area due to Direct Price Ititerveoit(ri
Unit: 1,P80 won in 1980 price
Instantaneous Effect Short-Run Effect Cumulative Effect
Small-Scale Medium-Scale Large-Scale Small-Scale Medium-Scale Large-Scale Small-Scale Medium-Scale Large-Scale
Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers
(0.5ha or (0.5-1.5ha) (1.5ha or (0.5ha or (0.5-1.5ha) (1.5ha or (0.5ha or (0.5-1.Sha) (1.5ha or
less) more) less) more) less) more)
1962 73.9 169.7 348.8 91.9 286.7 430.7 64.1 132.7 246.7
63 51.1 127.6 296.7 71.1 174.5 394.3 81.1 195.5 435.3
64 88.8 208.2 451.8 111.1 260.5 575.4 128.6 299.8 656.3
65 79.8 153.9 313.3 94.9 184.7 390.8 167.6 218.5 465.2
66 28.8 42.8 42.9 31.5 48.2 55.4 57.3 99.9 174.6
67 11.9 14.1 8.9 8.8 12.9 14.9 34.4 68.4 85.9
68 5.5 24.8 47.5 46.2 133.1 333,3 52.4 68.9 125.7
69 37.4 93.4 188.1 44.6 111.6 241.9 53.8 129.8 278.9 0
70 48.1 99.0 202.4 51.5 125.6 282.2 61.5 145.2 328.3
71 81.1 240.8 484.6 183.6 295.4 615.2 109.1 312.5 648.6
7'2 103.8 355.6 695.2 135.6 440.7 885.8 120.1 585.6 1,004.5
73 191.5 462.5 1,086.7 115.0 527.9 1,193.1 237.9 573.8 1,288.0
74 226.6 476.8 964.2 249.4 543.2 1,122.0 279.5 610.8 1,261.2
75 98.5 185.4 323.4 102.6 -215.8 413.6 158.4 348.8 653.8
76 69.3 263.1 556.5 162.1 345.3 775.9 138.6 444.7 921.2
77 149.8 76.8 1,316.6 266.5 885.5 2,139.7 210.4 738.7 1,761.8
78 380.4 838.4 1,851.5 357.0 992.9 2,257.4 348.3 987.9 2,272.1
79 289.9 869.0 1,846.8 337.9 983.3 2,100.9 344.5 994.4 2,142.3
80 252.8 735.8 1,556.9 284.6 819.7 1,741.6 275.8 797.2 1,732.1
81 241.5 878.9 1,925.1 276.2 974.6 2,161.9 262.3 941.2 2,141.7
82 299.1 925.8 1,838.4 349.3 1,051.8 2,174.5 315.2 1,012.9 2,152.7
83 484.6 798.6 1,694.4 468.8 917.3 2,047.9 439.7 842.1 2,808.8
84 436.1 915.1 1,788.2 495.5 1,654.1 2,845.6 412.8 1,039.A 2,142.8
Appendix 47b.Absolute Change, of Real Income in Rural Area due to Total Price Intervention
Unit: 1,000 won in 1980 prices
Instantaneous Effect Short-Run Effect Cumulative Effect
Year Small-Scale Medium-Scale Large-Scale Small-Scale Medium-Scale Large-Scale Small-Scale Medium-Scale Large-ScaleFarmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers(0.5ha or (0.5-1.5ha) (1.5ha or (0.5ha or (0.5ha or (1.5ha or (0.5ha or (0.5-1.Sha) (1.5ha or
less) more) less) more) less) more)
1)62 70.4 25.1 -90.6 59.3 -17.8 -198.7 59.3 -17.8 -189.7
63 78.6 14.5 -42.7 71.9 -6.3 -94.4 61.1 -33.0 -155.0
64 5.9 -153.7 -494.9 -10.2 -197.1 -583.2 -19.3 -226.4 -656.865 4.4 -105.3 -374.7 -6.7 -133.6 -448.4 -17.7 -164.5 -524.766 -33.6 -199.5 -539.7 -61.0 -268.8 -700.4 -78.8 -312.6 -793.6
67 -129.4 -270.6 -656.5 -99.9 -349.4 -806.3 -122.2 -405.4 -930.968 -60.0 -247.7 -637.7 -104.1 -345.8 -846.9 -149.2 -441.6 -1,045.069 -32.6 -198.3 -425.9 -63.7 -274.7 -711.9 -117.6 -390.5 -938.6 X
70 38.1 3.9 -25.3 -25.9 -165.0 -432.6 
-78.3 -271.6 -628.0 X
71 27.5 -19.9 -79.1 20.9 -31.5 -106.5 -17.2 -117.n -260.9
72 31.6 116.3 264.4 48.5 157.9 340.5 31.3 121.0 276.873 82.3 171.7 355.6 102.0 ?18.2 454.0 100.4 215.9 456.674 222.7 373.8 682.7 247.0 432.5 813.9 241.0 417.0 773.575 59.3 -8.6 -148.9 37.9 -65.4 -271.5 51.0 -30.8 -201.3
76 -55.8 -55.7 -44.2 -57.5 -52.8 -22.4 -56.6 -53.8 -26.177 6G.0 378.4 983.2 107.1 485.6 1,224.4 111.1 498.6 1,249.278 292.5 801.9 1,817.3 340.4 922.0 2,079.2 356.0 957.9 2,154.579 340.2 889.6 1,825.9 382.5 977.7 2,032.3 403.5 1,022.4 2,116.980 293.3 699.7 1,454.5 323.6 770.6 1,602.0 349.2 826.2 1,709.881 227.9 741.3 1,663.2 257.8 825.1 1,752.0 287.6 904.0 1,929.382 246.6 750.6 1,573.3 278.7 843.0 1,769.9 316.3 935.7 1,949.783 321.3 657.3 1,496.0 361.8 745.7 1,705.6 393.5 812.5 1,862.384 366.3 792.9 1,539.7 
- 404.9 939.7 1,770.0 428.0 989.1 1,944.3
Appendix 48. Migration of Agricultural Labor Force-
Natural Growth Rate of Simple-Average Annual -____d_______
Growth Rate Share of Labor Force Agri. Labor Forcehb/ Migratiogns Rate of Migration-
Period of
Labor Force Agriculture Non-Agri. a=l a=1/4 a=1/3 a=1/2 a=1 a=1/4 a=1/3 a=1/2 a=1 a=1/4 a=1/3 a=1/2
(N) (Q1) (Q2) (NIA) (NIB) (NIC) (N1D) (MA) (MB) (MC) (MD) MRA MRB MRC MRD
1960-64 .118 .621 .379 .118 .143 .139 .133 38.4 68.5 64.5 57.0 .0077 .0138 .0130 .0115
1965-69 .171 .569 .431 .171 .219 .204 .195 158.2 208.4 192.8 183.0 .0309 .0407 .0377 .0358
1970-74 .222 .502 .498 .222 .273 .266 .254 130.5 184.4 177.2 163.8 .0237 .0334 .0321 .0297 ,
1975-79 .181 .425 .575 .181 .222 .216 .206 279.6 326.4 320.2 308.6 .0500 .0583 .0572 .0551 x0
1980-84 .051 .322 .678 .051 .061 .059 .057 338.5 349.2 347.8 345.2 .0719 .0741 .0738 .0733
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Economic Planning Board, Labor Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
a/ The methodology to obtain the migration series was developed by Y. Mundlak's Intersectoral Factor Mobility and
Agricultural Growth, IFPRI Research Report No.6, Feb. 1979.
Nl = N / [1 - (1 - a) Q1Q2], i = A, B, C, and D.
where a = N2YN1 when the entire labor force is assumed to be in agriculture.
c/ M1 = t [ (1 + Nlj) LF10 - LFt], i = A, B, C, and D.
where LFI is agricultural labor force.
d/ MR1 =M1 / [ (LFIO + LFlt)/2], i = A, B, C, and D.
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Appendix 49.1 Determination Procedures of Rice Purchase
Price, Selected Years 1965-80
Unit: won/80kg bag
Purchase Rate
Crop Information Criteria Purchase of In-
Year Referred to (won) Adopted (won) (wone) crease
1965 1. Agricultural parity ratio 1. International -3,150 4.9
(1960=100) 2,987 price 3,000
2. Production cost 2,325 2. Incentive
3. International price 3,000 bonus 150
1970 1. Agricultural parity ratio
(1965=100) 5,881 1. Agricultural 7,000 35.9
1965-69 increases in: parity ratio 5,881
2. WPI 5,562 2. Incentive
3. CPI 5,738 bonus 1,119
4. PPFI 5,881
5. Rice farm price 5,675
1975 1. Agricultural parity ratio
(1975=100) 18,354 1. Increases in: 19,500 23.7
1974-75 increases in: WPI - 18,329
2. Price of non-food Agricultural
items 17,646 parity ratio 18,354
3. WPI 18,329 2. Incentive
4. PPFI 17,998 bonus 1,150
5. Agricultural supply
prices 17,982
1980 1. Agricultural parity ratio
(.1977=100) 51,399 Increase in 45,750 25.0
2. Increase in GNP wholesale price
deflator 1977/1978 44,100 of rice
1979-80 increases in:
3. WPI 49,739
4. CPI 47,617
S. Wholesale price
of rice 45,530
6. Production cost 43,920
Source: Minist--y of ASL,riculture and iislieries, Food Bureau,
various issues.
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Appendix 50.! Government Share in Rice Marketing and Rate
of Seasonal Price Variations, 1960-84
Unit: 1,000 MT
Goverment Rate of
Rice Total Government Governme t Government Price
Year Production_/ Purchasea/ a esal Share Variationc/
1960 3,149 198 76 5.4 25.2
1961 3,046 141 20 - 25.0
1962 3,463 309 94 - 24.0
1963 3,015 278 264 22.2 23.2
1964 3,758 224 74 5.4 21.4
1965 3,954 240 94 5.0 18.3
1966 3,501 302 217 12.2 15.1
1967 3,919 355 285 13.5 11.7
1968 3,603 286 442 21.7 9.0
1969 3,195 156 681 30.4 7.6
1970 4,090 326 749 29.6 6.7
1971 3,939 365 1,181 44.3 6.7
1972 3,998 517 589 29.5 6.5
1973 3,957 507 606 30.3 2.3
1974 4,212 480 972 46.3 7.5
1975 4,445 735 553 24.6 4.4
1976 4,669 789 848 39.1 9.0
1977 5,215 1,043 606 23.2 4.4
1978 6,006 1,404 1,183 39.4 8;3
1979 5,797 1,355 1,683 49.5 4.2
1980 4,565 1,301 1,742 50.0 7.8
1981 3,551 546 1,560 41.3 8.0
1982 5,063 915 694 36.7 6.5
1983 5,175 1,091 911 33.6 5.2
1984 5,404 1,219 832 32.1 3.8
Source: Computed from Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Yearbook of Agricul-
ture and Fisheries Statistics, various issues.
a/ Production and acquisition of the previous year.
b/ Excludes rice sold to the armed forces and other government institutions,
but includes imported rice.
c/ (highest monthly price) - (lowest monthly p;ice) X 100
(annual average price)
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Appendix Figure 1
Nominal Protection Rates of Rice
Produce Pr Iices
Total
t.1 1X44 IM r 2 1984 O9
I .o .... _._-
- 294 -
Appendix Figure 2
Nominal Protection Rates of Barley
Producer Prices
Direct Total|
2.S
2.0S- /
'S.5
1i64 1318 1972 1X76 1960 1964
Year i
l1
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Appendix Figure 3
Nominal Protection Rates of Soybean
Produce* Prices
1 D~~~~ir-ct Total
a.t 
t~~~~~~~~~~~~
0.5
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I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I! _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I
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Appendix Figure 4
Nominal Protection Rates of BeeF
Producer Prices
Dirtti Total
i ___ ._
I a
1 3.0'- I 
* -0.5i
r -l. t
I 1"44 17976 19S0 19O4
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Appendix Figure 5
Nominal Protection Rates of Pork
Producer Prtc.s
Direct Total
2.5.
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I .0'
ss9 ss4 1972 1974 1360 1964
I~~~~~~~~Ya Y
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Appendix Figure 6
Nominal Protection Rates of Rice
Consuaer Prices
Direct Total
-1g0 '  
1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1964
: _ _ _~~~Ye
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Appendix Figure 7
Nominal Protection Rates of Barley
| ~~~~~~~Consumes- Prices 
Oi.ec t Total
1 .0
1964 1966 1973 1976 196 S914
Year ,
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Appendix Figure 8
Nominal Protection Rates of Soybean
Cansueor Prices
* Direct Total
1.5+-{
| 1.0 ' ,
o@-.ot.. ._t.. 
i :964 S9S6 1972 1976 196O 1984
Year
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Appendix Figure 9
Nomimal Protection Rates of Beef
CefluapePrPc*s
Direct Total
2.0___
-. 0.
.0.as ' - -I| .J 1944 19s %972 1971 930 S194
YewrI r*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Appendix Figure 10
Nominal Protection Rates of Pork |
Consus*r Prices
Direct Total
10.5 
I -O- 
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, ~~~~~~~~Year
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Appendix Figure 11
Output Effect oF Rice
Direct Short Direct Total Short Total
-Run Cumulative -Run Cuoulatlye
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Appendix Figure 12
.Output Effect of Barley
Direct Short Direct 'otal Short Total
-RUA Cumulative -Run Cuaulatiye
_ - - a . _ 
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Appendix Figure 13
Output Effect of Soybean
Dlect Short Dtirect Total Short Total
-Run Cumulatlve -Run Ci.ua ttve
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Appendix Figure 14
Output Effect of Beef
Direct Snoet Di.eat Total Shoet Total
-Run Cumulative -Run Cumulative
1.21
i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
-02 -g _ l l
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Appendix Figure 15
Output Effect of Pork
DireCt Short Direct Total Short Total
-Run Cumulative -Run Cumulative
-1.27'
0 .4.
-0.4- !.964 1968 1972 1976 1960 1964
Year
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Appendix Figure 16
Consumption Effect of Rice
Direc t Total
1..0
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Appendix Figure 17
Corisumption Er'ect of Barley
-
0.4
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Appendix Figure 18
Consumption Effect of Soybean
Z :sret n~~~~~~~~~ota!
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Appendix Figure 19
Comsumption Efiect of Beef
totsl
I. ~ __
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Appendix Figure 20
Consumption ERfect oF Pork
Total
I~ __ _ __I.
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Appendix Figure 21
Producer Real Income Effect
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Appendix Figure 22
Producer Real Income Effect
Show -Rw a.d lua-sc a1e It sees
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Appendix Figure 23
Producer Real Income Effect
Ctw"&&latf ye ,dt U*-sC a1*Frmr
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Appendix Figure 24
Consumner RQal Income Effect
Low Inc ome Orcup
nfoect Total
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Appendix Figure 25
Consumer Real Income Effect
niddl- Incae. Group
Oirec t Total
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Appendix Figure 26
Consumer Real Income Effect
High AcOa. OGrOuP
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